# THE NEW THINKING OF FRANZ ROSENZWEIG

by

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A Dissertation presented to the General Faculty of the Claremont Graduate School in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

1968

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Aber vielleicht
haben wir
vor Irrtum Rauchende
doch ein wanderndes Weltall geschaffen
mit der Sprache des Atems

But perhaps
we
beclouded with errors
created a wandering world
with the speech of breath

-- NELLY SACHS

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TO MY WIFE, PARENTS, TEACHERS

# INTRODUCTION: "THE NEW THINKING"

## I

Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) set forth the intentions of his book, The Star of Redemption (1921),[1] in a subsequent essay, "The New Thinking" (1925).[2] The essay's purpose is to show that Rosenzweig has written neither a "Jewish book" nor a philosophy of religion, but "merely a system of philosophy".[3] Rosenzweig's philosophical reader may therefore gain access to the book through the essay; for the essay alerts the reader to Rosenzweig's philosophical system on the one hand, Rosenzweig's account of Judaism on the other, and the connections between them.

On the one hand, Rosenzweig speaks of his book as "at once a reductio ad absurdum and preservation of the old philosophy." Previous philosophy is said to have arisen in contradistinction to sound common sense or everyday beliefs, by viewing the things already known by common sense or everyday beliefs with an attitude of "philosophical wonder". Unlike common sense or everyday beliefs, it begins by asking "What is...?" concerning those things. Previous philosophy thus seeks the "essence" of some or all things. Yet in seeking the "essence," it becomes unavoidably reductionist; it tries to reduce its understanding of some or all things to the terms of one or a few things. Above all, previous philosophy tries to understand three

ultimately distinct things -- viz. God, the world, man -- in terms of one another. Thus, classical philosophy tries to understand God and man in terms of the world, medieval philosophy tries to understand man and the world in terms of God, and modern philosophy tries to understand the world and God in terms of man.[4]

But the absurdity of previous philosophy is therefore that it tries to understand what things are in terms of what they are not. Common sense or everyday beliefs may also provide answers to the question "What is...?",[5] yet the "method" of common sense is to view those answers in terms of things it "experiences" here and now -- in terms of what has happened, what is happening, what is about to happen. Previous philosophy, however, views its answers precisely in terms of things distinct from the here and now -- in terms of timeless essences. Yet in so doing, previous philosophy ignores the things experienced here and now. Rosenzweig's "new thinking", by contrast, is a return from the standpoint of "philosophical wonder" to the standpoint of common sense or everyday beliefs. It does not thereby seek to ignore what is timeless. Rather, it seeks to transform previous philosophy's "method of thinking", whose sufficient concern is timeless essences, into a new "method of speaking", whose necessary concern includes the time-bound -- what has happened, what is happening, what is about to happen.[6]

On the other hand, Rosenzweig is therefore led to a quasi-historical account of Judaism -- in terms of a "creation" which has happened, a "revelation" which continues to happen, and a "redemption" which is about to happen. Rosenzweig's account of Judaism is not intentionally "theological", in the sense in which revealed theology may be said to require a more systematic philosophical understanding, to which it therefore remains subservient. Nor is it intentionally "apologetic", in the sense in which apologetics may be said to follow from some prior traditional or dogmatic understanding of Judaism, to which apologetics in turn does not contribute. The core of Rosenzweig's account of Judaism is rather an attempt to understand, and therewith renew, a constant "revelation to Adam." Such a revelation, though experienced and expressed by traditional Judaism, nonetheless remains a constant and so timeless possibility even apart from traditional Judaism. Rosenzweig's account of Judaism is therefore neither a traditional or historical discussion of specifically "Jewish things," nor an a-traditional or a-historical philosophy of religion. Rosenzweig understands Judaism as an historical or time-bound way of experiencing what is timeless.[7]

The most obvious connection between Rosenzweig's philosophical system and his account of Judaism is thus that they are both intentionally "new". In both cases, Rosenzweig finds a new departure from the traditional understanding at once necessary and possible. In order to understand more fully

that possibility and that necessity, as Rosenzweig himself understood them, the present dissertation therefore turns to his book, The Star of Redemption.

## II

Rosenzweig's book is divided into three parts. The first part concerns Rosenzweig's questioning of previous philosophy, the second concerns the relations between philosophy and revealed theology, and the third concerns inter alia Rosenzweig's account of Judaism. Each part is further subdivided by Rosenzweig. The parts and chapters of the present dissertation follow, as closely as possible, Rosenzweig's own divisions and subdivisions.

In the first part, Rosenzweig questions previous philosophy radically, in terms of what may be said to be its underlying assumption. That assumption is the possibility of knowledge of all things from the standpoint of "Philosophical wonder", or as Rosenzweig calls it, following Hegel, knowledge of "the whole". Such knowledge is knowledge by virtue of considering each thing according to its "essence", and is knowledge of the whole by virtue of considering that "essence" as part of a totality.[8] By questioning knowledge of the whole radically, Rosenzweig however questions neither the possibility of such knowledge simply, nor the existence of such a whole simply, i.e. his questioning is neither epistemological nor ontological as such. Rather, he questions

the possibility of knowledge of the whole by showing the further possibility of everyday beliefs concerning God, the world, and man, which are not reducible to the whole (Chapter 1). He then shows that previous philosophy's attempt to know God (Chapter 2), the world (Chapter 3), and man (Chapter 4) must result, not in a knowledge of the whole, but in remote abstractions from experience.

In order to restore the possibility of a knowledge of the whole which is not remote from experience, philosophy must therefore reexamine its relationship to everyday belief (Chapter 5). The second part of Rosenzweig's book therefore turns to that form of everyday belief which is most comprehensive, or which claims to provide the fullest knowledge of God and the world and man together, as previous philosophy could not -- to religious belief. The possibility of knowledge of God and the world and man as parts of the whole would therefore seem to require an understanding of the categories of revealed theology (Chapter 6). The categories of revealed theology -- viz. creation (Chapter 7), revelation (Chapter 8), and redemption (Chapter 9) -- must therefore be shown to be open, not just to a theological, but also to a philosophical understanding.

Moreover, a philosophical understanding of the theological categories of creation, revelation, and redemption may provide the basis for a new understanding of God and the world and man as parts of the whole (Chapter 10). But the question remains whether this new understanding also provides

an adequate account of religious beliefs themselves. Part three of Rosenzweig's book therefore begins with a philosophical and theological discussion of the religious situation in general (Chapter 11), and of Judaism in particular (Chapter 12). And it concludes with a final attempt to distinguish between the new philosophical result, i.e. the new understanding of the whole, and the new theological result, i.e. the new understanding of Judaism (Chapter 13).

## III

A further word is necessary concerning the method or standpoint from which the present dissertation is written. The present approach is systematic rather than historical. Hence it distinguishes itself from other philosophic treatments of Rosenzweig's book, including those of Freund, Löwith and Guttmann. These other treatments seek to understand Rosenzweig in comparison with other philosophers, especially modern philosophers, such as Schelling, Heidegger and Hermann Cohen respectively.[9] The present study too agrees that Rosenzweig appears to have more in common with these modern philosophers and others than with, say, premodern philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle or even Maimonides. It disagrees in trying to understand Rosenzweig rather in his own terms than by comparison with others. Further, it agrees with others in seeking a basis for the understanding of Rosenzweig in his modernity as a philosopher --

though it begins implicitly with the understanding of modern philosophy as found in Hegel (with whom Rosenzweig's book has been called a "running fight"):[10]

> Study in antiquity differed from that current in modern times: it was nothing less than the thorough education of the natural consciousness ....In modern times, on the other hand, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made.... The work cut out for us now is less to purify the individual from the manner of immediacy and the senses while making it into a thinking and thought substance, than to attempt the opposite: to sublimate [or: dispense with] fixed, determinate thoughts and thus to actualize [or: realize] the general and infuse it with spirit.[11]

The present study is therefore dialectical rather than comparative, tentative rather than dogmatic, and seeks to base Rosenzweig's arguments on what a modern philosopher might call "experience", rather than on, say, what a pre-modern philosopher might call "nature".

This last distinction explains, from a systematic point of view, the use of "modern experience" throughout the present dissertation. According to a pre-modern philosopher, such as Aristotle, "nature" may be said to be the innate or underlying source or cause in all things, a source or cause moreover independent of each thing's merely accidental attritutes, and so for example independent of the accident of whether that thing is ever actually experienced or not. "Nature" thus remains a possible, though not necessarily actual, object of knowledge. On the other hand, "experience", as understood by a modern philosopher such as Rosenzweig, consists not simply of a possible object or objects of knowledge whether actually known or not, but rather of what is

actually known, in other words of the relation of objects to an actual knower or of the relation between the knower and the known. It is obvious that such an understanding of "experience" may differ from that of a pre-modern (especially pre-Kantian) philosopher, such as Aristotle, for whom "experience" remains only "knowledge of individuals", which is of little more than pre-philosophical significance. In order to call attention to that distinction systematically, we have used the expression "modern experience".[12]

# PART I: PHILOSOPHY AND THE WHOLE

# CHAPTER I: THE BEGINNING OF A NEW THINKING

## I

A new thinking, such as Rosenzweig's, is thought to be necessary only on the basis of modern experience. More precisely, its necessity is disclosed by a consideration of modern philosophy, which in its origin and significance is the most theoretical part of modern experience. Modern philosophy may be said to have arisen in explicit opposition to traditional experience and pre-modern philosophy, and even to have resolved that opposition decisively in favor of modern experience. Modern philosophy thus vindicates modern experience.[1] However this may be, modern philosophy also shares with pre-modern philosophy an assumption which on the basis of modern experience appears erroneous. On account of that assumption, modern and pre-modern philosophy alike therefore appear inadequate to modern experience. Hence a new thinking appears necessary, in order to question that very assumption: the assumption of the possibility of knowledge of the whole.[2]

Philosophy, as the love of or search for knowledge of the whole, was said in pre-modern times to be possible only by a certain disregard for or abstraction from experience. This abstraction was in turn made plausible by the thought of severing from man's body, which is mortal, an immortal soul. As a result, philosophy which aims at knowledge of

the whole must abstract above all from the experience of death. From the standpoint of man's pre-philosophical experience of death, the distinction of body and soul need not have arisen. The philosopher was however taught to welcome death as an escape from all life which is dependent on the body, and so as the way to a contemplation of the whole of which the soul alone is capable. Now it may appear that for a man to have followed philosophy's teaching would be to welcome not natural death but suicide. Only when philosophy viewed in the light of the whole man's capacity to know the whole was it able so to disregard man's pre-philosophical experience of death.[3] For just as the whole does not die, neither does man's capacity to know the whole, of which it is a part. Pre-modern philosophy may then rightly be said to have ignored the experience of death in its knowledge of the whole, or to have regarded death as something outside the whole, or to think of it as nothing.[4] And yet this "nothing" remains, if not a part of the whole, at least a presupposition without which knowledge of the whole may also be said to have been impossible. For the experience of death, though thought of as nothing, remains something -- even if only the occasion for man's search for knowledge of the whole. Or at least it is a "nothing" which remains capable of being experienced in many ways, i.e. as something manifold; but something manifold is something. From these considerations alone, the conclusion therefore seems inescapable that philosophy must have erred in its

search for knowledge of the whole whenever it thought of that something as nothing.[5]

One may follow these considerations a step further, and say that so far as a philosophical search may be found to err in its own presuppositions, its error must be recognized as radical and thoroughgoing. Otherwise, for example, philosophy as the search for knowledge of the whole may become a deceptive search. To say that philosophy may be deceptive in this way says more than that philosophy may proceed from pre-philosophical ignorance. Pre-philosophical ignorance gives rise to deception whenever man may subsequently come to regard the whole in terms of an "-ism" which overlooks what he began by ignoring; and the deception becomes thoroughgoing whenever the "-ism" which ignores the whole becomes a monism which disregards rival claims originating outside the whole, or in what was at the outset ignored. Now because what was ignored at the outset may remain a part of experience, if only in the form of common sense or everyday belief, it therefore becomes necessary, in order to avoid such deception as may afflict the search for knowledge of the whole, that philosophy begin by recognizing or confronting the claims to knowledge of everyday belief. Such a confrontation becomes all the more necessary for modern philosophy, which is thought to base itself on experience including everyday belief. Yet in order for such a confrontation to occur, it must occur in a way which at the outset compromises neither philosophy

On the one hand nor everyday belief on the other.[6]

Such a confrontation between philosophy and everyday belief was thought to be possible in two ways long before modern philosophy. Yet neither way would appear without radical compromise to the confronting parties. For either certain claims of everyday belief might be clearly distinguished from those of philosophy, in which case philosophy must acknowledge to those claims an authority inaccessible to thought.[7] But then philosophy would appear compromised in recognizing the validity of claims which are at once beyond its comprehension. Or else philosophy might simply appropriate certain claims of everyday belief as its own, in which case it need only confirm in the thought of the whole what is already present prior to such thought.[8] But then everyday belief, and especially religious faith or belief concerning the highest things, would appear compromised in being reduced to a truth alongside others. Accordingly, modern philosophy, based on modern experience, came in its effort to reduce the rival claims of everyday belief to deny the very conditions under which it need ever again confront those claims. First, in effort to preserve the integrity of philosophy against the claims of belief, modern philosophy, especially that of Hegel, turned to the thought of the whole. The thought of the whole was then said to govern both the knowable world as known by philosophy and those things known only by belief. But second, in order to preserve the integrity of belief, modern philosophy allowed itself to appropriate the claims

of belief in thought only long after they had already been present and authoritative in the world in fact. And this appropriation must occur progressively and systematically, and so constitute the history of the world spirit. Yet if followed from this twofold effort not that modern philosophy need not, but only that it could not any longer confront the claims of everyday belief -- it could then only absort them. And therefore the problem of the relationship between philosophy and everyday belief became no longer that of resolving their rival claims -- it became, as it were, to distinguish those claims once again.[9]

This new task of distinguishing between philosophy and belief was first undertaken by what is now called existentialism. But existentialism in turn found itself able to begin only by denying that philosophy must aim at knowledge of the whole. For if philosophy alone yields knowledge proper, and does so by absorbing what is merely believed into the thought of the whole, then the whole which is thought must itself be a mixture of thought and belief, of truth and half truth, of knowledge and deception. To distinguish between knowledge and deception must then require an Archimedian point outside the whole or a true belief not reducible to the whole. Thus the rival claims of philosophy and belief might once again be distinguished, but only on condition that philosophy alone could not fully grasp that distinction. For the new distinction stands or falls with philosophy's radical incompetence in

matters of belief. Nonetheless the very thought of such matters must be contradicted by a philosophy which is intent upon knowledge of the whole.[10]

II

This new questioning of the longstanding philosophical assumption of the possibility of knowledge of the whole, which emerged from the modern conflict and supposed reconciliation between philosophy and belief, becomes further intelligible only on the basis of a certain pre-philosophical consideration: a consideration about the origin and significance of philosophy itself. The consideration is required in order to make more precise the circumstance in which there arise beliefs which philosophy at once cannot grasp, yet cannot deny.

Previously everyday belief was treated by that part of philosophy which treated of man, viz. ethics. Ethics understood man in turn as a part of the whole, and so culminated in a doctrine of the community as a part of the whole. But if there are beliefs which are not reducible to the whole, then the contemplation of man as a part of the whole must give way to a new view of human life. Whether the new view is able to solve with superior wisdom the problems raised by the old is hard to say. Let it be said for the moment simply that the new view of human life must seek to supersede the dependence of the old ethics on the whole, or that the

new view as it stands vis-a-vis the old ethics should be called "meta-ethical".[11]

Yet moreover if there is to be a belief of concern to philosophy beyond the whole, or outside the knowable world, then the new understanding of the world must likewise differ from the old. For over against the whole, which claimed to be a unity, now appears something else, which may claim to be singular and irreducible to the unity of the whole. The whole itself can thus no longer be thought to be wholly alone or to be an all-inclusive unity. Previously the unity of the whole could be said to depend on the unity of the thought of the whole, and perhaps the dependence was mutual. The attack on the unity of the whole is therefore at once an attack on the unity of thought. Yet if the whole was thus dependent on the thought of the whole, and even vice versa, then the two must have been recognized to be different. How then was it possible for them to be seen as identical? The basis of their identity must have been sought in thought itself. But if so, thought too must have a determinate content, in order to be identified with a whole which is "so and not otherwise"; thought must be not a mere unity, but also a plurality; or its unity must be not one which comprehends the whole, but only a self-contained one -- like a picture on a wall, or rather, to speak of the historical succession of philosophical doctrines of the whole, like a fresco. And the forms or essences which are thought must then be, not the source or

cause of the world, but only its contents for thought, and not proved by the world, but rather preserved in it. There must then be something beyond such thought or thoughts, something not for that reason alogical, but "meta-logical".[12]

A metalogical concept of the world is thus necessitated by a meta-ethical concept of man; for if human life is something extending beyond the whole, yet exerting an influence on it, then the world itself can no longer be thought as an autonomous whole, but must be radically dependent or contingent. Yet if so God too must be beyond its limits. Previously God might be understood as a part of the whole (as for Thales, for whom the world was "full of gods"): just as man was known by his habits and the world by its forms or essences, as they were thought to be parts of the whole, so God was known by His nature. And if God Himself can no longer be a part of such a whole, He must also be independent of what was thought to be His nature. It need not follow that God utterly lacks a nature, but only that it must remain apart from His relationship to the whole. Of God Himself, His nature then remains only a trace, just as of metaethical man his habits, and of the metalogical world its forms or essences. The new quest for God's nature thus points beyond nature itself, or is "meta-physical".[13]

About God and man and the world, the new thinking must therefore remain at the outset ignorant. To accept that ignorance in terms of the new thinking, is however to accept

not that God and man and the world have yet to be known as parts of the whole, but that such knowledge of them appears in principle impossible. And yet for this very reason, the new thinking must face at the outset its own crucial dilemma.

Either as a philosophical thinking, it continues to aim at knowledge of God and the world and man so far as these may be thought to be parts of the whole. But in that case it can no longer confront the claims to knowledge of these which may be accessible only through everyday belief. For it has already discovered that philosophical inquiry into the whole necessarily abstracts from experience including everyday belief. Or perhaps, as a thinking based on modern experience, it may dispense with the thought of the whole in favor of a more direct analysis of everyday belief. But in this case, the new thinking must ignore whatever elements of modern experience may be intelligible only in the light of the whole. And by systematically ignoring the whole in this way, it would deny the very possibility of a philosophical understanding which abstracts from experience. Such is the dilemma posed by the new discovery of the independence of everyday beliefs concerning God and the world and man from the thought of the whole. To accept the old philosophical thinking is then to accept that philosophy must abstract from experience; while to deny it, is to deny that philosophy can abstract from experience.

To resolve this dilemma, the new thinking must begin by accepting the possibility that philosophy can abstract from experience. Otherwise it could not accept this possibility for previous philosophy either. It follows that the new thinking may be said to be philosophical at least so far as it may come to understand those elements of modern experience which are intelligible in the light of the whole. Such an understanding may nonetheless be limited to fragments, not to say figments, of modern experience, or be abstract or partial with regard to modern experience. And yet by being critical with regard to its own basis, the new thinking may also recognize the partiality. This recognition in turn would depend on the consideration of a radical difference between philosophical thinking on the one hand, and modern experience including everyday belief on the other. And this difference must somehow correspond to the difference between a thinking which must abstract from experience, and one which need not do so. Both kinds of thinking must then be recognized by the new thinking. The new thinking may therefore be said to base itself on modern experience, precisely so far as it aims to differentiate itself or pass from the old thinking of God and the world and man, which has been said to require thinking of pre-philosophical experience as nothing, to a new consideration of these as found in everyday belief, in which they may be experienced as something. Thus, accepting the possibility that the new thinking as a philosophical thinking

may abstract from experience, it may be characterized more simply as a passage in thought from nothing to something. For it begins by thinking of pre-philosophical experience as nothing, only to make possible its radical acceptance as something.

## III

Now even assuming that the new thinking may abstract from experience in this way, it may still be true that it is impossible to follow such a passage in thought from nothing to something with a precision appropriate to mathematics. As Aristotle says, the same sorts of precision ought not to be sought alike in all things. Yet if the consequences of the modern discovery of everyday beliefs concerning God and the world and man as something beyond the old "nothing" be made as precise as possible, can there be any better guide than mathematics? Modern mathematics, moreover, may be said to recognize the possibility of a passage from nothing to something in the concept of a differential. The differential formulates infinitesimal differences as such between two consecutive quantitative variables. In so doing, it may then be said to treat precisely of those differences which proceed from or approximate nothing. Might not the mathematical concept of the differential then be appropriated by the new thinking? If so, either the concept might be thought as indicating the possibility of a passage from nothing to some-

thing, viz. by its stating something as originating in and passing through infinitely small differences or differences approximating nothing. Or conversely, it may serve to deny explicitly that differences which approximate nothing simply amount to nothing, viz. by its equating or correlating those differences to some constant which may be indefinitely large. The possibility of a passage from nothing to something would then receive appropriate mathematical or quasi-mathematical expression in two ways: as a statement or affirmation of what is not nothing, and as a denial or negation of what is simply nothing. Whatever else the consequences of this appropriation, it becomes possible at least with the assumption that the new thinking, following previous philosophy, may abstract from experience. And whatever else the value of the resulting expressions, they would seem necessary at least for the purpose of radically re-thinking the problematic connection between the "nothing" presupposed by the old thinking about God and the world and man, and the "something" which may be known through everyday belief.[14]

## CHAPTER 2: THE METAPHYSICAL GOD

To search for God, so far as He has been thought to be a part of the whole, was discovered to be radically deceptive. For it was found to rest on the presupposition of pre-philosophical experience as nothing. To begin to remove the deception is therefore to confront its presupposition, or to begin with nothing. Yet God, or what is sought, is Himself not nothing, but something. To search for God in this way must be to pass from nothing to something. And such a passage from nothing to something has already in the interests of precision been said to be twofold, viz. an affirmation and a denial -- an affirmation of what is not nothing and a denial of nothing simply. Now it will be shown that to affirm what is not nothing in this way is possible only on condition of thinking of the whole as something infinite, i.e. something limited or determined by nothing. While to deny nothing is possible only on condition of thinking of the whole as something finite, i.e. something limited or determined by something else. The search for God which begins with nothing therefore results in a twofold whole. On the one hand, by way of affirmation there results something of which it can so far be said only that it is not nothing. Or to speak in this way of God, there results something which God may be said to be. And to search for whatever God may be said to be, is to inquire into God's essence. On the other hand, by way of

denial of nothing there results only what may be said to be opposed to nothing -- what continues in a kind of escapade with nothing or what escapes from nothing. Or, to speak of God in this way, there results whatever God may be said to do. And if to search for whatever God may be said to be, is to inquire into God's essence, then to search for whatever He may be said to do is to inquire into His activity. The search for God in the light of the whole is then a twofold inquiry into God's essence and God's activity. God's, we say, and not essence or activity as such; for both remain hypothetical, or subject to the conditions underlying the new thinking about God, a thinking which begins by making more precise the deceptiveness of the old.[15]

The search for God in the light of the whole cannot properly begin with a denial; for such a denial at the beginning can only be a denial of nothing, whereas to deny nothing is already to have affirmed something. In the beginning is then an affirmation. Nor can this affirmation be an affirmation simply of nothing; otherwise "nothing" is presupposed as a result, yet what is affirmed at the beginning must be no presupposition in the sense of a previous result, but merely a starting-point for knowledge of the whole or an awareness of previous ignorance of the whole. In the beginning is then an affirmation not of nothing, but rather of ignorance of God, which is not nothing. To affirm what is not nothing, is however not yet to affirm something. It is not

yet independent of nothing, and so remains, if not identical with, at least determined by, nothing. Or rather, to affirm what is not nothing, is at once a determinate or finite and an indeterminate or infinite affirmation. It is infinite because, as determined by nothing, it is an affirmation simply. Yet it is also finite because, though in part identical with nothing, it remains a simple affirmation incapable of affirming nothing, and so in part incapable of affirming itself. Its determination is therefore a self-imposed determination. God's infinite essence may thus be expressed abstractly as an infinite self-determination. This concept of an infinite self-determination, whose archetype is God's essence, may also be expressed in ordinary human speech. Its expression is however not complete sentences, not even parts or symbols of sentences. It is expressed only in speech which accompanies sentences or in the speechful confirmation of speech. It may be expressed variously as "so" or "sic" or "amen" -- as a particle of speech. Such simple affirmation may nonetheless be symbolized mathematically in its relation to complete sentences. Suppose a complete sentence to be symbolized by "y=x": where "y=" symbolizes the relation of subject to predicate, or determination in respect of a condition about to be imposed; and where "=x" symbolizes the relation of predicate to subject, or determination in respect of a condition already imposed. Bare x or y would then symbolize no relation at all within a sentence, or would symbolize a relation to nothing at all beyond itself.

Such a relation to nothing beyond itself corresponds precisely to the concept of God's essence. God'sessence may therefore be symbolized by an instance of x or y, by **A**. Yet God's essence must then be symbolized by A only, and not by B or C: for while infinitely self-determined, it is self-determined only, and hence related to, or distinguished from, nothing beyond itself.[16]

The search for God by way of simple affirmation has resulted in an infinitely self-determined essence -- a thought of something determined or moved by nothing beyond itself, something impassive. One is then led simply to affirm this impasse, i.e. the impossibility of moving beyond that thought. Such a movement would require instead a denial. And this denial, if it is to presuppose nothing, and nothing other than nothing, must be just as simple as the previous affirmation. It must be simply a denial of nothing. To deny nothing is however no longer to remain with nothing. It is already to affirm something -- even though no affirmation as such is pre-supposed. The thought of a simple denial is thus self-contradictory, or in conflict with itself. Nothing is said to be denied, yet in being denied, nothing is recognized as something or is affirmed. Denial of nothing thus gives rise to the thought of something other than nothing. The search for God by way of simple denial then becomes possible only if there is something other to be denied, something moreover recognizable in the very act of denial. This divining of God by way of denial or this divine denial does not therefore

result in an essence of God as did divine affirmation. God is divined not as "so", but only as "not otherwise". He is then thought as constantly opposed to something other or as the utter denial of everything other than itself, as divine freedom. As a form of denial, divine freedom is thus determined only in respect of a condition about to be imposed. In ordinary human speech, divine freedom is accordingly expressed only as the subject of a sentence, as y=. Yet as a denial which constantly imposes upon itself the requirement of something other, or as an infinitely self-determined relation to another, divine freedom resembles what has already been affirmed to be God's essence. Divine freedom would then take the form A=. And such freedom may be said to reveal itself constantly in opposition to God's essence. Yet it is not for that reason identical with God's essence, and so not God's freedom simply, but only divine freedom, freedom in and in reference to God.[17]

Divine freedom, like God's essence, is accordingly both finite and infinite. Divine freedom is finite, because it is necessarily opposed to God's essence, which is infinite. But it is also infinite, because it establishes its very identity by that opposition, i.e. by its relation to the infinite. This, its requiring God's essence in order to be what it is, makes itself known as infinite activity or power or caprice. God's essence in turn does not however require that caprice. It remains what it is apart from all other. This remaining apart from all other, even in face of the

attempt of divine freedom to identify itself with all other, constitutes divine constraint or necessity or fate. Together, divine freedom which seeks to identify itself with all other in the form of caprice, and God's essence which flees that identity in the form of fate, become known as the vitality of God or the gods. Of the concept of such vitality there are indeed traces in ordinary human speech. And these traces too become known only in the conjunction of simple affirmation and simple denial, of what is "so" and "not otherwise". Traces of the concept of God's vitality then arise in ordinary human speech only through complete sentences. For simple affirmation and simple denial have no meaning together apart from sentences, or apart from each new instance of joint affirmation and denial, which may isolate and agglutinate and inflect speech in ever new ways. This thought of God's vitality as the conjunction of simple affirmation and simple denial, of what is "so and not otherwise", coincides with the conjunction of the two previous results of the new search for God. It may therefore be symbolized as the conjunction of the two previous symbols, as A=A. Such a symbol then properly abstracts from the process by which it was arrived at in thought, in order to express the concept of the self-sustaining life of the divine, the concept of God's lively dependence on or need of nothing beyond Himself, of His autonomous vitality.[18]

The gods of Greek antiquity may in this way be spoken of as living. By this is meant, however, that they are

immortal, rather than living. For they are remote from death. They do not confront death, much less govern it. Hence they do not govern human life, though they may intervene in it. They may be affirmed to be living gods, but not gods of the living. Their world remains a world unto itself, even when it is said to include the whole world; for the included world is by contrast not a world unto itself, a world with which the gods must enter into definite relation, but is simply included in the other world. These gods must then be strictly speaking without a world or, conversely, the view of the world which divines these gods, divines also a world without gods. These gods are mythical. A mythical life knows nothing beyond itself, and hence governs nothing beyond itself. It is governed rather by the inner harmony of caprice and fate. Thus the free-flowing passion of the gods is stemmed by the dark commands of their inner nature. Their traits may be said to arise exclusively in an alternation of hates and loves which to modern experience appear groundless and arbitrary. And their acts are met or overturned by a blind necessity which to modern experience appears implacable and so intolerable. To modern experience, what is included in myth seems to exclude the real world, and its insights seem blind to whatever is the reality of the divine.[19]

The mythical therefore survives in modern experience only outside its original ralm -- in the realm of art. Like ancient myth, art, according to modern aesthetic experience, must be

recognized to be something exclusively in itself, without regard to what lies outside itself. Modern aesthetic experience thus judges art exclusively by the concept of beauty, as a concept of something excluded from everything else; and this element of exclusiveness may be said to have its basis in the ancient experience of myth.[20]

But the living God or gods of myth remain blind to human life in the world according to modern experience or view that life as nothing. The search for God which began with nothing has thus resulted in a new nothing. And this new result likewise demands a new beginning. For the God of myth became known precisely on account of a radical blindness to or ignorance of the modern experience of the world and man. And having exposed this ignorance, the new thinking seeks to overcome it. Such ignorance cannot however be overcome by continuing to deny the autonomy of the worldly or the human in face of the divine, or by reducing them to aspects of what is simply divined. The God of myth rather remains for modern experience essentially what he is, viz. by nature beyond the world and man: the meta-physical God.[21]

## CHAPTER 3: THE METALOGICAL WORLD

The world like God and man may be supposed in a certain way self-evident to common sense or everyday belief. Only philosophical reflection may come to overlook that self-evidence, in order to understand the world in thought. Whenever the self-evidence of the world is thus denied or reduced to nothing, what results may be called a "negative cosmology". Yet as what begins with nothing has already been shown to result in nothing, so too a negative cosmology may come to affirm that we can know nothing of the world. In the light of everyday belief such an affirmation becomes evidently absurd. And modern experience may then call for a radical denial or new beginning of cosmology in the light of everyday belief. A new beginning may however be made only when it is realized that, if we think to know nothing of the world, that "nothing" belongs to our knowledge rather then the world. That "nothing" must be hypothetical, since we begin to think of the world as nothing, or as nothing self-evident, only in order to know something of what we already believe about it. And we are then freed from our belief in the world only hypothetically, since our belief remains the beginning of the knowledge we seek. Thus, when our search for knowledge of the world results in nothing, it becomes necessary to re-examine the connection between the thought of nothing and our belief in something. To think of the world as nothing may then be found to presuppose

our thinking of the world as a universal whole, over against which stands a universal thought which may take the form of doubt of the whole, or absolute doubt. To deny absolute doubt as the necessary result of a modern understanding of the world therefore leads to a denial of the old philosophical presupposition of the whole. And absolute doubt must accordingly remain absolutely hypothetical, or a mere means to understanding which presupposes something positive.[22]

The new thinking about the world therefore begins with something positive, or begins not with a doubt or denial but with an affirmation. And unlike the simple affirmation of God, this affirmation of the world must affirm something infinite in two senses. To affirm God may be said to be infinite only in the sense that any affirmation of what is not nothing must be infinite, or determined by nothing. But to affirm the world, in contrast to a God Who remains "beyond", is also to affirm what is evident everywhere and always, hence what is -- to say the least -- determined by something. And because what is everywhere and always is evident only to thought, to affirm the world is therefore to affirm what is determined by thought. Thus the world cannot be affirmed simply as something self-determining, as God's essence; otherwise thought would remain determined by nothing other than itself, or could never truly affirm something everywhere and always beyond itself. Rather, thought which is determined by something beyond itself is no longer "pure"

thought: it becomes "useful", or determined wholly by some need or lack in the world. This presence of thought in the world as nothing but its usefulness, though as useful everywhere and always, is expressed by the concept of universality. The concept of universality finds expression in ordinary human speech through predicates of sentences. For speech may strive to establish what is "so", and to confirm it once and for all, by predication; and thus, for example, the predicate "free" considered by itself independently of its single uses must have a universal sense. Still universality, as the capacity of speech to predicate, expresses only the usefulness of thought in the world, and not how it is actually used. This universality of thought is then symbolized in human speech only as something determined by or subjected to something else, in the form of =x. As something universal, whose validity extends everywhere and always, thought in the world is like God's infinitely self-determined essence, and so symbolized by A. While as something merely useful, which is necessarily related to something else, it must also receive the sign of relation or equation. Thought in the world is thus symbolized by =A.[23]

Yet the world is not only what is thought, but evidently something else too. In contrast to the universality of what is thought to be everywhere and always, there is also the visible abundance of what comes to be and perishes. And to common sense, what is visible is just as much in the world as what is thought. Philosophy must therefore seek the

origin of both in something beyond both, or in nothing in the world. However this may be, what is visible must originate otherwise than what is thought. Thought may be said to originate in the world as an affirmation of what is not nothing, hence as an affirmation of what is visible in the world. But what is visible is seen to originate in renewed procreation and bearing, in the coming to be in the world of what has never and nowhere been, hence in a denial of nothing. Over against the affirmation of universal order in the world is thus seen to arise something else, something particular. The universal has been said to be dependent on the useful, and so may be affirmed only on condition of a lack in the world to be fulfilled. But from the standpoint of the particular, any such lack in the world must be denied. Each particular is indeed particular with respect to something else; yet this respect it does not show. It shows itself to be not otherwise than it is at the moment. It remains, so to speak, blind from birth to its own particularity. It must therefore be symbolized, in contrast to what has already been symbolized, as bare particularity, with no sign to indicate dependence on a likeness to another: as B.[24]

The new thinking therefore comes to view the world as a radical conjunction of universal order and visible activity. The latter may take the form of like-like appearances, which may even include the appearance of life, though in a way not yet apparent to living things themselves. And the former

may take the form of useful thoughts, which may also include the thought of usefulness, yet in such a way that living things in the world do not apparently find thought useful. Life in the world does not then appear used to thought, and vice versa. But it does not follow that the world must be a chaotic "given" which is ordered ab extra by the simple imposition of thought. For on the one hand, the visible particular is not given in the sense of something simply affirmed to precede the imposition of universals. Rather, if at all, its being given must be thought as a constantly renewed activity, or a coming to be thought. It is then something "bestowed" or disposed to thought.

No on the other hand can the universal be thought as spontaneously imposed on the world from without. But, as something unchanging which is always and everywhere as it was and is to be, it must already be present in the world or cannot be what it is outside the world. Thought does not therefore create or produce the world, but must inhabit it. Or rather, it animates the world from within only so far as life in the world becomes in turn thoughtful. This meeting of universal and particular as exemplified by the meeting of life and thinking awareness in the world becomes known through the concepts of "individual" and "kind". Individual and kind alike originate not so much in the directionless activity of the particular, as in the requirement of the universal that it be used. The universal demands the

the particular as its instance -- a demand which cannot be said to be mutual, since the particular has already been said to acknowledge no relationship to anything else. The particular must then be attracted towards the universal blindly. Yet once incluenced by it, the particular is no longer wholly blind, but reflects that influence in its activity: it becomes an "individual" particular.

In the individual the influence of the universal compared with the particular still remains quite minimal. Were that influence to increase, the particular would soon fall under its decisive sway. The particular need not then lose all trace in the light of the universal: it may equally remain a "kind" of particular or, in other words, a particular kind of universal. Individual and kind are thus both expressions of the tension between universal and particular in the world. Kinds are thought to be universal only by an abstraction from the particulars which they include; and similarly individuals are thought to be particular only by a disregard for the universals of which they are instances. The tension between particular and universal may be said to find its highest expression in the animal world in the cycle which begins in each birth of a particular individual, who becomes increasingly formed and habituated in the ways of the kind, and to culminate in a particular act of generation which results in the birth of a new individual. This cycle of individual and kind is therefore symbolized as the con-

junction of what was previously symbolized about the world: as B≡A. Thus the particular, previously symbolized by B, is now shown to be subject to the determination about to be imposed by the universal, previously symbolized by ≡A, while the universal in turn is now symbolized as no longer free of particular determination, but necessarily subjected to it.[25]

This view of the world as figured by individuals which come to be thought as kinds may be called the "plastic" or "figured" world. This figured world figures in modern experience above all in the legacy of ancient cosmology, including its teachings about the microcosm, as well as about the macrocosm. Concerning both the macrocosm and the microcosm ancient cosmology taught that individuals "imitate" kinds, or that they tend towards a universal "purpose". The ancients themselves, however, recognized an incompleteness in the doctrine of the macrocosm. For notwithstanding that individual things are ultimately to be known by the thought of kinds which are distinct from them, the connection between thought and thing remains a problem. Nonetheless the most systematic attempt of antiquity to solve this problem leads away from the connection between thought and things in the world, to a divine "thinking of thinking" which thinks only the "best", i.e. itself. And while the thought of divine purpose might be expected to complete the explanation or causes of things in the world, ancient cosmology appears rather to remain silent on the precise relation between

divine thought and the worldly activity of individuals.[26]

This silence may be said to continue in the account of the microcosm or political community as a whole, as purposeful and intelligible wholly apart from its individual members. The ancients were then able to understand the individual man most completely in his relation to the political community. The doctrine of the political community as an intelligible whole may however seem inadequate to the possibilities which the modern state contributes to the freedom of the individual in his capacity as a private person -- short of the ancient understanding of the virtual collapse of public order in the face of individual license. While the doctrine of the political community as a purposeful whole would appear to overlook the full consequences which confront the modern individual in the organized state -- especially of the modern individual's possible absorption and corruption in the state's machinery.[27]

Consequently modern experience may leave further consideration of the doctrines of the microcosm and the macrocosm. Instead it may seek an antidote to them in the teachings of the ancient sophists. Yet whole the sophists proclaimed the free mastery of man over all things and all orders or made man the measure of all things, they remained quite indifferent as to how and by whom and with what rule all things are to be measured. And this indifference makes sophistic teaching no less incapable of solving the fundamental problems posed by ancient cosmology, than appear

the ancient philosophical teaching of divine purpose in the macrocosm and the microcosm towards solving the philosophical problems posed by modern experience as such.[28]

The figured world, as the unresolved interdependence of individual and kind or of part and whole, rather comes to correspond in a second way to modern aesthetic experience. For to judge a work of art by modern standards of beauty requires not only the concept of its exclusiveness, but also the concept of its being exclusively figured or formed from within or self-enclosed. Thus according to modern aesthetic experience, the work of art is a thoroughgoing unity of its parts which may even defy logical analysis, a figured or figurative whole. This element of the figurative -- together with that of the mythical, as something excluded from something else -- may then be said to be the basis of the modern experience of the single work of art as an exclusive whole of its parts, as a beautiful figure.[29]

Yet the figured world or the ancient teaching about the macrocosm and the microcosm does not itself acknowledge a correspondence with modern experience as such. One may say that it remains deaf and blind to such correspondence. Ancient cosmology, in terms of its own self-understanding, likewise requires no God as He may be known outside the concept of the macrocosm in order to cast light on its teachings. Nor does it require a man who may reflect experiences beyond the understanding of the microcosm to bespeak those experiences

in the face of its teachings. Ancient cosmology remains in this way sufficient or complete in itself. The world as may be otherwise presented to modern experience remains beyond it: a metalogical world.[30]

## CHAPTER 4: THE METAETHICAL MAN

As for man -- in contrast to God and the world, of which we so far know nothing -- he may be thought to be the most self-evident of parts of the whole. For the knowledge of man has been said to be a kind of self-knowledge. Yet modern philosophy has come to deny that man can know himself as such: man cannot be known save in connection with activities which give rise to his knowledge, hence by the fruits of those activities, not by himself. What results from this denial may be called a "negative psychology" or a psychology without soul. Modern philosphy thus comes to think of the soul as nothing. But this "nothing" too may become the starting-point of a new thinking about man. For it ale indicates something, namely the result of modern philosophical attempts to demonstrate man. Hence it may be said to be a radical expression of the modern ignorance of man. A new thinking about man on the basis of modern experience must accordingly begin by exposing that ignorance in the light of the whole.[31]

Ignorance of man must then be affirmed to be the beginning of a new thinking about man, or rather the beginning of a beginning. For not only must the new thinking begin by affirming its ignorance of man, but that ignorance must also be acknowledged to result from man's own affirmation of himself. Its ignorance of man must thus be affirmed in a way which contrasts with the affirmation of God and the world.

Whereas God was affirmed simply as immortal and unconditioned, and the world as necessary and universal, man must be thought in a way opposed to these -- as transitory and particular.

He is particular, since he is neither wholly beyond the universality and necessity of knowledge, nor wholly identical with it, but surrounded and circumscribed by it. Yet he is transitory, since he is then not only absorbed or contained in knowledge, but also removed or alienated from it. He remains singularly apart from the attempt to know himself as universal and necessary, or remains something peculiar. This peculiarity, which occurs in the form of man's resilience to thought, may be expressed by the concept of character. Character must then be distinguished from individuality. Individuality has already been said to stand or fall by a differentiation from other individualities, as a particular or indivisible part of a universal whole: individuality thus requires a denial of something else. Character, on the other hand, depends on the affirmation of something apart from anything else, or on the affirmation, not of nothing, but of what is not nothing -- only of something transitory and particular.

Character, unlike individuality, is thus expressed in what is transitory and particular in human speech, i.e. is not expressed in complete sentences. Yet as particular, it must be expressed otherwise than as the particle, which is the unconditional confirmation of speech by speech: it is therefore symbolized not by A, but by B. While as transitory, it must

also be expressed otherwise than as the subject or predicate of a sentence, but stands in relation to no determination imposed or about to be imposed by speech: its symbol must therefore show no sign of relation. Man's particular and transitory character is thus symbolized by B.[32]

Of man's character as such, we know nothing else than that it affirms itself apart from all else. Were it identical with a part of the world, its particularity must be denied to be anything other than an aspect of what comes to be and perishes in the world. While were it even in part identical with the divine, its transitoriness must be denied to be anything other than the capriciousness of divine freedom. But on the one hand, divine freedom, while a freedom on account of its being something transitory, as opposed to something impassive, is divine on account of its being thought as unconditioned. The transitoriness of human character must then be thought in this way opposed to divine freedom or as something inherently conditioned. Character or man's resilience vis-a-vis thought thus gives rise, not to divine freedom or freedom to act, but to human freedom or freedom to will. On the other hand, however, what comes to be and perishes in the world is, like human freedom, particular over against something universal; though, unlike human freedom, it remains part of the world because it is attracted blindly to the universal or because it lacks inherent direction. The particularity of human freedom, in contrast, must be thought

as an inherently directed freedom. Human freedom to will, or free will, thus establishes itself on the basis of character as opposed to divine freedom on the one hand and to worldly appearance on the other, as a denial of the exhaustiveness or all-inclusiveness of both. Like worldly appearance in all save its having direction, human free will is therefore symbolized in the first instance as a particular, and so as B. Yet like divine freedom in all save its being conditioned, it is symbolized too as the subject of a sentence, and therefore as B=.[33]

But man himself must be said to be more than a free will which opposes itself necessarily to both divine freedom and worldly appearance, and likewise more than a peculiarity which consists in his sheer resilience to thought. For sheer resilience would blind a man alike to the world and the divine, to which however he must continue to oppose himself. While this very opposition to them is unthinkable simply as freely directed, but must suffer some containment or resistance in turn. Free will must be, in other words, at once directed from within and resisted from without. As directed from within, its object can be none other than itself, or its freedom must be identical in form with divine freedom. Free will too then becomes arbitrary or capricious. Yet as resisted from without, its caprice inevitably becomes thwarted. This thwarting of caprice from without need not at first find full expression within free will itself, for

free will may continue to will capriciously despite its being thwarted.

But free will then becomes spiteful will or spite. As spite, it continues to impose its will, not strictly in opposition to external objects, but rather in disregard of them. Now this peculiar disregard for anything else has already been called character. A spiteful character however wills its peculiar object in a spiteful way, or wills itself alone despite its peculiarity. Spite then spites character. This encroachment upon character, which peculiarly disregards any object outside itself, by a free will which wills itself alone as an object despite all peculiarity, constitutes self-awareness or, in a word, the self. Because the self is thus a conjunction of spite and character, it is utterly self-enclosed. Were it instead a conjunction of spite and individuality, it must first differentiate itself from all other individuals of its kind, as has been said; but then it could no longer be a self-enclosed self, but becomes what may be called a personality. Personality is thus expressed in ordinary human speech as the result of a man's willing participation in or imitation of kinds of activities despite his own peculiarity, hence as the assertion that something peculiar has nonetheless a kind of object: personality is therefore symbolized as B=A. The self, in contrast, does not express itself as the result of something imitated, but as inimitable, and hence as the assertion that something peculiar has as its object nothing other than itself: the self is symbolized as B=B.

According to our symbolic language, the self or B=B is thus immediately alike in form to the divine or A=A in its being self-enclosed. Yet the self and the divine are evidently opposed in content, in that the latter is inherently unconditioned or infinite, whereas the former must remain inhereently conditioned or finite. The likeness of the self to the divine is therefore possible only by a certain disregard for the relation of the self to the world. And this last possibility is rooted in the radical difference between character and individuality, of which we have already spoken. Inherent in the self is thus the radical alternative of retaining its stability in character despite the world as B=B, or else of losing itself in the world as B=A. The meaning of this alternative becomes clear when we consider the one phenomenon of human life for which, above all, the concepts of individuality and personality remain inadequate, but which must give way to those of character and self: this is the phenomenon of senility.

Senility is unintelligible in terms of what we have already referred to as the cycle of individual and kind. For the senile person stands outside the circle of growth and productivity. A person becomes senile only with the awareness of himself as removed to a stage of life where these otherwise universal activities remain for him unknown, but where he knows only the stability of his own character or becomes a solitary self. To the solitary self facing death, the circumstances

governing individuals and kinds remain a mere backdrop, to which he need no longer look or listen or speak.[34]

The solitary self came upon the scene long before modern experience, in the role of the tragic hero of ancient drama. The tragic hero is heroic because he personifies that human possibility which verges on the divine. His heroism is enacted in a conflict which arises from worldly eros or love, yet sets him apart from the ways of the world. And this very estrangement from the world makes possible a sublime confrontation with what is only divined and never wholly articulated, with thanatos or death.

Despite this, the hero is tragic because he buries himself in that inarticulateness; he suffers tragically through his inability to speak but only to bespeak what confronts him. Tragic speech thus requires a kind of silence. Precisely through this tragic silence in the face of both the worldly and the divine, the weakness as well as the strength of the tragic hero is dramatized. On the one hand, the hero must in his speech remain silent or aloof to the ways of the world; otherwise he forfeits his heroic character. But as a self which thus ignores the world, the tragic hero suffers, in spite of his character, something owing its existence to a particular activity in the world.

On the other hand, the tragic hero must also remain silent or ignorant in face of the riddlesome powers of the gods. Were he to solve their riddles, he would thereby mitigate his own suffering and so mar the tragedy. Hence not

the hero himself, but only the dramatic poet, can ever speak within a full understanding of the tragic situation. But tragedy therefore requires more than the troubled equilibrium of things in which the hero must act: it also requires a dramatic fable. And the decline of the hero is then above all a dramatic necessity which makes possible the most fabulous heroism, i.e. the most perfect solitude of the self. Accordingly, the tragic hero desires solitude or silence even before death: for death, far from daunting his heroism, merely bars forever his possible return to the ways of the world; while solitude, though far from mitigating his suffering, becomes the way which satisfies his highest desire.

So finally the tragic hero must be said to desire an undying solitude or a speechless immortality. Such immortality can only be understood by recalling ancient psychology, which tried to discover this human possibility theoretically in the form of a part of the whole -- in a permanent human capacity, or rather an incapacity to die, called the soul. Yet to modern experience, this doctrine of the soul as a self, or as the natural bearer of immortality in the world despite particulars which come to be and perish, likewise suffers from an intolerable silence towards the world, to say nothing of the divine; for such a soul desires immortality alone in the knowledge of itself in relation to what does not change, though it must nonetheless pass untiringly through bodies or figures in the world which thwart that desire. But thereby the knowledge of its own situation in the world becomes a knowledge

only in name, while in truth its situation in the world remains for itself nothing knowable.[35]

The tragic self therefore survives in modern experience alongside the mythical God and the figurative world -- as an element of aesthetic experience. Just as the element of the mythical underlies the modern experience of art as something exclusive, and as the element of the figurative underlies the modern experience of the single work of art as something self-enclosed or self-explanatory, so too the element of the tragic underlies the modern experience of aesthetic value. Now because art is thought to be something exclusive, it follows that aesthetic value must be understood as something apart from the intentions of the artist. And because art is thought to be something self-explanatory, it follows also that aesthetic value must be understood as something presented alike to all men, though accessible to each according to his own standpoint. It follows therefore that aesthetic value must be something immediately recognizable in the work of art alone, apart from the world, or need only be exposed and not explained in order to be grasped. Aesthetic value is thus realized wholly through the self's turning away from or silence towards the world. Just as the tragic hero may be said to bespeak that silence in his tragic situation, in order to arouse fear and pity in his beholders, so too each beholder may be said to arouse within himself a similar silence, in order then to appropriate what is fearful and pitiful in that same situation. Appropriation of aesthetic value then rests

on a similar silence or a mute agreement of contemplator and contemplated, an agreement made possible by the common structure of the self. However, common agreement among selves is not yet a community of selves. The life which is aroused within each contemplator does not thereby arouse to life the contemplated. Rather, the world which each self perceives in silence is only perceived momentarily -- a momentary appearance of the self, not the world of living souls.[36]

The community of living men must in contrast be more then a unity of selves which remain deaf and blind and mute to the world. They must relate to something else in the world. And yet for the self to relate at all to something else, is precisely for him to realize it as part of himself. Hence the self must finally ignore whatever in the world remains other than himself, or indeed know nothing of it. And conversely the self becomes known only in company with his own activities in the world, or as nothing beyond his own habits: a metaethical self.[37]

## CHAPTER 5: A NEW BEGINNING

The new thinking began with the modern discovery that previous philosophy, which claims to be the love of or search for knowledge of the whole, requires the philosopher's thinking of pre-philosophical experience as nothing. Previous philosophy must therefore result in a disregard for or abstraction from commonsense or everyday belief, in a way which contradicts the claim of modern philosophy to base itself on experience. To resolve this contradiction, the new thinking, which opts in favor of modern philosophy, came to question the very possibility of knowledge of the whole.

On the one hand, it did so by supposing the possibility of everyday beliefs concerning God and the world and man which are not reducible to the whole. To inquire into knowledge of these in the light of the whole must then result, not in the whole of which previous philosophers have spoken, but only in three fragmentary elements of modern experience. These we have called "the mythical God", "the figured world", and "the tragic self". Yet despite its efforts at precision, the new thinking cannot be said to know these elements univocally. For though it may come to locate each element provisionally in modern aesthetic experience, nonetheless each remains hypothetical or thought under certain conditions not thereby wholly explicit. The question to which the new thinking inevitably gives rise is then: can it consistently validate its original hypothesis, by showing more completely the con-

ditions under which these elements may be experienced?

On the other hand, any answer to this question must be radically qualified by the original discovery of the new thinking, viz. that previous philosophy, and perhaps philosophy as such, must abstract from experience. By assuming that philosophy can abstract from experience, the new thinking itself began -- following a consideration of the modern mathematical differences which proceed from or approximate nothing -- with a consideration of the possibility of inquiring about God and the world and man by presupposing nothing. And by assuming that philosophy must abstract from experience, it resulted in the three concepts mentioned above, for which modern experience may be said to be something remote or "beyond". For this reason, the resulting concepts were also called metaphysical, metalogical, and metaethical. Yet the difficulty with these concepts is not that they are abstractions, but that they are abstractions which claim insight into the whole. It is this insight into the whole which proves inadequate to modern experience. And yet it is this same insight by which previous philosophy, and perhaps philosophy as such, has been said to stand or fall.[38]

The new thinking must therefore come to terms with the possibility of a radical crisis in philosophical inquiry as such. For on the one hand, philosophy would seem required to retain the assumption of the possibility of knowledge of the whole. Otherwise, as we have said, it must ignore elements

of modern experience which may be intelligible only in the light of the whole. Yet on the other hand, philosophy cannot simply retain that assumption. For it has been shown to abstract from what may be its most important access to modern experience -- from common sense or everyday belief. But what if it were possible to gain access to the whole, and hence to modern experience, precisely through everyday belief? This is a possibility at which we have so far barely hinted. And if we may in passing do no more than hint at this possibility, we may also recall that previous philosophy too was far from indifferent to everyday belief. However, to say nothing of other considerations, it would seem premature to recall previous philosophy's relationship to everyday belief prior to an adequate consideration of that belief. The new thinking must then make a new beginning by turning to a consideration of everyday belief.

# PART II: PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

## CHAPTER 6: THE PROBLEM OF MIRACLES

Modern experience compelled Rosenzweig to begin his new thinking by questioning a longstanding philosophical assumption, the assumption of the possibility of knowledge of the whole. That assumption appeared to require, and yet to preclude, a modern philosophical confrontation with everyday belief. A confrontation was required, otherwise philosophical reflection must ignore that part of experience constituted by belief. And without such a confrontation, it could no longer result in a knowledge of the whole, but only in elements of thought or remote abstractions. Nonetheless such a confrontation was precluded. For to recognize everyday belief was at once to absorb it into knowledge of the whole; therefore the result would be no longer knowledge simply, but knowledge permeated with belief. Yet what if knowledge of the whole were possible precisely through everyday belief? Far from suggesting the denial of the possibility of knowledge of the whole, the new thinking must then reaffirm that possibility in a radically new way. Belief itself must be reconsidered in the most comprehensive manner. To this end it would not suffice merely to consider beliefs accidental to each individual: such a consideration might for example preclude beliefs whose source can only be said to be communities of men. Nor however would it suffice to consider all beliefs accessible to men as men, even in communities: these may

exclude beliefs whose source cannot be said to lie within the world and man alone. It would be necessary to consider that form of belief which may include the most comprehensive awareness of not only the world and man, but also God. The new thinking must turn to religious belief.

A modern understanding of religious belief is however impeded no less by the modern prejudice that religious belief falsifies present experience. Present experience, one may say, is what is here and now, whereas religious belief subjects the here and now to what is beyond and heretofore and hereafter. Religious belief assumes the possibility of miracles. For Judaism and Christianity, at any rate, the miracle of miracles is that a God Who lives apart from the world reveals Himself to man, that He does so as the creator of the world in which man lives, and that as such He continues to care about and for man's activity in the world. But modern man is apt to deny such miracles in the name of modern experience.[1]

Miracles might be thought rendered impossible by the concept of nature, or of a self-sustaining order in the world. But the concept of such an order, far from destroying the possibility of miracles, is its necessary presupposition. Miracles must rather be thought impossible in a world which is enchanted: one need only consider the Bible's prohibition of Sorcery (Deuteronomy 18:10 et seq.). The possibility of miracles, on the contrary, cannot be confined to possible exceptions in the course of events in the world; otherwise

the question remains unanswered how the very exceptions might be experienced as ordained in the world. The experience of miracles would rather seem to require the experience of what predicts or prophesies the course of events: the experience of miracles must therefore be the experience of some sign that the future has been previewed. The possibility of such a sign is in no way impaired by the concept of order in the world. It is also true that from the fact that the world is ordered, to say nothing of whether that order might be part of the very meaning of miracle, it does not follow that the course of any given event is established, or that all events are ordered thus and so. The denial of miracles must therefore confront not the general possibility of miracles, but their particular reality or credibility. A given course of events must be said to lack any miraculous sign. In other words, one must recognize the need to prove in every single instance that a miracle has in fact occurred. For this purpose, circumstantial evidence would seem the weakest or least credible proof; circumstantial evidence here must mean evidence of both prophecy and fulfilment, i.e. evidence not only of expectation of a miraculous sign, but also of the sign itself which fulfils this expectation; yet such evidence is available only to eye-witnesses who would be present during the moments of prophecy and sign, and to whom both prophecy and sign were already addressed. More credible might then be the sworn witness, who swears by the authority of a tradition which vouchsafes miracles; yet his sworn declaration

might well simply carry on a tradition which, whether known or unknown to himself or his hearers, could be false. The strongest or limiting case for the credibility of miracles is provided only by the blood witness, who, in contradistinction to the mere eye-witness and sworn witness, would continue to testify to miracles even in the face of the sore question, the question of martyrdom. The sworn witness and the blood witness are nonetheless identical in the decisive respect: both, in contradistinction to the eye-witness, share an appeal to the authority of a tradition which vouchsafes miracles. The strongest denial of miracles is therefore the denial of the legitimacy of the appeal to the authority of tradition.[2]

Only the denial of the very authority of tradition in matters of tradition opens the way to a denial of the possibility of miracles. This denial, which is not answerable on the basis of tradition alone, makes possible a new and non-traditional reinterpretation of the traditional acceptance of miracles. In other words, it lays the ground for the modern historical criticism of traditional revealed religion, and with it the need for a modern revealed theology.[3]

Historical criticism challenges in principle not only the mediate source of authority in traditional revealed religion, viz., in Christianity the visible church and in Judaism the oral law. It also challenges the immediate source, viz. Scripture itself. Whether these authorities as such or alone are necessary to religious belief may well be doubted:

thus, for example, did Christian pietistic and Jewish hasidic mysticism following the seventeenth century. But if so, there remains the problem of reckoning with the disjecta membra of tradition, in order to restore the integrity of tradition. This reckoning may be thought satisfied by the concept of progress. According to the concept of progress, i.e. of the necessary superiority of the present to the past, the past is to be abandoned as the final source of authority, in favor of present experience. At the same time, present experience is to be sustained by the belief in the necessity of man's future moral perfection, consequent upon the liberation of the human will from the authority of the past. But the new concept of progress leaves undecided the old question whether a revealed religion can really ignore miracles. The concept of progress requires a historical theology. Whereas the concept of progress leaves tradition free to be reinterpreted, a historical theology must take on the burden of actually reinterpreting it. And the standards of interpretation must remain those of the present; otherwise the present awareness of the past might, once again, endanger the possibility of a revealed religion to which present experience alone may testify. On the basis of the concept of progress, historical theology must therefore construct a concept of historical development, which elevates itself above whatever in the past isinessential to belief in the present. Historical development thus effects a radical separation of present experience from

the past. Yet because the separation is based on the primacy of present hope in a better future, it must succeed in more than simply reworking tradition. It must succeed no less in overlooking all past miracles in favor of present and perhaps future ones, or, theologically speaking, in overlooking the miracle of creation in favor of the miracles of revelation and redemption.[4]

Historical theology therefore fails to meet the full challenge of historical criticism. It agrees too hastily with historical criticism in subjecting the past wholly to the interpretation of the present. Consequently, like historical criticism, it ignores the past: the past as such, in contrast to the merely interpreted past, remains unalterable. Historical theology rather disagrees with historical criticism only in interpreting what is alterable in the present experience of the past as the necessary condition for present revelation. Only in so doing is it able to deny in the name of religious belief a basic category of religious belief: the concept of creation. But when the concept of creation is replaced entirely by that of historical development, a modern understanding of the roots of religious belief becomes impossible. Suppose the concept of creation were somehow reaffirmed instead. Besides its unquestionable relevance to a revealed theology, the concept of creation would seem to have the philosophical advantage of comprehensiveness, which the concept of historical development lacks; creation may

apply to all things, to the whole, not just to what is alterable. Creation would then make possible a new awareness of the whole. Its apparent disadvantage would be that it raises an inescapable dilemma concerning the relation of philosophy, as the search for the knowledge of the whole, to revealed theology. Either philosophical reflection must forthwith accept the category of creation, and with it the category of revelation on which it is based; but then philosophy would become the handmaid of revealed theology. Or else philosophy, in rejecting the hegemony of revelation in favor of the autonomy of philosophical thought, must find some substitute for the concept of creation; but then a revealed theology, together with the problem of miracles with which it is coeval, would be rendered superfluous. The dilemma would be resolved if, instead of philosophy's and theology's coming to grief over the possible usurping of each other's domain, each were to manifest a mutual need for the other.[5]

Such a need has already been shown from the standpoint of philosophy. For if the possibility of knowledge of the whole is to be reaffirmed, then modern philosophy must indeed appropriate, and yet remain apart from, religious belief. Unless religious belief were appropriated, philosophy must remain onesided or partial in its awareness of the whole; yet a partial awareness, far from satisfying philosophical reflection, would seem to require more reflection. While unless religious belief remains apart, philosophy must in

turn become apologetics or aphorisms, i.e. at best an expression of beliefs about the whole; but as apologetics or aphorisms, the very possibility or intelligibility of philosophy would hang in the balance with each new shift in the weight of beliefs. Nonetheless there appears a conflict between these two requirements, viz. that philosophy be comprehensive or open to all and that it be objective or understandable by all. One must therefore ask: can a philosophy which adopts the standpoint of religious belief remain objective? The answer depends on whether the religious believer himself is able to reflect philosophically on the revelation in which he believes. It goes without saying that for the Christian or Jewish believer, at any rate, the revelation is not entirely ineffible or impervious to reflection: otherwise it could hardly give rise to a concept of creation. Yet whether and to what extent it allows or requires a philosophical reflection, as distinct from mere apologetics or aphorisms, becomes in turn a question for revealed theology.[6]

Revealed theology, however, requires philosophy, if it is to meet the full challenge of the modern historical criticism of tradition. Historical theology, for its part, was limited to defending present revelation from a dead past; but it could not revive that past, since it could not revive the authority of the past, including the authority of past miracles. In staking all on a present longing for future redemption, it left a theoretical gap between the miracles

or theological categories of revelation and redemption on the one hand, and creation on the other. Yet this result might satisfy longing, but not thinking. Philosophy is therefore required to bridge the gap anew between past creation and present revelation and future redemption, in the wake of the modern historical criticism of tradition. Philosophy, far from being wholly subject to the hegemony of a revealed theology, must therefore remain autonomous, in order to renew the very possibility of a revealed theology. While theology, far from being rendered superfluous, would then find the categories which it discovers in life reconfirmed in thought, and so regain its miraculous character.[7]

One may express this new need of philosophy and theology for each other by saying that philosophy must now anticipate theology. But granted that such anticipating is now necessary, how is it possible? Philosophy was heretofore silent about this possibility. However, it was also compelled to bespeak that silence, from the very standpoint by which it questioned the possibility of knowledge of the whole. From this standpoint, philosophical reflection was then led to reaffirm the possibility of knowledge of the whole through revealed theology. Thus philosophy may be said to anticipate theology, but only as a dialectical discussion may precede a religious decision, or as an abstract deliberation may precede a concrete choice, or as a speech which reflects on the possibilities for thought may precede a speech which reflects on the realities of every-

day life. Otherwise stated, philosophy may anticipate theology as logic anticipates grammar. The tacit underlying assumption would be that there must be some form of speech common to both philosophy and theology, necessitating and permitting knowledge of the whole. On the one hand, this form of speech must first necessitate or prophesy knowledge of the whole. But it could necessitate only from the standpoint of a philosophical reflection on religious belief, whose logic points to the need for the categories of creation, revelation and redemption. And it could prophesy only from the standpoint of a theological commitment to creation, revelation and redemption, so far as the religious believer may find that the grammar of everyday speech tends to organize itself in terms of these categories. On the other hand, this form of speech must then permit or confirm knowledge of the whole. But it would permit only if it were present to experience not only through theological commitment, but also through philosophical reflection. While it would confirm only if it illuminated all experience not only for reflective thought, but also in everyday life. The possibility of a new thinking, at once philosophical and theological, therefore stands or falls with the possibility that creation, revelation and redemption may be experienced as such through everyday human speech.[8]

# CHAPTER 7: CREATION

## I

Can creation, the first miracle, be experienced as such through everyday speech? It has already been said necessary to speak about creation from a philosophical standpoint, in order to renew the possibility of knowledge of the whole. And this possibility is confirmed from a theological standpoint, since God's creating the world and all things in it is spoken about at the very beginning of the Bible, the past *par excellence* of Christian and Jew. The philosophical question now remains whether speaking about creation permits knowledge of the whole apart from theological commitment. If so, creation would have to be objective, like the metaphysical God and the metalogical world spoken about previously: creation too must be able to be spoken about in terms of abstract affirmations and denials. At the same time, unlike the metaphysical God and the metalogical world, creation would have to be comprehensive: to speak about creation must overcome what was previously left unsaid about the whole, even if overcoming requires affirming what was previously denied and denying what was previously confirmed. Only if creation were both objective and comprehensive in this way, could speaking about creation provide for a new thinking about the whole, albeit one which points to theological commitment.[9]

## II

Theological commitment is however not required to see that, when speaking objectively about creation, God must be a creator, in contrast to something merely living or vital. Previously, God's life or vitality was spoken about metaphysically when God's sheer power or necessity was denied in favor of divine caprice or freedom. But so long as God is a merely living or vital being, there remains no power or necessity for Him to create. Therefore, if God is to be affirmed as a creator, then the previous result must in turn be denied.[10]

God's vitality may be denied by reaffirming God's power or necessity, even to the point of excluding divine caprice or freedom. So far as God's power or necessity is reaffirmed, God may be said to have the power or necessity to create: creation would be a property of God. While so far as divine caprice or freedom is excluded, there would no longer be a freedom constantly denying God's power or necessity, but only God's power or necessity simply. Creation would then be an aspect of God's sheer power or necessity alone, or of God's omnipotence.[11]

God as omnipotent would then have the power or necessity to create whatever He wills. And because He wills to affirm or exercise His power or necessity precisely in order to create, one may also speak of God's omniscience. Yet when speaking about creation in this way, a contradiction arises

between God's omnipotence, now spoken of as a property, and God's omniscience, its corollary. For God in creating must not only exercise or affirm but also restrain or deny His omnipotence, in order then to exercise or affirm His omniscience. But how can an omnipotent God be restrained from doing whatever He wills at all?[12]

This contradiction between God's omnipotence and God's omniscience may be resolved, though not completely, by removing all vestiges of freedom from God. This solution would allow God's omnipotence to be identified with His omniscience: whereas God's omnipotence would be His power to do whatever He wills, God's omniscience would be His willingness to do only whatever He must. But the contradiction would recur in the form of a question: does God then create out of will or out of need? If God creates out of will, then He may be denied any need to create; yet if so, God could no longer remain in any necessary connection with the world He created. While if God created not out of will but out of need, then He may be compared to an artist who in creating merely unloads an inner burden, -- a burden which when mingled with a drop of passion may resemble the burden of love. Yet when God is so unburdened, the world in turn must be reduced to a mere moment of divine necessity.[13]

In sum, the contradiction between God's omnipotence and God's omniscience therefore remains unresolved, so long as creation is spoken about as a property of God, at the expense

of divine freedom. To resolve that contradiction, divine freedom must as it were be redeemed, if not as an ingredient of God's creative power or necessity, at least as its necessary presupposition.[14]

## III

Still, does the world as freely created by God remain open to objective philosophical reflection? On the basis of previous reflection, the world may be spoken of metalogically, as figured with individuals and kinds, or consisting of universals instantiated by more or less blind particulars. But so long as the world is wholly populated by such figures, there remains no room for an understanding of it as created by God. It would not suffice, for example, simply to affirm in addition that God created this world freely or "out of nothing": the world might well be said to arise out of nothing, and still remain wholly figured as before. To affirm that the world is created must rather be to acknowledge the possibility of something else in the world. In other words, it would be necessary to recognize that the affirmation, "God created the world", says something primarily about God, as subject of that sentence, and only secondarily about the world, as object.[15]

It follows that creation must be spoken about as a relationship between the world and God. To begin with, that relationship must be affirmed to have already occurred:

creation must be spoken about in the past tense. But second, that relationship must also be denied to have occurred once for all time: past creation may in a certain way be revealed to the world only in the present. Finally, the disparity between that relationship's having once occurred and its being presently revealed may be overcome only if past creation as well as present revelation, remained somehow incomplete: past creation and present revelation may be said to be complete only with reference to a future redemption.[16]

However this may be, can the resulting incompleteness of the world as created be spoken about objectively? Just as God as creator was spoken about objectively as having the power or necessity to create, so the world as created may be spoken about objectively as having the power or necessity to be created. Yet just as speaking objectively about God as creator required a tacit presupposition, viz. divine freedom, so speaking objectively about the world as created may require a tacit presupposition. The tacit presupposition of speaking objectively of the world as created must be the world's awareness or revelation of itself as having been created -- its self-revelation as a creature. Only on the presupposition of revelation, could speaking of the world as created remain not confined to something completely within the world: it might refer to the very relationship between the world as created and its having a creator outside itself. While only on the presupposition of a <u>self</u>-revelation could speaking about the

world as created remain notwithstanding not created by a God outside the world: it might refer to that relationship in terms of the world itself, viz. in terms of an awareness of God's providence in the world. But is such a self-revelation in turn open to objective philosophical understanding?[17]

On the one hand, an objective understanding of the world's awareness of God's providence in the form of a self-revelation must be based on the reaffirmation of sheer particularity in the world. To deny particularity in the world might also permit an awareness of God's providence: but either that awareness must come in the form of a particular revelation from outside the world, hence not as a <u>self</u>-revelation; or it must come in the form of the world's awareness of a universal capacity within itself to be created, hence not as a self-<u>revelation</u>. To acknowledge God's providence must rather be to deny somehow sheer universality in the world. On the other hand, universality in the world, or what is there always and everywhere, cannot be denied wholly: otherwise particulars in the world must remain without universal constancy and direction. Rather, in order to redeem those particulars from mere inconstancy and indirection, universality too must be reaffirmed -- if not as always and everywhere in the world, at least as constant and directed, i.e. as directed from moment to moment or as momentarily renewed. Universality in the world may therefore be denied only in terms of its radical separation from the particulars

it instantiates, in favor of a constant need to be newly integrated with those particulars -- no longer by its simply including them as instances, but by its existing for them, i.e. by its being directed towards them moment by moment, and so in need of constant renewal of its otherwise momentary existence.[18]

Nor yet could this momentary needfulness of the universal for the particular, as the basis for a self-revelation of God's providence, be satisfied by the universal alone. Otherwise the conjunction of universal and particular would result, once again, in a world figured completely with individuals and kinds: but it was precisely this completely figured world which left no room within its circle for speaking of anything beyond itself, and yet which requires something beyond its circle in order to understand completely the multiplicity of fogures within. The needfulness of the universal for something else at each moment of its meeting with the particular would therefore be satisfied only by something wholly beyond the circle of individuals and kinds, which yet enters freely into that circle. In other words, the continued and continuing existence of the world, as a conjunction of universals and particulars, would then need to be completed by the freely provided and providing power or necessity of God to create.[19]

But God's providence simply, as the world's self-revelation of something beyond itself which is yet freely directed to what is universal within itself, satisfies only

negatively an objective understanding of the world as created. God's providence would no more than deny sheer universality in the world. God's providence must therefore be conjoined with the awareness that worldly existence is itself needful of constant renewal. Only the additional need of overcoming each moment the radical separation of universal and particular, would permit speaking objectively of God's providence in the world, and hence of the world as created by God.[20]

## IV

Creation, if understandable at all by means of objective philosophical reflection, must therefore be spoken about as a mutual relationship between God as creator and the world as creature. God as creator must create the world freely. Otherwise the contradiction between God's omnipotence and God's omniscience remains unresolved. While the world as a creature must exist in constant need of God's creating; and this need, though universal, must be revealed to the world at a particular moment in the form of God's providence. Otherwise the radical separation of universal and particular in the world could not be overcome. Yet this mutual relationship is so far objective only in that it may be spoken about in terms of abstract affirmations and denials. Beyond this, it points to a theological or at any rate subjective, commitment to revelation. How then, from the standpoint of such a commitment, is it possible to continue speaking about creation with the objective de-

tachment required of philosophical reflection?

This question demands a new and more radical provision for speaking about creation, or in other words a philosophical grammar. A philosophical grammar is required to provide for speaking about creation both objectively (i.e. as understood by philosophical reflection) and "subjectively" (i.e. as pointing to theological commitment). At the same time, as a grammar it must do so by means of an analysis or classifying of the spoken word or of parts of speech. These two requirements are satisfied at once if parts of speech themselves were to bespeak both objective knowledge and subjective commitment about creation. Parts of speech might bespeak objective knowledge about creation whose grammatical meaning or whose meaning as understood in everyday speech refers to objects: words which refer grammatically to objects include adjectives, pronouns, articles, proper names, and nouns in the objective case. While parts of speech might bespeak a subject commitment about creation whose grammatical meaning refers to a standpoint for speaking about objects: words which refer grammatically to such a standpoint include verbs.[21]

However this may be, parts of speech would then have to bespeak or refer systematically as well as grammatically. They would refer systematically if parts of speech could be shown to generate themselves systematically, like a family tree, with branches pointing in two directions, viz. objective knowledge and subjective commitment. While this family tree would nonetheless remain grammatical if parts of speech could

be shown to generate or stem from one such word or part of speech, which may then be called a stem-word. Above all, because the spoken word is often ambiguous, so that its classifications into parts of speech may often cross, the stem-word itself must possess a clear and distinct or simple meaning.[22]

In short, speaking about creation requires a philosophical grammar, which in turn requires a stem-word. Is there such a word, already present in everyday speech, which systematically provides for speaking about creation both objectively or as understood by philosophical reflection and subjectively or as pointing to theological commitment? Consideration shows that the requirements of a stem-word are satisfied by the evaluative adjective or value-word, such as "beautiful" or "good".

The stem-word must first satisfy the requirement of a clear and simple grammatical meaning. Another part of speech which would satisfy the requirement of a clear and simple meaning is the particle, such as "so". But the particle is no stem-word; for its meaning, while simple, is not grammatically simple; rather, in everyday speech its meaning must be determined by some prior question, such as "how?" or "whether?"; the particle as such remains grammatically indeterminate. The adjective would better satisfy the requirement of a simple grammatical meaning, since in everyday speech it may often determine the meaning of the simple particle, by answering the question "how (so)?" or "whether (so)?". The adjective

would also occur most clearly in a sentence as predicate. Yet it is also true that some adjectives have a clearer and simpler meaning than others. Thus to define the meaning of adjectives referring to intuited properties, i.e. property-words, would require not only a simple statement or affirmation, but also a further denial; for example, to define one color of the rainbow requires referring to other colors, if only to deny or differentiate or exclude them from the specific meaning. But to define adjectives referring to values, such as "beautiful" or "good", requires at most to deny or exclude what is not, say, beautiful or good; and this denial already presupposes a clear awareness of what is beautiful or good simply. To this suggestion, viz. that value-words in general have a simple, indeed the simplest grammatical meaning, it may be objected that their definition, like that of property-words, requires both an affirmation and a denial; moreover, unlike property-words, value-words have a circular definition, since what is denied or excluded is none other than the opposite of what is already presupposed as their meaning; accordingly, value-words would have neither a simple nor a clear meaning. These objections are however removed in the case of the positive evaluative adjective, since the circle involved in its meaning would be broken whenever value may be clearly affirmed, simply by being spoken -- "beautiful!" -- "good!"[23]

The positive evaluative adjective, as stem-word, must then provide for speaking about creation objectively. In

other words, it must generate a grammatical epistemology. For only an epistemology could provide for speaking about creation objectively, by providing a doctrine of objective knowledge or knowledge of objects. While only a grammatical epistemology could provide that doctrine on the basis that knowledge of objects is somehow identical with speaking of objects. More precisely, a grammatical epistemology would identify epistemological objects with grammatical objects. On this basis it would follow that the positive evaluative adjective refers epistemologically to objects, precisely insofar as it refers grammatically to objects. Yet the positive evaluative adjective, as stem-word, refers grammatically to objects not by itself, but only when spoken together with other parts of speech referring to objects. So too it must refer epistemologically to objects only when spoken together with other parts of speech referring to objects.

Thus epistemologically, as well as grammatically, the positive evaluative adjective would require other parts of speech referring to objects, viz. property-words, pronouns, articles, proper names, nouns in the objective case. Insofar as it requires them at all, it would generate a doctrine of knowledge of objects, whose categories are identical with parts of speech referring to objects. While insofar as it requires each category in turn systematically, it would also generate a doctrine of degrees of knowledge of objects, whose categories are identical with an increasingly complex grammatical reference to objects. Thus another part of speech

like the positive evaluative adjective may be spoken together with words referring to objects, yet unlike the positive evaluative adjective itself refers to an object intuited as a "this", or to a positive singular property -- the property-word; another part of speech like the property-word refers to this singular property, yet unlike the property-word also refers to the bearer of this property, as an object "here" or elsewhere in space, though as not yet properly named or known -- the pronoun; another part of speech like the pronoun refers to this singular indefinite object in space, yet unlike the pronoun also refers to what this object is -- the indefinite article; another part of speech like the indefinite article refers to what this singular indefinite object in space is, yet unlike the indefinite article also refers to it as inseparable from some kind or plurality of singulars to which it belongs -- the definite article; another part of speech like the definite article refers to this singular indefinite property in space as inseparable from its kind, yet unlike the definite article also refers to it as singled out from its kind -- the proper name; finally, another part of speech like the proper name refers to this singular indefinite object in space as singled out from its kind, yet unlike the proper name also refers to it as related to other singulars and kinds -- the object, related directly or indirectly to a subject in a sentence.[24]

Besides providing for speaking about creation objectively

in this way, the positive evaluative adjective, as stem-word, must also provide for speaking about creation subjectively. In other words, it must generate a grammatical ontology. Only an ontology could provide for speaking about creation subjectively, by providing a doctrine of subjective standpoints or commitment towards objects of knowledge. While only a grammatical ontology could provide that doctrine on the basis of identifying subjective commitment to objects with speaking of a subject in relation to objects in a sentence. More precisely, it would identify ontological commitments towards objects with the grammatical subject-object relationship. On this basis it would follow that the positive evaluative adjective refers ontologically to a subjective commitment towards objects, precisely insofar as it refers grammatically to the subject-object relationship. Yet the positive evaluative adjective, as stem-word, refers grammatically to the subject-object relationship not by itself, but only when spoken as predicate in sentences with a verb. So too it must refer ontologically to a subjective commitment towards objects, only when spoken as predicate in sentences with a verb.[25]

Thus ontologically, as well as grammatically, the positive evaluative adjective would require other parts of speech referring to the subject-object relationship, viz. certain verb forms. Insofar as it requires them at all, it would generate a doctrine of subjective commitment towards objects, whose categories are identical with certain verb forms. While insofar as it requires them systematically, it would also

generate a doctrine of degrees of subjective commitment towards objects, whose categories are identical with an increasingly complex grammatical reference to the subject-object relationship. Thus another part of speech like the positive evaluative adjective, as well as like the other parts of speech referring to objects when spoken in a sentence as predicate, refers to the subject-object relationship, yet unlike the positive evaluative adjective, as well as unlike the other parts of speech referring to objects, also commits the speaker to identifying the subject-object relationship with an event which may change now and then in time -- the copula verb; another part of speech like the copula commits the speaker to identifying the subject-object relationship with an event in time, yet unlike the copula also commits him to identifying the event in time with a property -- the participle or verbal adjective; another part of speech like the participle commits the speaker to identifying the subject-object relationship as an event in time with a property, yet unlike the participle also commits him to identifying the bearer or origin of that property too as an object in space -- the infinitive as verbal noun; another part of speech like the infinitive commits the speaker to identifying the subject-objective relationship as an event in time with an object in space, yet unlike the infinitive also commits him to identifying the event as something distinct from the object -- the indicative mood; another part of speech like the indicative mood commits the speaker to identifying the subject-object relationship

as an event in time with a distinct object in space, yet unlike the indicative mood also commits him to identifying the event as not only distinct from, but also occurring between or among more than one object in space -- a verb in the third person; finally, another part of speech like the third person commits the speaker to identifying the subject-object relationship as an event in time occurring between or among more than one object in space, yet unlike the third person commits him also to identifying that event as an object already completed in time -- a verb in the past tense, when spoken in a sentence with a property-word, pronoun, or article.[26]

So much for the two branches of a philosophical grammar which may stem from the positive evaluative adjective. A grammatical epistemology was required to provide for speaking about creation objectively, and so as understood by philosophical reflection; while a grammatical ontology was required to provide for speaking about creation subjectively, and so as pointing to theological commitment. The former requirement was satisfied by identifying objects of knowledge with grammatical objects. On that basis, creation may be spoken about in terms of grammatical objects, only if it already refers to properties or objects in space. The latter requirement was then satisfied by identifying subjective standpoints or commitments towards objects with the grammatical subject-object relationship. On this basis, creation may be spoken about in terms of a grammatical subject-object relationship

only if it also refers to an occurrence already completed in time.

## V

According to a philosophical grammar, creation, or the relationship of God and the world as expressed in the sentence "God created the world", may then be spoken about objectively only under certain circumstances. First, the object of this sentence, viz. "the world", must refer to properties or objects in space. Second, the verb which relates subject and object, viz. "created", must refer to an occurrence already completed in time. It follows that creation may be spoken about objectively only if the world may be said to consist of properties or objects in space which have already come to be or already exist in time.

Still, to speak about creation objectively is not yet to speak about creation philosophically. It is not yet to speak about all things or the whole. For creation, while objective, might not be comprehensive: conceivably not all but only some objects may be created, or even none at all. In order to provide knowledge of the whole, it would not then suffice for creation to refer simply to objects in the world. Creation would have to refer to <u>all</u> such objects. In other words, speaking about creation must be not only expressible, but <u>identical</u> with speaking about objects in the world.[27]

Such an identity between objects of creation and objects in the world would not be difficult to understand on the basis of modern experience. In the first place, such an identity would in no way exclude the possibility of modern scientific laws. On the contrary, it would confirm the assumption underlying those laws. The assumption underlying modern scientific laws, as well as the assumption underlying the identity of objects of creation and objects in the world, is that objects in the world are best knowable with reference to an occurrence in the past. Only on that assumption, for example, could the results of modern scientific experiments not be left in the form of present observations, but become grounded in past occurrences in the form of laws. And only on that same assumption could modern science have abandoned the teleological explanations of pre-modern science, which grounded present occurrences in purposes not yet attained or attainable only in the future.[28]

Second, if objects of creation are identical with all objects in the world, then an uncertainty inherent in the metalogical understanding of the world is removed. The metalogical world, as has been said, requires some unifying principle beyond the multiplicity of universals and particulars within it. Yet the connection between the unity beyond and the multiplicity within remains uncertain. Either the unity must remain beyond, as thought thinking itself, in which case multiplicity in the world remains unaffected by it. Or else multiplicity in the world may be absorbed into

that unity, by coming to be thought, in which case it would cease to be multiplicity. On the other hand, if objects of creation are identical with objects in the world, then the world may seek a unifying principle beyond the multiplicity of universals and particulars within, in the form of Divine providence. Yet the multiplicity of objects would be neither wholly unaffected by Divine providence, nor wholly absorbed by it. Objects would not be unaffected by Divine providence, since, as has been said, Divine providence would be required at each moment of the meeting of universals and particulars in the world, i.e. whenever a singular object may be spoken of as a kind. Nor then would such objects be wholly absorbed by Divine providnece either, since, as has also been said, the multiplicity of singulars in the world become unified as objects only in relation to other singulars -- in space.[29]

Finally, if objects of creation are identical with all objects in the world, then these objects in turn point beyond themselves. For space, the unity of all objects, is not itself an object. Space is merely a condition of objects. Nor is space even the pristine condition of objects or the first thing of creation. According to a philosophical grammar, which first identified objects of knowledge with objects of grammar, space arises only when an object may be said to be "here" or elsewhere. But "here" presupposes "this here", or "this" singular property simply. The pristine condition of objects or the first thing of creation must then be the calling into existence of an abundance or chaos of

singular properties. And this calling into existence must therefore be the presupposition of all objects.[30]

The identity of objects of creation with objects simply therefore points to, though it does not prove, a creator beyond objects in the world. It points to a creator, in order to explain the very calling into existence of objects in the world as a chaos of singulars. It therefore points to God as Creator. Yet God is not thereby proved, since God is pointed to as Creator only to explain the existence of objects in the world, not in Himself. But God may be said to be more than a Creator. He may also be a Revealer: even creation may be said to be "proved" only by revelation. This pointing to God as creator therefore points also beyond creation itself--to revelation. Creation is therefore proved, if at all, only by way of anticipating revelation, or in theological terms as a prophecy of revelation.[31]

## VI

But if creation is not "proved" save by revelation, can it be said to be anything more than an idea of the imagination, i.e. an imaginary response to an imagined Divine call? Must not creation, though spoken about objectively, be in the last analysis a merely subjective way of speaking about the world of objects? If so, speaking about creation would be identical not with speaking about objects simply, but only with speaking about certain objects experienced by the

human imagination -- objects of subjective human contrivance or of art. Above all, creation would then be, not a theological category, and hence not something to be anticipated by a new thinking about the whole -- but only an aesthetic category.

As an aesthetic category, creation would refer to the relationship, not between God and the world, but only between the author and his work. And just as previously the idea of a God open to metaphysical reflection was reduced to the "mythical" element of aesthetic experience, and as the idea of a world open to metalogical reflection was reduced to the "figured" or figurative element of aesthetic experience, so the relationship between the author and his work might be understood in terms of the relation between the mythical and figurative elements of aesthetic experience.[32]

The mythical was said to be the element of exclusiveness in modern aesthetic experience, which marks off the experience from all other experiences, as an aesthetic whole. So too the author must have a capacity for the mythical, or for organizing his experience aesthetically or in aesthetic wholes. He must have artistic genius. Yet genius, if necessary, is not sufficient condition of artistic creation. Genius must be exercised, otherwise it remains unfulfilled genius, at best indistinguishable from a mere child prodigy. The element of genius, or of the mythical, would therefore require another element in order to result in artistic creation: The element of the figurative.[33]

The figurative was said to be that element of interconnection between parts of a single work of art which makes the experience of the work self-explanatory. So too the author must compose the work harmoniously; its inner parts must fit together among themselves. Yet how the parts fit together may also be experienced as reflecting the personal manner or genius of the author himself, so that all his works may be said to have a family resemblance. The element of the figurative in artistic creation therefore points back to the element of the mythical.[34]

Thus creation, if no more than a subjective way of speaking about the world of objects, would be experienced as the mutual relationship between the mythical and figurative elements of art. Yet what if relegation of creation to a subjective way of speaking were hasty? What if creation were more than a merely imaginary response to an imaginary Divine call -- if the call, as well as the response, were real? An understanding of creation would have to come, not from aesthetic experience alone, nor even from metaphysical and metalogical reflection, but from what was said to be the revealed word of God Himself -- from the account of creation in the Bible.

## VII

The Biblical account of creation is therefore required philosophically, as well as theologically. From a philosophical

standpoint, it is required if speaking about creation is identical with speaking about objects in the world. For these objects point to, although they do not prove, the existence of a Creator beyond the world. From a theological standpoint, however, the Biblical account of creation is not simply an account of objects in the world, but a revealed account -- the word of God as heard through theological commitment. But as the word of God, its purpose cannot simply be to satisfy a philosophical way of speaking, which must remain apart from a commitment to revelation. It follows that the Biblical account of creation must be understood neither philosophically, as a human way of speaking, nor theologically, as the word of God, alone.

Is there a third alternative, which provides for both? To be sure, the ways of God and the ways of man are distinct. But the word of God and the word of man must be identical, since it is the same speech which is both spoken and heard. The biblical account of creation may therefore be understood both as permitting philosophical understanding, and as prophesying theological commitment, by means of a grammatical analysis.[35]

A grammatical analysis is possible, since the key word in the Biblical account of creation is identical with the stem-word of a philosophical grammar concerning objects, viz. the positive evaluative adjective -- "good". This word appears in a sentence in the indicative mood, repeated six times throughout the account of creation, in order to mark off

the stages of creation, viz. "It was good".[36]

A grammatical analysis would also permit an objective understanding of creation. The stem-word, "good," referrs to objects in the world, which are said to be God's "work" (Genesis 2:2,3). God "created" or "made" them. The account of God's making or creating occurs in the third person and in the past tense. Grammatically, the past tense has already been said to be the form par excellence for speaking of objects. While because God's name occurs as subject only in the third person, God is not further particularized; "God" is interchangeable with the mere pronoun "He" (cf. English translations of 1:5); thus "God" does not personalize or subjectivize the objects which appear in the predicate, but they remain mere objects.[37]

Moreover, a grammatical analysis permits an understanding of creation as comprehensive. Thus the real subjects of the account occur in the accusative (ibid. 1:1) or passive nominative (2:1), viz. "the heaven and the earth". These nouns are qualified by the definite article, whereas most others first appear with only an indefinite or no article. "The heaven and the earth" are thus definite, singular things, although they refer to a collection of things which they include. The definite article, which indicates a collection of things in space, suggests that spatial determination precedes all further determination of heaven and earth. In a similar way, the past tense suggests that temporal determination precedes even spatial determination (e.g., "created", 1:1), and that temporal

determination accompanied each further stage of creation (e.g., the copula "was", 1:3 and passim).[38]

However, a grammatical analysis would also indicate certain limits to the comprehensiveness of creation. Creation would seem to be limited precisely to objects knowable in space and time past. For example, even objects which man may come to experience not merely as finite objects, but as personalized and divine beings, viz. the "sun" and the "moon", are said to be mere "lights" (1:14 et seq.). The account of creation would then appear to rest on a certain disregard for or abstraction from human experience, or perhaps from man himself.[39]

This abstraction from man may also be seen grammatically to permeate the entire account of creation. The very beginning of the account mentions both God and the world -- viz. "the earth was unformed and void...and the spirit of God was brooding over the face of the water" (1:2) -- but omits mention of man. Yet it includes all parts of speech referring to objects. Aside from those parts of speech already noted, the property-word is the first direct reference to objects in the world; the earth being "unformed" and "void", it follows that "darkness" (1:2) is not an object simply, but merely prefigures objects, by awaiting "light" (1:3), which is also not an object simply, but a mere property. While the distinction between darkness and light, which completes the first day of creation, is qualified in turn by the participle "brooding" (1:2), which directly qualifies, not God

Himself, but His "spirit" (ibid.). It would thus seem that the abstraction from man is parallelled by a corresponding depersonalization of God.[40]

To this it may be objected that the parts of speech referring to objects do not yet establish creation itself, or that the account of creation requires more than parts of speech. Creation also requires speech simply. Thus creation proper occurs only when God Himself speaks "Let there be light" (1:3). Yet here is no longer creation simply, but also a glimmer of revelation. Revelation suddenly occurs in the form of the imperative, which is the only instance of the present tense in an account otherwise entirely in the past tense and in indicative or narrative mood. Nonetheless this imperative remains impersonal, as if it too were a sheer occurrence like other occurrences, or as if not God but something else spoke.[41]

God is first personalized only with the creation of man. The speech, "Let us make man..." (1:26), is the first exception to parts of speech referring to objects. The first person plural form suggests not a collection of objects, but many I's, or an I speaking to another I as a second person, i.e. as a Thou. The creation of man would therefore seem to be the limit of creation simply, where creation is no longer narrated in a depersonalized and objective way, but prophesies revelation between a first and second person, or between I and Thou.[42]

Yet God as creator is not yet a revealer. He is not

Himself I and Thou, but remains a "We" -- absolute, all-encompassing, a pluralis majestatis which excludes no I, yet distinguishes itself from no Thou. God's I is then impersonal because He speaks with no Thou outside Himself. This passing outside Himself would mark the boundary between creation and revelation.[43]

This boundary is crossed only with the creation of man. The word "man" (Hebrew: Adam) is grammatically ambiguous. It is both an object-word and a proper name. "Adam" is then at once like and unlike other objects, which are merely created "according to their kind" (1:11). Unlike them, "Adam" is also created "in the image of God" (1:27). The creation of "Adam" would then seem to be the sign or prophecy of an impending miracle -- the miracle of revelation.[44]

Hitherto in the account of creation, God is said to have found creation "good". Now that man is created, God finds creation "very good" (1:31). The adjectival stem-word remains, yet is no longer in simple but in comparative form (Hebrew: tov me'od). According to Jewish tradition, the word "very" refers to something beyond mere creation. It refers to death, as the sign that human life is more than merely created, but made complete by something beyond creation. Death therefore marks a passing beyond merely created life, and, in the light of revelation, anticipates a transformation or renewal of human life by means of revelation and redemption.[45]

# CHAPTER 8: REVELATION

## I

Speaking of creation therefore requires speaking of revelation too. It has already been said necessary to speak about revelation from a philosophical standpoint, since speaking about creation provides knowledge of the whole only on the assumption of revelation. And this necessity is confirmed from a theological standpoint, since whereas the limit of creation is God's creation of human life and death in the world, God's revelation to man in the form of Divine love is said to be "strong as death" (Song of Songs,8:6). The philosophical question now remains whether speaking about creation and revelation together permits knowledge of the whole apart from theological commitment. If so, revelation, like creation, must first be understood objectively, though unlike creation it must be understood primarily as a relationship not between God and the world, but between God and man. At the same time, like creation, revelation must be understood in a comprehensive way, in order to overcome the fragmentariness of the metaethical man as well as of the metaphysical God. Only if creation and revelation were both objective and comprehensive, could speaking about creation and revelation give rise to a new thinking about the whole, albeit a thinking which points to theological commitment.[46]

II

But as in the case of creation, theological commitment is not required to see that, when speaking about revelation, God must first be affirmed to be a revealer, in contrast to either a merely metaphysical or a merely creating God. As a merely metaphysical being, God was said to be a conjunction of power or necessity and caprice or freedom. As a creator, God's caprice or freedom was then denied, though it could not be denied completely, in order that God may be said to have the power or necessity to create. But from the fact that God may have the power or necessity to create, it does not follow that He has the power or necessity to reveal Himself -- unless creation is already a certain form of revelation. Yet creation has so far been said to be a revelation only in the form of the world's self-revelation of its needfulness at each moment for Divine providence. Therefore, if God Himself is to be affirmed as a revealer, then it must be denied that God may be understood simply in terms of His power or necessity to create.[47]

Such a denial is already implicit in saying that Divine caprice or freedom is a necessary presupposition of God's power or necessity to create. Yet that presupposition does not suffice to an understanding of a God Who reveals Himself in the form of love. To be sure, on the presupposition of Divine caprice or freedom, God may be said to exercise His power or necessity to create capriciously or freely or out

of love. But then Divine revelation becomes a mere revelation of an infinity of capricious or free creative acts in the world, and Divine love a mere "origin" of creation, and in either case God Himself remains not revealed, but hidden behind His creation.[48]

In order to understand God as a revealer, then, not only must Divine caprice or freedom be presupposed, but also God's power or necessity to create must be denied somewhat. It need not be denied wholly. For on the presupposition of Divine caprice or freedom, the world as created may remain a revealed or visible sign of God's capricious or free love. Yet precisely as such a sign, the world must also be subject to something else, viz. to God's capricious or free love simply, apart from His power or necessity to create. Creation as a form of revelation thus presupposes a revelation of a higher order. Alternatively expressed, the world's self-revelation of its needfulness as a creature, at each moment of the meeting of universals with particulars in the world, presupposes a revelation simply, as something on-going which can become present to the world at any given moment, without regard to the particular situation of universals in the world.[49]

It would follow that God may then have the caprice or freedom to reveal Himself at any moment in the form of love. And God would then reveal Himself, not as the receiver, but as the giver of love, i.e. not as a beloved but as a lover.

Only as a lover could God reveal Himself at any one moment, since only the love of the lover can deny all else, including the power or necessity to create, for the sake of the moment. While only as a lover could God continue to reveal Himself at any and all moments, since the love of the lover then remains constant only by renewing itself fully in each moment, and so may be affirmed to be the on-going presupposition of God's constant power or necessity to create, which then takes the form of Divine providence.[50]

To this it may be objected that all love, including that of the lover, implies some previous lack, so that God as revealer, and hence as creator, must be said to arise through some previous need in God. And yet God as creator has already been denied to create out of lack or need, otherwise the world would be reduced to a mere moment of Divine necessity. But this objection is removed when love is understood, not as a property, and hence not as something acquired in order to overcome some previous lack, but as a result wholly in and for the moment, and hence as something aware of nothing of what precedes the moment. Only so could God's love as revealer be understood, not as a result of God's power or necessity to create simply, but as the presence of His momentary and ever-renewed caprice or freedom in the world.[51]

## III

But can the man to whom God reveals Himself as a lover

remain open to objective philosophical understanding? Previously, man was understood metaethically as a self-enclosed self -- a conjunction of character, or free-will over against external objects, and spite, or proud defiance over against external objects. But so long as man remains a self-enclosed self, he cannot be understood as open to anything outside himself, God's love included. In order to understand man as a possible receiver of Divine love, he must therefore be denied to be a mere self.[52]

Instead of a self-enclosed self, man must be said to be open, if not to an awareness of external objects, at least to an awareness of something beyond himself. And this openness requires a denial, not of man's character or free will, but only of his spite or proud defiance of external objects. Yet spite or proud defiance cannot be denied simply. Otherwise man remains mere character, i.e. a mere free will apart from external objects, and so unknowable. But is character or free will then necessarily conjoined with spite or proud defiance?[53]

Or can one further distinguish within spite, between pride on the one hand, and defiance on the other? If so, one could trace the self's self-enclosedness not to pride simply, but rather to defiance, as an extreme form of pride. Pride itself would then be a mean between defiance and its opposite. And the opposite of defiance would be humility.[54]

Humility too must then be a kind of pride. Like arrogance, humility must be, not one human property alongside

others, but a property in which man's entire character may be said to rest, whether it becomes self-enclosed or not. Yet unlike arrogance, humility must then have its origin, not in self-awareness alone, but in the awareness of something outside the self, which is moreover superior to the self, in order that character may then become secure or rooted in it. Humility, as a form of pride, must therefore originate not in defiance of external objects in the world, but in reverence for the super-human and other-worldly -- in other words in the feeling of dependence of the human soul on the Divine.[55]

Such a feeling of dependence constitutes the awareness, not of the lover, but of the beloved. Whereas the love of the lover is momentary, and therefore constantly renewed, the love of the beloved remains constant, and therefore without momentary change or renewal. The beloved as such remains secure in the feeling of unchanging dependence on the favor of the lover. Thus, whereas to God as lover must be attributed the attitude of ever-renewed bestowal of love, to the soul as beloved must correspond only an attitude of unchanging reception of Divine love, of undying trust or faith.[56]

But if the soul is to remain beloved, must not God be said to be constrained to renew his love each moment? Would not His freedom to withdraw from the human soul be denied? Moreover, can the soul, as a mere beloved, even venture to become trusting or faithful? Does not trust or

faith belong primarily, not to the beloved, but to the lover, and not as an undying property, but rather as a momentary and therefore constantly renewed activity? To answer these questions in the negative requires recalling the origin of the beloved soul in the self. Only if the soul arises from the self, is is no mere object in the world; and only if it is not an object in the world, can it become trusting or faithful. Only then would trust or faith originate in the denial of spite, which excludes the self-from all else in the form of defiance, in favor of reverence, which opens the self to something else in the form of humility. While this trust or faith of the beloved soul, far from constraining God's freedom to love, would then confirm that freedom, as a constant and undying testimony to God's otherwise merely momentary and constantly renewed love.[57]

## IV

Revelation may therefore be understood objectively as the relationship between God as lover and the human soul as beloved. God must first bestow His love capriciously or freely, moment by moment; otherwise revelation could not be understood to occur apart from God's sheer power or necessity to create. While the soul must then receive that love through faith or trust, a constant feeling of dependence on the Divine; otherwise revelation could not be understood to leave any constant and undying testimony of God's love. Yet it is

necessary to understand revelation, not alone, but in order to be able to speak comprehensively about creation. Without revelation, speaking about creation, according to a grammatical analysis, remains incomplete -- a mere collection of parts of speech referring to objects in the world. Revelation must then be understood as giving sense to those parts of speech or those objects or must then be understood, not in terms of parts of speech referring to objects, but in terms of speech simply, apart from objects.[58]

Such an understanding of revelation therefore requires a new philosophical grammar, which analyzes speech occurring apart from objects. And this new philosophical grammar in turn requires a new stem-word, which need never be spoken as an object. Such a word, which never appears in a sentence as object, but always as subject, is the first-person pronoun: "I". And the form of speech in which the "I" occurs most clearly therefore is the form of speech spoken without objects, but only in the immediate play of question and answer: the dialogue-form.[59]

There is already an anticipation of question and answer, or of the dialogue between a questioning I and an answering Thou, in the Biblical account of God'screating man. Yet neither the I nor the Thou there is genuine. For the Thou still remains within God. In order for a genuine I to arise, there must first arise some Thou outside God's I. But where, if not in God (otherwise the Thou would not be genuine), nor

in the world (otherwise it would be a mere object), is such a Thou? This question coincides with God's question to Adam in the Biblical account of creation: "Where art thou?" (Genesis 3:9).[60]

This is the I's quest for the Thou in its purest form. The I does not then seek the essence of the Thou as an object in the world, but asks only "where?" Still, the asking is a genuine asking, since the Thou is not situated within but outside the I. This question therefore presupposes no objects in the world, but only a Thou whose whereabouts might be known. It presupposes only the existence of a Thou, to whom the question is addressed. But it suffices the moment the Thou is addressed, to expose the I.[61]

The I then first exposes itself as questioner. But this self-exposure of the I, while necessary, does not suffice for the full discovery of the Thou. The I's question may remain unanswered, or answered only indirectly. Thus, in the Biblical account of Adam, God's question is answered by "the man" only with reference to "the woman" and "the serpent" (ibid. 3:12 et seq.). Man then remains an object in relation to other objects in the world -- a He in relation to She and It. In order for man to expose himself in turn as a Thou, despite his relationship to objects in the world, he would first have to acknowledge the I's question in a form which singles him out from those objects. He must then be called by his proper name, in the vocative. Only in the Biblical account of Abraham is

God first said to call man by name: "Abraham" (ibid. 22:1). And only then does man reply directly: "Here I am".[62]

Thus only the self-exposure of the I in the question to the Thou, not in its pure form, but by means of the vocative, results in the Thou proper. The Thou proper is the single human I, as distinguished from the all-encompassing Divine I. But this human I, though singular and receptive, remains empty or without content -- its answer signifies the mere hearing of the Divine question, or it answers the Divine question only insofar as that question is understood as a demand to be heard. In order to give content to this merely formal or listening I, the Divine question must then be heard in a form which signifies more than the demand to be heard, but as a demand simply -- in other words, as an imperative.[63]

This Divine imperative, which gives content to an otherwise purely listening human I, must itself have a definite content. Without such a content, it remains a mere commandment to be heard. With such a content, it may become the commandment of commandments, which gives sense and meaning to all other commandments. According to the Biblical account which repeats and summarizes the most important Divine commandments (Deuteronomy 5 and 6), the commandment of commandments is none other than the commandment to love God (ibid. 6:5).[64]

Considered apart from the dialogue-form in which it occurs, the commandment to love appears paradoxical. How

much more so, then, the commandment to love God! The commandment to love appears paradoxical because love itself must remain capricious or free. Yet if love is subject to command, may not that command also be expressed in the form of an impersonal law, so that love becomes obligatory and hence unfree? This paradox disappears only when the commandment to love is considered, not as amenable to law, but as the voice of love itself-- as the only possible expression of the lover's love for the beloved, hence of a Divine I for a human Thou. The Divine commandment to love must then be the commandment of commandments, since all other such commandments would then be understood, no longer as mere impersonal laws, nor as the immediate expression of love itself, but rather as further clarification of what is meant by the primordial commandment to love. The commandment to love is thus the only commandment which cannot also be expressed in the form of law. It follows that other laws may establish man's relationships to objects in the world, and so provide for the future with a view to man'a experience of the past (cf. ibid. 6:20 et seq.); but the commandment itself can be directed only to the present -- as the immediate expression of love in the here and now.[65]

Thus the commandment to love must come only from the mouth of the lover, and from this mouth as such can come no other commandment. It follows that if revelation occurs primordially in the form of dialogue as an expression of

love, then the I of the speaker must accompany each revelation, as the stem-word in terms of which it must be understood. Thus, for example, Biblical commandments are accompanied by "I, the Lord" (e.g., the first commandment of the decalogue). And thus, too, Biblical prophets, who claim to speak with the voice of God, speak in the first person, with the simple indication, "Thus says the Lord" (e.g., Exodus 11:4, et al.).[66]

To this imperative, the commandment to love, the human soul must however reply, otherwise there results no dialogue but again only a Divine monologue. Yet what possible answer is there to the demand to love?[67]

This answer can only be the beloved's confession of love. Only the beloved can confess love; were the lover to confess, his confession could not remain the pure presence of love, but must refer to something already past, and so distort the present. And only the beloved's confession does not distort; unlike the lover's, his love is not momentary and therefore in need of constant renewal, but constant and therefore, once born, undying as faith or trust. The beloved can therefore confess his love as being present now, as it was in the past, and as it will be in the future. Yet it is also true that his love was not always present in the past. The love of the beloved was said to originate only by means of a denial of spite or proud defiance in the self -- a denial which presupposes that the presently beloved was once an unbeloved self. An undistorted confession then requires also

that the beloved confess not only his constant love, but also that he was once in the past without love. The beloved confesses this past, and yet presently recognized weakness and shame, in the confession: I have sinned.[68]

This confession then removes the shame. It must therefore have a twofold meaning. First, it is a confession of past sin: I was a sinner. Second, it opens the way to overcoming the presently recognized shame: I am a sinner. The former alone, as the confession of the past, permits the present recognition of shame, without which the beloved could not prepare to receive the love of the lover in humility. Yet only the latter in addition as the confession of the present, removes the present recognition of shame, by overcoming any present doubt whether his confession would find acceptance, i.e. whether his faith or trust would be confirmed. It follows that, in this twofold confession of past and present sinfulness, the beloved does not need the lover as such to purify his sins, but in the recognition of his own faith or trust, he purifies himself.[69]

The confession of the beloved is therefore the highest point of the soul's self-recognition. It must be a full self-recognition, otherwise the soul could not remove from itself all shame, in favor of an attitude of complete faith or trust. Yet for this reason it must also be more than a mere self-recognition, since the faith or trust is not in itself, i.e. its own past and present experience, but in Another, i.e. the Other <u>par excellence</u> or God. The grammatical

form of this self-recognition can then be none other than "I am Thine" (cf. Song of Songs 2:16).[70]

To this confession of the beloved, which transforms the self singled out by the Divine imperative into a faithful or trusting soul, must now correspond a second recognition or revelation of the Divine. The second revelation is required to complete the former revelation which occurred in the Divine imperative. In the Divine imperative, God revealed Himself, yet remained concealed, insofar as the soul's recognition of Him as anything other than His being present would involve a distortion, viz. the distortion of referring that presence to objects in the world, and hence to what is already past. But the Divine imperative is now recognized to be incomplete by the very soul which, in the moment of confession, recognizes no ground for faith or trust within itself, and so must seek that ground beyond itself. The soul must now discover that ground in the revelation of God not as revealer alone, and hence no longer as sheer Presence, but also as creator, and hence as the Author of the very dialogue which the soul now undergoes. That ground must be God as creator, otherwise revelation would remain wholly present, without reference to objects already existing in the world. And yet that ground cannot simply be God as creator, otherwise revelation would be reduced to a mere aspect of creation, and the immediacy of the dialogue between God and man to a mere relationship of objects in the world. To the soul's confessing "I am Thine" must then correspond the answer of the Divine as <u>both</u>

creator and revealer: "I have called thee by they name, thou are Mine" (Isaiah 43:1).[71]

Thus, whereas the soul's confession of its belovedness, "I am Thine," expresses its mere self-recognition in the presence of the lover, the lover's answer, "...thou art Mine", expresses not only His presence to the beloved, but also the beloved's situation in the world. The subject of the lover's answer is therefore no long an "I", apart from objects in the world, but a "thou", already said to be somewhere in the world. With this anwer, the Divine I therefore accommodates itself to the speech of the world, without however ceasing to be present to the soul. This last accommodation then allows the soul in turn to address the Divine in the language of the world, or, in other words, to pray.[72]

Prayer is the final moment of the dialogue of revelation. As part of this dialogue, it prays for no fulfilment beyond the revelation itself. It is thus the prayer only for the ability to pray (e.g., Psalm 4:2). Yet as the final part of this dialogue, the soul's ability to pray imposes on it also the necessity to pray for more than revelation. Otherwise prayer would cease with the mere presence of the Divine to the soul situated in the world, and so would confirm the soul's faith or trust in God only as a revealer, but not as creator. The soul must therefore turn to God, not just as revealer, but also as creator of the world in which it is situated -- or, in other words, as redeemer.[73]

But at this moment the soul steps outside the dialogue of revelation. The soul then prays for not just the presence

of God in the world, but also for the future repetition of His presence. It therefore prays for a future kingdom of God in the world. The dialogue of revelation then climaxes with a wih unfulfilled in the soul, which remains its limit. This unfulfilled wish points beyond the present to a future, in the light of which the prayer of revelation, i.e. the prayer to be able to pray, remains a mere fragment -- a mere sigh or impulse of the soul. Pulfilment of this prayer or completion of this fragment then stands or falls with another kind of prayer, which goes beyond the dialogue of lover and beloved -- the prayer of redemption.[74]

V

According to a philosophical grammar, revelation, as the relationship between God as lover and man as beloved, may so far be understood objectively only in contradistinction to creation. Whereas creation must be understood in terms of objects in the world, and therefore in terms of speech in the past tense which refers to events in the past, revelation can be understood only in terms of a dialogue between I and Thou, and therefore in terms of speech in the present tense which merely expresses present experience.

Revelation, as a dialogue, therefore refers to the past only in the light of the present. It refers to the past in the moment where it gives expression to the presence of a Creator in the world, whose creation is the ground of the

soul's present experience of revelation. Yet it does not refer to the past simply, since even those verbs in the dialogue which occur in the indicative are spoken only on the presupposition of a present imperative addressed to a Thou. Only on this presupposition may the Thou, to whom the imperative is addressed, by spoken, no longer simply as an object among objects, but asa singular subject in the nominative, and hence as grammatically interchangeable with the I.[75]

Like the Divine I, the human Thou is therefore singular, without reference to a plurality of objects to which it belongs. In direct speech, neither I nor Thou is qualified grammatically by the article. The human Thou is unlike the Divine I only in that it must first be singled out from the world of objects in which it remains situated -- by means of the proper name, in the vicative. Yet once singled out, it is no longer a mere object alongside other objects in the world, but also recognizes its own alongsidedness, and no longer a mere event consequent upon other events in the world, but also realizes its own consequences.[76]

Whereas the likeness of the human Thou to the Divine I may be expressed grammatically in terms of the nominative case, the unlikeness of the human Thou to other objects in the world may be expressed in terms of the proper name. According to the Biblical account of creation, man is the only object in the world given a proper name. To this it must be added that other objects too were given names as

creatures, since Adam's first act was the giving of names (Genesis 2:19-20). Yet unlike Adam, other creatures were said to be named, not as singulars, but only "according to their kind" (cf. ibid. 1:12 et al., with 2:19). Hence it is uninteresting, for purposes of revelation, that objects in the world have names -- save in order that the Thou who is already singled out by his proper name can then orient himself in space and time by means of those names. Were other objects in the world shrouded in namelessness, then revelation could not be experienced by the Thou in terms of a "where", i.e. a still visible place where the Divine I once commanded, and a "when", i.e. a still resounding moment where the human Thou once responded.[77]

Nonetheless, it follows that, from a theological standpoint, revelation cannot be understood as autonomous, but requires creation as its basis, just as, from a philosophical standpoint, creation could not be understood save on the presupposition of revelation. For, from a theological standpoint, revelation must be recognized as an event occurring, not only between a Divine I and a human Thou, but also to a human Thou situated in the world; just as, from a philosophical standpoint, creation must be spoken about, not just as an event having occurred between a God as creator and the world as a creature, but also as revealed to man. Revelation must therefore be said to remain incomplete without creation, i.e. without the prior revelation of creation, just as creation remained incomplete without revelation, i.e. without prophesying

revelation. Either revelation or creation alone therefore remains a mere fragment -- an incomplete account of the whole.

VI

But if revelation, in its own way, is no less fragmentary than creation, must not revelation, as well as creation, refer in the last analysis to merely subjective human experience -- experience which would find its highest expression, not in philosophy or theology, but merely in art? Must not revelation, as well as creation, be an aesthetic category? And whereas creation would signify the effect of the "mythical" on the "figured", i.e. the stepping forth of a single aesthetically rich figure from an otherwise merely pre-aesthetic whole of experience, must not revelation signify rather the effect of the "mythical" on the "tragic", i.e. the soul's momentary experience of animation or inspiration in an otherwise merely pre-aesthetic whole of experience? If so, revelation would also differ from creation only in aesthetic terms, viz. as the experience of aesthetic inspiration differs from the experience of aesthetic application, or as the experience of the revealed work differs from that of the creative author.

Thus both the author and the work would be understood in terms of the "mythical" element, which marks off the aesthetic experience from all other experience, as an aesthetic whole. Yet whereas the experience of the author requires

in addition the element of the "figured", which interconnects the parts of the aesthetic experience coherently or harmoniously, the experience of the work requires rather the element of the "tragic", which animates or inspires the human soul in its experience of the aesthetic whole.

It follows that all three elements of aesthetic experience viz. the "mythical" or the experience of an aesthetic whole, the "figured" or that of single parts of the whole, and the "tragic" or that of aesthetic animation, may be found together neither in the author alone nor in the work alone, but only in the relationship between the author and the work. But because they are found there, one may classify certain universal properties in works of art, with respect to their manner of authorship.[78]

One must first distinguish between "epic" and "lyric" qualities of works of art. Epic works would be those in which the conception governing and animating the whole work is realized in the execution of each of its single parts, e.g. a particular figure in a painting or a particular verse in a poem. "Epic" would thus refer aesthetically to the content of the work in a formal or technical sense. Lyric works, on the other hand, would be those in which its single parts as such do not realize the conception governing and animating the whole work, but require concentration only on the beauty of the moment, so that the whole arises only as a succession of single moments, e.g. single tones of music or single lines of a recitation. "Lyric" would thus refer aesthetically to

the content of the work in a non-formal or non-technical sense. It follows that the figurative or plastic arts would be predominately "epic", since they occur in the medium of space or alongsidedness, in which all their single parts are surveyable at a glance; while music would be predominately "lyric", since it occurs in the flow of time, so that each single part is experienced only one at a time.[79]

Next, one may distinguish between artistic creation and artistic revelation in predominately epic works. The creation or beginning of plastic works of art must be the creative glance or vision, where the whole work comes to stand before the artist's inner eye or imagination, momentarily with all its constituent single parts. This creative glance would be distinguished from a mere natural impression, since nature would be experienced as at best a material for the artist's creation, to which a formal structure and animation must be added by way of anticipation. Yet this anticipation of the work in the artist's imagination would be no more than an anticipation, i.e. a prophecy, since subsequent execution is not mechanical, but is as primordial and there as demanding as the creative vision. Execution or artistic revelation is thus the artist's confrontation with his merely natural impression, in which the single parts of the work are now formed aesthetically, independently of their natural forms. Yet though execution is thus independent of the artist's vision, it also presupposes that vision, otherwise single parts could not be said to be formed "with feeling",

by which is meant not sentimentality, but the animation of the single part in terms of a vision of the whole work.[80]

Finally, one may also distinguish between artistic creation and artistic revelation in predominately lyric works. The creation or beginning of works of music can be no creative vision (since single parts arise here not visibly, but audibly), but rather a creative beat or rhythm. Yet like the creative vision, which is not optic simply, but which refers also to the artist's aesthetic aims and relative emphases, the rhythm too must move through the whole work and unify it; otherwise the artist's hearing would be confined to the single moment (but a single tone has no rhythm). However, rhythm is no more than an anticipation of the work of music as it extends in time, and so merely prophesies a tonal revelation. This tonal revelation occurs in the form of harmony, or the animation of single notes by means of voicing. Yet harmony, the revelatory property of lyric works, also presupposes the whole sequence of moments constituted by rhythm, the creative property of lyric works, must as execution, the revelatory property of epic works, presupposes the artist's creative vision of the whole.[81]

Nonetheless, consideration of creation and revelation as merely aesthetic categories in this way involves an intolerable consequence -- that <u>all</u> speaking about creation and revelation refers only apparently to creation and revelation simply, but actually to merely subjective or imaginary human experience. It therefore denies the capacity of speech

to be exactly what it appears, viz. speech about objectsor speech between I and Thou. It therefore denies the very possibility of a genuine revelation which may take the form of a dialogue between I and Thou. And it would preclude even turning to that part of the Bible which is, if not the most epic, at least the most lyrical expression of such a revelation -- the Song of Songs.[82]

## VII

A grammatical analysis of the Song of Songs is therefore required in order to reestablish the possibility that revelation is identical in form with a dialogue between I and Thou. Such an analysis is therefore both a philosophical and a theological consequence of a grammatical analysis of the Biblical account of creation. It is a philosophical consequence, since whereas a philosophical understanding of creation was confined to an account of objects knowable in space and time past, and hence required a certain abstraction from human experience, the Song of Songs provides an understanding of revelation precisely in terms of human experience, viz. the experience of love between I and Thou. Moreover, it is a theological consequence of a grammatical analysis of creation, since whereas creation included the creation of human life and hence of human death, which prophesies something more than creation, the Song of Songs compares revelation precisely to this something more -- to love, which is said to be "strong

as death" (Song of Songs 8:6).[83]

Grammatically, the Song of Songs moreover completes the account of creation, so far as it speaks in terms not present in the account of creation. The account of creation does not include, but merely anticipates, an I-Thou relationship, or an I simply; the word I (Hebrew: 'ani) permeates the Song of Songs, sometimes referring to itself (e.g., 1:5 and passim), sometimes to an addressee to Thou (e.g. 2:5 and passim). The account of creation climaxes with a single comparative, "very good" (Genesis 1:31); the Song of Songs is the only Biblical book which begins with a comparative, "better than wine" (1:2), and continues replete with comparatives and comparisons (passim). The account of creation was narrated in the past tense; the Song of Songs uses almost entirely verbs in the present tense, especially imperatives (passim).[84]

Yet creation is also referred to in the Song of Songs. The climax of the account of creation was the creation of human life and death; according to the Song of Songs, "love is strong as death" (8:6). This passage imitates grammatically the account of creation, since it is the only impersonal passage in the Song of Songs, i.e. the only one which does not simply express the relationship of lover and beloved, but gives an objective or impersonal basis for it. Yet unlike the account of creation, and like all other comparisons in the Song of Songs, the comparison of love and death is also not merely spoken about love, but from love. The basis of

the beloved's comparison is then not a consideration of objects in the world themselves, i.e. not creation, but rather the mere presence of the lover, i.e. revelation. Nonetheless the comparison remains objective, indeed the only possible objective statement here referring to creation, since it expresses not only the soul's experience of its belovedness, nor even the experience of its mortality, but its superiority as a mortal yet beloved soul to what is mortal and yet not beloved.[85]

The mere presence of the lover, as the basis for the beloved soul's experience, is evident elsewhere in the Song of Songs. Because of that presence, the soul cannot or need not distinguish between dream and reality, but only compare the presence of the lover to what it is not, e.g. "a gazelle or a young hart upon the mountains of spices" (2:17). Because of that presence also, the beloved soul also addresses the lover in imperatives which all carry the same meaning, viz. of love, e.g. "draw me towards you" (1:4), "rise up" (2:10), "open to me" (5:2). And because of that same presence, the beloved soul can even dream of changing roles with the lover (5:2)[86]

Yet this mere presence of the lover is not sufficient to satisfy the beloved. The presence of the lover is sufficient to overcome a certain sense of shame in the beloved: the beloved must at first apologize for her difference of complexion (1:5-6; cf. 5:10-15), yet soon "found peace" in this regard, in the gaze of the lover (8:10). But the beloved's

satisfaction is no more than singular or personal, i.e. belongs to that one beloved soul alone in relation to the lover, and so is not a universal or general satisfaction; only a single beloved soul speaks, "My beloved is mine, and I am his" (2:16). The beloved can therefore only anticipate a future fulfilment of its desire for the continued presence of the lover, by means of an appeal to brotherly feeling: "O that thou wert as my brother (8:1; cf. 4:9 et al.).[87]

This desire for a more than momentary fulfilment therefore points beyond love alone, as a momentarily present I-Thou relation. Hence it points beyond the mere dreams and comparisons which are the expression of that love. The beloved now desires to realize its love in the world in the light of day, not just as a sigh in the night (cf. 8:1-2). It desires not merely the inner or personal, but also external or worldly realization of the love of the lover -- in a realm of brotherhood in the world.[88]

But to this realization, belovedness alone does not suffice. To say the least, brotherhood requires more than a momentary I-Thou relation. It also requires a stable community of blood-relationships in the world. The beloved soul must then step outside the mere presence of the lover in order to realize that community. It must provide its own realization, by turning to the world in which belovedness is not, or is not yet, a part. In so doing, the beloved soul must therefore act as if it were not beloved, but rather unloved. For the love it seeks to realize no longer requires

the form of human belovedness, but of human love. In turning to the world, the soul therefore passes beyond the experience of present revelation to an experience of future redemption. Still, according to Jewish tradition, at any rate, present revelation remains a precondition of that redemption. "Abba Saul said: Let us become like Him; as He is merciful and gracious, so be you merciful and gracious." [89]

# CHAPTER 9: REDEMPTION

## I

The fragmentariness of revelation, as well as of creation, necessitates speaking about redemption. It has already been said necessary to speak about redemption from a philosophical standpoint, in order to understand man's relationship to God, not just as Revealer alone nor as Creator alone, but as both at once, and therefore as Redeemer. This necessity is also confirmed from a theological standpoint, since the core of all the commandments revealed to man as God's creature is said to be the commandment, not merely to love, nor even to love God, but to "love thy neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18) -- a commandment which Jewish tradition understands in the light of man's having been created in the likeness of God. The philosophical question now remains whether, together with creation and revelation, speaking of redemption permits knowledge of the whole apart from theological commitment. If so, redemption, like creation and revelation, must first be understood objectively -- though, unlike creation and revelation, it must be understood as a relationship, not simply between God and the world, nor even between God and man, but in accord with commandment to love one's neighbor, primarily between man and the world around him. At the same time, like both creation and revelation, redemption must also be understood in a comprehensive way, which overcomes the fragmentariness of creation and revelation alone.

Only so could speaking of redemption, together with creation and revelation, give rise to a new thinking about the whole, albeit one which points to theological commitment.[90]

## II

Theological commitment is however not required to see that, when speaking about redemption, it is not sufficient to speak of man merely as a soul beloved of God. Man was said to be or become a beloved soul, by means of a denial, not of his self, which consisted of a conjunction of character and spite, but only of his spite, in favor of reverence or humility. Yet as a conjunction of character or free will over against objects in the world, and reverence or humility in relation to God, the beloved soul relates primarily to God, his lover, and only secondarily to the world in which he finds himself situated. As a beloved soul, he then relates to the world not as his "neighbor", but as a mere means for expressing his relationship as beloved to a lover.[91]

In relation to the world, the beloved soul therefore assumes the figure of the mystic, who is alone with his (sic) God. The mystic, though situated in the world as a condition of his being able to receive Divine revelation, nonetheless renounces the world in effort to secure repetition of that revelation. He then relates to the world only accidentally, i.e. only in the moment when he feels compelled to respond to the Divine presence in the language of prayer, which cannot

help but refer to objects in the world. The mystic thereby acts as if he were not part of God's creation, even though he claims for himself God's love. For he acts, not as a whole man, created in God's image, but as a mere vessel of his Divine extasies, respondent to God's love alone. In order to respond otherwise, as a bearer of God's image as well as a receiver of His love, the beloved soul would have to assume the figure, not of the mystic, who closes himself off from the world in favor of the Divine, nor of the self, who closes himself off in addition from the Divine, but of the saint.[92]

The saint, unlike the mystic, exposes himself fully, not to God alone, but to the world. Moreover, unlike the self, his aim is to become, not master of himself, but a servant of God. The saint thus exposes himself fully to the world, precisely in order to expose himself fully to God. The possibility of the saint, as a servant of God, therefore presupposes that the mystic's self-exposure to God is somehow incomplete. It requires another force in the soul in order to bring about self-exposure, not just to God, but also to the world. It implies a denial, not of reverence or humility in the soul, whereby the soul has already become exposed to God, but therefore of character or free will simply, which remains in the mystic soul as a consequence of its likeness to the non-worldly self.[93]

It goes without saying that, in the saint, character or free will must not be denied entirely. Otherwise the saint, unlike the mystic as well as unlike the self, would

lack inherent direction. He would then become simply identical with an object in the world, distinguished from other objects only on account of his God-belovedness. However, as directed towards becoming a servant of God, the saint must somehow retain his human character or free will. Nonetheless he cannot retain it simply, for his being directed towards serving God is itself not just inherent in him, but is already dependent on something beyond himself, viz. his awareness of a particular commandment of God and his own particular situation in the world. The very possibility of the saint then stands or falls with the possibility of a human freedom, which neither prevents man from being commanded by God, nor excludes him from his particular situation in the world.[94]

This human freedom may be found in neighborly love. On the one hand, neighborly love may presuppose the commandment to love. Notwithstanding, it remains free. To be sure, the freedom of neighborly love qua commanded must be distinguished from free will simply. Whereas free will as such is dependent on nothing other than itself, the freedom of neighborly love must then be said to depend directly on the commandment to love. Yet whereas the former yields an incomplete account of human freedom, the latter may overcome that incompleteness. For either free will as such must will arbitrarily or capriciously; but in that case it is identical with, not human, but divine freedom. Or else it must subject itself to universal moral laws; but in this case, while no longer arbitrary,

it must will to obey the moral law without regard for its particular situation in the world, but only for the universal applicability of the law. The freedom consequent on the commandment to love is however neither wholly arbitrary, nor disregardful of the particular situation, since the commandment to love can come only from the mouth of the lover, and is addressed only to the beloved as a particular Thou in the world. But the freedom of neighborly love consequent on the commandment to love would then presuppose, in addition to human freedom, God's love.[95]

On the other hand, the freedom of neighborly love as commanded by God may be realized, not just in the Divine commandment, which is commanded out of love, but also in the resulting human action in man's particular situation. It may be realized in human action, since man, as in Jewish tradition, may come to recognize or express his God-belovedness as inseparable from his being created in God's image, and so, like God, expose himself to the world as a lover. Moreover, this very action would remain confined precisely to man's particular situation, since, unlike divine freedom, human freedom belongs to man as a result of his being commanded, and hence to man's particular situation as a Thou in the world. Like all love, however, God's included, human love must then remain wholly in and for the moment, and so, like God's love, may be renewed each successive moment only on an additional presupposition, viz. the presupposition, in addition to God's love itself, of God's providence.[96]

III

Still, can the world to which man so exposes and directs himself remain open also to objective philosophical understanding as his "neighbor", i.e. the object of his neighborly love? The world has already been spoken of as a creature, in terms of its constant needfulness for Divine providence, for its existence, in order to overcome an otherwise radical separation of universals from particulars within itself. If the world is now to be understood as man's "neighbor", then it must in turn be or become open to humanly effected changes in the world. But must not such changes in effect deny Divine providence, by disturbing or making superfluous the world's needfulness for that providence? Thus, may not human action transform the world, making it subject to universal laws under man's control as in modern technology, so that the need for Divine providence gradually disappears? Or conversely, must not the continued possibility of Divine providence in the world then presuppose that no sphere in the world is subject to human control independent of divine powers, so that the world becomes re remains enchanted?[97]

This contradiction between the world understood both as a creature needful of constant Divine providence, and as a neighbor open to humanly effected change, cannot be resolved by understanding the world either as enchanted or as wholly subject to human control. An enchanted world must be reduced, once again, to an aspect of a mythical God Who neither creates

nor reveals, but simply includes the world in His power; but in such a world, the very possibility of free human action is denied. While a world wholly subject to human control becomes at best a mere expression of a God-beloved soul's infatuation with an obedience to a Divine commandment; but such a world excludes the possibility of Divine providence simply. In neither case, then, could the world, as either enchanted or as wholly subject to human control, continue to be understood as a creature.[98]

Nonetheless, the disjunction between the world understood as a creature needful of constant Divine providence, and as a neighbor open to humanly affected change, may be incomplete. To be sure, the world must be understood as more than a creature, otherwise its having been created in the past could not be distinguished from its merely being enchanted, in light of the possibility of modern technology. At the same time, the world must also be understood as more than a neighbor, i.e. more than an expression of the present experience of revelation in the form of the commandment to love one's neighbor, otherwise its being subject to humanly affected change could not be distinguished from its requiring Divine providence simply. In other words, the world must remain incompletely understood in terms of a past event such as creation or a present experience such as revelation alone, but may be completely understood only in terms of an event or experience neither wholly past nor present. Thus, in contrast to a God, Who must be understood to have existed fully in the past, in order to

create, and to a man who must be understood to exist fully in the present in order to appropriate Divine revelation, the world cannot be understood to exist fully either in the past (as a mere creature), or in the present (as a mere neighbor) -- but only in the future. The world must then be said to exist fully only by anticipation or expectation or prophecy, i.e. as a becoming -- a coming-to-be of a realm of constant Divine providence and humanly affected change together, or in other words a coming kingdom.[99]

To repeat, this understanding of the world as a coming kingdom implies that the understanding of the world as a creature remains incomplete, or in other words that its dependence on Divine providence at each moment of the meeting of universals with particulars in the world cannot be complete. This dependence has already been understood in terms of a denial of sheer universality in a world otherwise consisting wholly of universals and particulars, i.e. of kinds and individuals. Such dependence need not however be denied in order to understand the world as a kingdom. What must be denied then concerns not the dependence of universals or kinds on Divine providence, but rather that sheer particularity or individuality which remains when the world is understood as a creature, just as in the metalogical world. In both, individuality may continue to be understood as an instance, a merely self-contained part of a universal whole limited only by some other such part. But an understanding of the world as a kingdom now stands or falls with the possibility

of denying such individuality in the world, or in other words of denying that everything which is not universal in the world is simply self-contained.[100]

The possibility of an individuality in the world which is not simply self-contained, but also dependent on another, is confirmed by the existence of life in the world. Individual organisms which live in the world, for example, must be understood as distinct from individuals which simply exist in the world as objects. The former, unlike the latter, are dependent for their self-preservation on an environment (e.g., in the form of food) which is other than themselves; and their continued self-preservation, unlike the continued existence of objects in the world, requires that they do not merely succumb to their environment (e.g., in the forms of disease or death), but successfully withstand it. Life must then be distinguished from all other individuality in the world, as a kind of individuality which is not merely self-contained, but at once appropriates and withstands something other than itself, which constitutes its environment or situation.[101]

Yet the concept of life, as individuality-in-a-situation, while necessary, is not sufficient to an understanding of the world as a kingdom. The world as a kingdom must be understood as not only needful of constant Divine providence, but also open to humanly affected change. And the concept of life, while permitting an understanding of the world's dependence on another, and so of its continued needfulness for Divine providence, does not imply an openness to humanly affected

change, and so does not provide an understanding of the world as a neighbor. This understanding therefore requires that the concept of life in the world be conjoined with an additional concept. By means of the additional concept, the world's openness to humanly affected change may be understood in terms of the incompleteness of the world already referred to, i.e. in terms of its coming to be a kingdom. This additional concept is the concept of growth.[102]

The concept of growth presupposes the concept of life. For without individuality-in-a-situation, individual objects in the world may indeed change, but their change need not depend on their appropriating and withstanding anything other than themselves, as in an environment. At the same time, the concept of life also requires the concept of growth. Otherwise individuality-in-a-situation, while appropriating and withstanding something other than itself, and so changing in order to preserve itself, would change qua individuality, but not qua in-a-situation, so that its situation might already become complete in the past or present, and not in a future kingdom.[103]

Thus, as a conjunction of the concepts of life and growth, the understanding of the world as a kingdom does not exclude, but requires, an understanding of the world as a creature. It does not exclude it, since the individuality-in-a-situation which is dependent on another, may also be dependent on Divine providence. Moreover, it requires it, since in order for such individuality to preserve itself, its

situation must already exist or must already have been created. The world understood as a creature then differs from the world understood as a kingdom, as a situation already created in the past differs from a constant changing of something within that situation, with a view to a future not yet attained.[104]

Finally, the understanding of the world as a kingdom does not exclude, but requires an understanding of the world as a neighbor. It does not exclude it, since individuality-in-a situation which is dependent on another, may also be open to humanly affected change. Rather, it would seem to require it, since the individual's appropriation and withstanding of its environment is not always successful, but uncertain, and so appears to require something else, as a condition of the world's ever being realized as a kingdom. This something else would appear to be not Divine providence (which simply creates the world), but human action.[105]

## IV

Redemption may therefore be understood objectively in terms of the relationship between the growth of life in the world, and the self-sanctifying soul's love of or search for its neighbor -- in other words, between worldly growth and human work. Each must then anticipate the other. Work must anticipate growth in the world, since the soul begins to work the moment it turns, from being a merely beloved soul,

towards its neighbor in the world. At tje same time, the world must anticipate work, by remaining both needful of and open to humanly affected change, in the form of the growth of life which is dependent on another in a situation. The world must then remain needful of humanly affected change, rather than simply of progress or change itself, otherwise human work might never keep up with the progress of the world, so that the loving soul could never reach its neighbor! And the world must also remain open to humanly affected change, rather than become complete at any one moment, otherwise its completion might be expected at any subsequent moment, so that the loving soul could reach its neighbor at every moment![106]

Yet redemption as a mere relationship between human work and worldly growth remains incompletely understood. To be sure, work may come to involve man wholly, and growth may come to involve the world wholly, so that the relationship between them would involve each wholly. Thus, work would unbind human activity from man alone, and bind it again to the world; while growth would unbind the kingdom from the world alone (otherwise the world would merely progress, not grow), and bind it again to human work. But in redemption, the world and man would not simply become bound to each other separately. They must be redeemed by a Third. Redemption must therefore be understood as the relationship of human work and worldly growth both to God as redeemer.[107]

Thus, just as creation as the relationship between God and the world, and revelation as the relationship between

God and man, were fully understood only by means of a philosophical grammar, so too redemption as the relationship between the world and man requires a philosophical grammar. And as creation was understood in terms of everyday speech as a series of words referring to objects in the world, and revelation as a dialogue between lover and beloved, so redemption -- the reconciliation of creation and revelation -- requires a form of speech which combines reference to objects and dialogue, or narration and conversation. Because redemption is the reconciliation of creation and revelation, its stem-word must be two-fold, i.e. the conjunction of the stem-words of creation (viz. the predicate "good") and revelation (viz. the subject "I"), or in other words a stem-sentence: I am good. Yet because the speech of redemption must be narrative as well as conversational, or must relate God as redeemer to the world as well as to man, the Divine I must give way to a form understandable also in terms of objects in the world, i.e. to an object-word, which however may continue to refer to the Divine: "He is good". (Psalm 136:1).[108]

This stem-sentence must then bind together all other forms of speech in one form. And, to repeat, this new form must include narration, which relates the speaker to things, as well as conversation, which relates him to an addressee. This new form of speech may then be found in song. All song, whether ballad or lovesong or other, alike combines narration and conversation. In other words, all song is polyphonic in content as well as in form. Like conversation, song is poly-

phonic in form, or its tones and phrases are spoken in more than one way and by more than one person; though, unlike conversation, the tones and phrases of song are also coordinated in an overall unity. While like narration, song is polyphonic in content, or communicates a definite content by referring to many objects in many parts of speech; though, unlike narration, the content is not complete in itself, but subordinate to the further purpose of singing. Thus the content of a song is a mere basis for singing, so that the grammatical content of a song par excellence (viz. "He is good") appears in a qualified form, as a statemtn of purpose: "for He is good". (ibid.).[109]

In the song, the stem-sentence or statement of purpose thus serves as a basis for something else, namely the polyphony of form and content in the song itself. It is the basis for the many things sung by the many persons. It therefore presupposes in addition that the community of relation between the many things and the many persons be already established. This establishment of a community cannot however precede the song as an established fact simply, otherwise the statement of purpose would occur simply in the indicative, without any qualification; rather, the statement of purpose supplies a reason for common song, and so presupposes, not the community simply, but only a summons to a common singing "that He is good", i.e. "because He is good" (Hebrew: ki tov; identical in meaning with "for He is good"). Nor yet can this summons to community be independent of the establishment of the community, otherwise it would occur simply in the imperative, and so need not be sung;

rather, the summons becomes part of the song itself, as generated by the statement of purpose. This summons to community then takes the form of the cohortative, as an exhortation binding all potential singers and all potential things sung: "Let us praise...", "Let us thank..." (Psalm 135:1, 136:1).[110]

What binds together singers and things sung in praise and thanks is then itself neither a singer nor a thing sung about. It must be beyond both, otherwise all potential singers and all potential things sung could not be addressed and referred to in the exhortation to praise and thank. The exhortation is therefore completed, not by the nominative, nor by the accusative, but by the dative case. It acknowledges a Giver beyond all singers and things sung.[111]

The summons to sing praise or thanks thus gives rise to a form of prayer different from the prayer of the single God-beloved soul. The prayer of the God-beloved soul remained a mere ejaculatory prayer, whose fulfilment lay only in the soul and capacity to pray; yet all prayer prays for more than the mere capacity to pray, i.e. points beyond mere revelation. Likewise the prayer of praise or thanks points beyond mere revelation, to redemption, by actually unifying the soul with the world -- if only in song, as the unity of singer and things sung. Thus, in Jewish tradition, all communal prayers begin with a prayer of thanks for the fulfilment of prayer. Yet this thanking is not identical with fulfilment, but only anticipates fulfilment. Otherwise the granting of prayer, i.e. the kingdom

of redemption, would exist already. But the non-existence of that kingdom, save by way of anticipation, is the condition of the possibility of all prayer -- not only common prayer for the coming of redemption, but also individual prayer for, e.g., forgiveness or food. All prayer, common as well as individual, thus anticipates the future.[112]

It follows that, whereas revelation was understood in terms of a dialogue whose basis is an experience in the present, and whereas creation was understood in terms of objects whose basis is an event in the past, redemption must be understood in terms of a communal song of praise or thanks, whose basis is an anticipation of the future. Like creation, redemption may then be understood in terms of objects, but only of objects which are yet to come or are not yet here. While like revelation, redemption may be understood in terms of an experience in the present, but only in the present experience of a future which is always to come or not yet today. It is this experience of what is always yet to come which constitutes the experience of eternity, and so which may be expressed as coeval with or in opposition to the statement of purpose underlying the song: "For His lovingkindness is forever" (ibid.).[113]

Thus the experience of the unity of world and soul in song as an eternal possibility must be qualified by a tacit "not yet". That unity would be realized only if the soul's present moment were its last, and if its nearest neighbor in the world were also its most universal and highest. For

despite the experience of eternity, the bond binding together the soul with the world in the anticipation of redemption remains the immediate neighbor. This bond may therefore be expressed grammatically not in the plural, which treats objects in the world as mere instances of kinds, nor in the singular, which expresses the experience of a single soul alone, but only in the dual -- not a lasting form of speech, but absorbed in the development of grammar from singular to plural and collective. Similarly, the neighbor is not a lasting but momentary part of the world, which is immediately superseded by something else. Wherever a part of the world has become a neighbor in relation to a soul, it may become appropriated by that soul, and so cease to be what it was previously: from a mere part of the world, it would become a part of the soul.[114]

Yet what the soul may then appropriate as its own remains undetermined in advance. It remains merely a neighbor. The soul merely knows in advance that it can by its activity transform objects in the world to singular substances according to its own image. In a similar way, words connoting activity, i.e. verbs, can transform mere adjectives into predicates, and object-words into subjects of sentences, although the verb does not choose or determine the content of those adjectives and object-words in advance.[115]

Thus redemption concerns no definite objects in the world. Whereas creation concerned definite objects in the world, especially those which may be spoken about by means of the

definite article, and whereas revelation concerned one definite object in the world, namely the one which must first be addressed by a proper name, redemption concerns no such definite object. To be sure, redemption concerns the relation of a definite soul to an indefinite neighbor. But the soul, while a definite object qua bearer of a proper name, remains qua in relation to an indefinite neighbor likewise indefinite; otherwise it might have no need to relate to its neighbor, but remain complete in itself. Moreover, the result of that soul's relating to its neighbor must also remain indefinite; otherwise that result would not also be what is simply appropriated by that soul, but also complete in itself. The relation of soul and neighbor therefore finds grammatical expression in no one object-word, but in a word which preserves the indefiniteness of that relation: "we".[116]

"We" is indefinite, since it connotes "we all", or at least "we all, who are together here". Unlike all other pronouns, which refer to a definite object, "we" cannot be understood grammatically without another word in opposition to it, or be spoken without a gesture to indicate to whom it refers. Nor is "we" a mere plural, since its meaning is not the sum of members of a group, but develops from the dual, so that it can be analyzed only into the relationship of I and Thou. "We" is thus the most comprehensive unifying word in the song of redemption, combining the unity brought about by the summons in the cohortative, with the unity sought between the soul and its neighbor in the dual.[117]

Yet grammatically, the unity brought about by the We, the most comprehensive word in the song of redemption, is not the most comprehensive unity simply. The We unifies only as a word which is sung or spoken in song. But words are not only spoken, but also speak, i.e. they also address and are heard by what they do not include. The "We" of the song of redemption thus anticipates a further "You".[118]

This anticipation by the We of a You is necessary, otherwise the We could not experience itself as a unity which is comprehensive or all-inclusive, as "we all". Yet despite that experience, the We is also not yet all-inclusive. The We therefore relates to the You not simply as included in itself, nor yet as simply addressed outside itself, but in a form in which it experiences its present exclusion and anticipates its future inclusion: the judgment. This judgment, though anticipatory, is nonetheless decisive, since by stepping outside the unity of the We, it anticipates a final Unity, and another Addresser Who addresses both We and You. The We thus anticipates God's judgment, in judging its enemies as God's enemies (cf. Psalm 139:21). Yet in so judging, it also judges decisively and fearfully, since it places itself too in judgment (ibid. 23-24).[119]

The We thus acknowledges, in its judgment of the You, that it does not have the final word, but that the final word or judgment belongs to God. God must have the final word, otherwise there would be no end to speaking, but merely an anticipation of the next word. For God, both We and You are then unified in They. Yet as the final word, it is not spoken,

but fulfilled, by means of a final act of redemption. The final act of redemption thus coeval with the disappearance of all proper names and objective distinctions in a final judgment. God then appropriates the whole to Himself, in His nameless Unity.[120]

V

According to a philosophical grammar, redemption therefore differs alike from creation and revelation. In redemption, God redeems not only the world He creates, and the man to whom He reveals Himself. He also redeems Himself. Thus in redemption both world and man disappear. God however completes Himself. Instead of a merely past creator and a merely present revealer, He becomes One and Whole.[121]

Yet there is no contradiction between speaking of the kingdom of God as anticipated by redemption, and the kingdom of the world as existing by creation. True, both redemption and creation must be said to occur in the world. Yet redemption, unlike mere creation, also occurs to man, as distinct from the world. The God-world relation, which constitutes creation, constitutes only a part of redemption. Grammatically speaking, it becomes expressed in the song of redemption only in the dual bond which unites soul and world in the relation of love; for that love was said to have first been commanded by God. But such love is a mere fragment of redemption -- the lover simply remains deaf to the exhortation

to thank, which is the beginning of redemption, as well as blind to the judgment of the We, which is the end of redemption.[122]

No is there a contradiction between redemption and revelation. In revelation, the soul is commanded to love. In redemption, it enacts that commandment by loving its neighbor "as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18). But this act of love is no self-denial on the part of the soul. On the contrary, the soul here is first confirmed as what it is by the world. In the relation of neighborly love, the world ceases to be a chaos or crowd of objects, but becomes "as thyself" -- a part of the soul.[123]

Nor again, in terms of revelation, is there any contradiction between creation and revelation. For, while God is already common to both creation and revelation, the world and man are now united by the relation of love. The possibility of redemption does not exclude the possibility that the world consists of objects, nor that man is primordially a beloved soul. It merely assumes in addition that love is not foreign to the world, but is possible wherever the world consists of growing life, and that objects are not foreign to the soul, but that the soul may also conjoin its life to the world as its object.[124]

Thus, far from excluding their possibility, redemption presupposes creation, as well as revelation. Redemption presupposes creation,, as the ground of all human relations in the world. Without creation, it would be impossible to under-

stand human consanguinity, brotherhood, nationality, or marriage. These relationships, though prefigured in the animal kingdom, may yet be transformed in the life of the human soul. They may become ingredients of the soul's relationships to God and the world. They may thus bring about an order, without which the soul's experience of redemption through neighborly love remains impossible.[125]

Finally, redemption also presupposes revelation, as the means whereby man must finally relate to the world. As the soul first awakes to a life in contradistinction to the world of objects, the moment it responds to the Divine commandment to love, so too redemption stands or falls with the possibility that the world may awaken to become part of the life of the soul, as the soul orders the world in turn as a consequence of its primordial love.[126]

## VI

But if redemption, or the reconciliation of creation and revelation, can be understood objectively only in terms of the grammar of a song, then again, must not redemption, as well as creation and revelation, be no more than an aesthetic category? And whereas creation would signify the arising of a single figure from an otherwise pre-aesthetic whole of experience, and revelation the soul's being animated or inspired by that whole, must not redemption in turn signify the connection between that single figure and the animated

Or inspirational element in the whole?[127]

If so, redemption would complete the account of aesthetic experience made possible by the categories of creation and revelation. It would, for example, account for the fact that a finished work of art existing apart from its author, as already created, may yet be recognized as a work of one particular author as its only possible author, when experienced in a moment of aesthetic revelation by the beholder. In other words, the category of redemption would explain aesthetic experience with reference to, not the author alone, nor the work alone, but the audience. For without the audience, the author remains, not a whole man, but a mere demon or demi-urge who is filled with creative ideas and permitted artistic license; and the work becomes, not inspirational, but an unappropriated sum of values embodied in a medium.[128]

Previously, the author was considered, by himself as a creator capable of artistic fantasies, and in relation to the work, as an artist executing single aspects of the work by means of a technique appropriate to the medium. But in relation to the audience, both these aforementioned factors appear alone as mere blind creativity and conscious artistry, respectively. A third factor is therefore required, in order to permit the audience to appreciate the author's efforts aesthetically. Similarly, the work was considered only with respect to the manner of its authorship, as having both "epic" or predominately technical and "lyric" or predominately non-

technical qualities. But in relation to the audience, those qualities alone appear merely as the aesthetic medium in which the work is conceived, and as the immediate presence of its non-technical aspects, respectively -- not as an animated whole. In order to redeem the work from being a mere sum of its qualities, and also to allow the author an intention which is symbolic as well as creative and technical, a third quality or factor is therefore needed: the "dramatic".[129]

The "dramatic" quality of a work, in contrast to the "epic" and "lyric" qualities, is what gives it symbolic meaning. This quality is then best understood in relation to neither the plastic arts, which are predominately "epic", nor music, which is predominately "lyric", but in relation to a third form of art: poetry. Poetry, unlike either the plastic arts or music, occurs neither in space nor in time, but in the medium where man's experience of both space and time originates, viz. imaginative or representational thinking. The possibility of experiencing a work of art in terms of its "dramatic" quality implies that the experience of works of art as either "epic" or "lyric" alone is somehow incomplete.[130]

Thus plastic works of art, as predominately "epic", were understood as a conjunction of creative vision and executed form. The former was the imaginative inner eye of the author as he first conceives the work in its entirety; the latter was his imposing an aesthetic form on a natural medium. But from the standpoint of the symbolic meaning of such a work, it must be said that too much vision and not

enough attention to aesthetic forms results, not in a satisfying figure, but only in an ornament; while where the will to form predominates and the creative vision is weak, the result becomes, again not a satisfying figure, but a mere model of something in nature. Symbolic meaning then appears in works of plastic art simply as what makes both aspects of the work go together, so to speak, with artistic feeling.[131]

Similarly, music, as predominately "lyric", was understood as a conjunction of rhythm and harmony. The former was the unity of the work as heard by the artist's imaginative ear; the latter was the animation of that rhythm by means of an arrangement of notes. But from the standpoint of the symbolic meaning, a musical work must have more than a certain rhythmic character and harmonic voicing; it must also have a melody line. As an indication that melody is what gives decisive meaning to a work of music, it need only be mentioned that a composer may use the same rhythms and harmonies found in other pieces, without being charged with plagiarism -- but not the same melodies.[132]

But, to repeat, the "dramatic" or symbolic quality of a work does not fully appear in predominately "epic" or "lyric" works as such. It may appear fully in poetry. Moreover, as in the plastic arts and music, its necessity may be shown in relation to the creative aspects (e.g., creative vision and creative rhythm) and revelatory aspects (e.g., artistic form and musical harmony) in a work. In poetry, which occurs in the medium of representational thinking, the creative

aspect of the work resembles rhythm in music, while the revelatory aspect resembles artistic form in the plastic arts. The analogy in poetry to musical rhythm is timbre: both the rhythm of a musical piece and the timbre of a poem can be measured by a meter, so that rhythm or timbre implies meter, although the reverse is not always true. Timbre is then, like rhythm, the movement of sound unifying the whole, which may be discriminated audibly. The analogy in poetry to artistic form in the plastic arts is speech itself, especially figurative speech: both plastic forms and figures of speech constitute the singular parts of the work. But whereas plastic form occurs in the choice of form superimposed on a natural medium, figures of speech occur rather in the choice of words taken from ordinary speech.[133]

Yet timbre and figures of speech alone as the creative and revelatory aspects of poetry do not account fully for the experience of a poetic work. Timbre is a mere feast to the ears. While figures of speech are a mere choice of phrases what completes the experience of poetry is rather the idea animating each of the single parts of the work. The idea, which is the "dramatic" element in poetry, is moreover unlike the "dramatic" elements in the plastic arts and music, viz. the plastic figure and the musical melody. These latter do not stand for anything beyond the aesthetic immediacy, i.e. they satisfy only the eye and only the ear, respectively; whereas the poet, literally, speaks to his audience. It follows that the poetic arts in general may express and so animate human

experience most fully, since the medium of poetry as such is more nearly identical with the medium of distinctively human experience, viz. speech. It also follows that, among the poetic arts, those works in the medium of prose may be more fully expressive of and inspirational to human life, than those also using song and gesture.[134]

As an aesthetic category, redemption, unlike creation and revelation, thus explains the relation of art to human life. Redemption here presupposes the category of creation, since the audience, like the artist as creator, must experience the imaginative representations conveyed by the works. Similarly, redemption presupposes the category of revelation, since the audience, like the artist as revealer, must be aware of artistic technique. Yet like the artist's, the audience's experience of the work too remains incomplete merely as a conjunction of imagination and technical awareness. The two must come to interpenetrate completely. Art then enters human life, not as an array of imaginative representations which are experienced either as merely burdensome or as merely indifferent to life, but as episodes of experience which yet give meaning to life, and so may be gathered and cultivated all life long.[135]

Yet as a mere episode of life, aesthetic experience cannot be said to include the whole of life. Creation, revelation and redemption as aesthetic categories cannot then illuminate the whole of experience. But creation, revelation and redemption simply were required precisely to understand

the whole of experience; and the means for this understanding was to be found in an understanding of religious belief. A discussion of redemption must therefore return from a discussion of aesthetic experience to a discussion of the experience of redemption as found in religious belief -- in the Biblical Psalms.[136]

## VII

A grammatical analysis of the Biblical Psalms is required, in order to complete the understanding of the whole of human experience begun in terms of creation and continued in terms of revelation. Whereas the account of creation found in Genesis provided the basis for an understanding of the experience of objects in the world, and whereas the dialogue of revelation found in the Song of Songs provided the basis for an understanding of man's relation to God apart from the world, the songs of redemption found in the Psalms provide the basis for an understanding of the togetherness of all three distinct elements of human experience -- man, God, the world. The grammatical word which unifies these three elements, as the object-word unifies man and the world, and as I and Thou unifies man and God, is We. The Psalm which best reveals the character of the We is found in the center of that series of Psalms which are referred to by Jewish tradition simply as the psalms of praise -- the One Hundred and Fifteenth Psalm.[137]

This is the only psalm which both begins and ends with

the word "we". At the beginning, "we" occurs in the dative, in simple dependence on the verb "give". The psalmist thus prays for more than the mere ability to pray of an I to a Thou, i.e. for more than revelation. He prays for the granting of honor to a We, i.e for redemption. Moreover, such a prayer is no mere expression of the moment, but anticipates the future, by denying that the We deserves the honor prayed for at the present momen: "not to us, Lord,... but to Thy name, give honor..." (Psalm 115:1). The psalm thus continues with a withdrawal from the immediacy of the present moment, with which it begins, in favor of an anticipation of the eventual granting of the prayer for reasons independent of the present -- i.e. not only "for Thy love's sake", but also "for Thy truth's sake" (ibid.).[138]

Redemption is anticipated, rather than simply granted, because the We does not stand in the world alone, but is opposed by a You. Yet because redemption is anticipated from God's point of view, the You in turn assumes the grammatical form of They. "They" are identical with idolators. The psalmist scorns idolators, comparing them to the say-nothing, see-nothing, hear-nothing and do-nothing creatures they worship (ibid. 4-7). Unlike idolators, the worshippers of the God, Who created heaven and earth (ibid. 15), and Who does whatever He pleases (ibid. 3), have a basis for anticipating the future, trusting in their "help and shield" (ibid. 9-11). These worshippers include not only the present community constituted by the We ("Israel") and its leaders in worship in a world where

the You still predominate (the "House of Aaron"), but potentially also the You ("that fear the Lord").[139]

The final "we" (ibid. 18), which occurs in the nominative, is the all-inclusive We -- "the great with the small" (ibid.13), for whom the fulfilment of honor is anticipated. This fulfilment is to be brought about by a gradual growth of blessedness, from one man to the next and from one generation to the next (ibid. 14). Yet though this blessedness is well-grounded in God as creator (ibid. 15), the human activity which brings it about in the world remains independent of both Creator and creation (ibid. 16), but is effected through the human freedom of neighborly love. And it results in blessedness for "the children of men" (ibid.), not just Israel, since neighborly love knows of no distinctions other than that between a man and his neighbor.[140]

The psalm thus anticipates the triumph of an eternity of blessedness in the world, despite the fact that human life as created remains mortal. The past experience of death would seem to contradict the future expectation of a blessed life (cf. ibid. 17-18). But the contradiction is overcome by means of an exhortation to praise God -- Who has in the past "been mindful of us" (ibid. 12) --"from now and for ever" (ibid. 18). In the moment of praise, which anticipates the possibility of eternal praise, the We experiences itself as more than mortal, but endowed with the capacity to confront a Presence Who Himself is immortal.[141]

This anticipation of eternity in the confrontation with

an immortal Presence constitutes the core of the experience of redemption, as distinct from the mere awareness of objects which constitutes the experience of creation, and from the momentary dialogue of love which constitutes revelation. And this experience would seem to be confirmed according to a Jewish legent concerning redemption: "In the world to come there is neither eating nor drinking; no procreation of children or business transactions; no envy or hatred or rivalry; but the righteous sit enthroned, their crowns on their heads, and enjoy the luster of the Divine Presence".[142]

## CHAPTER 10: THE NEW RESULT

The new thinking turned to pre-philosophical experience in the form of religious belief, in order to restore the possibility of knowledge of the whole. Such a restoration appeared necessary, since it was precisely by ignoring pre-philosophical experience that previous philosophy came to think of God and the world and man, not as three distinct though connected parts of the whole, but only as three fragmentary and remote elements of experience. And such a restoration appeared possible through religious belief, since religious belief presented itself in turn as the most comprehensive form of pre-philosophical experience. By turning to religious belief, the new thinking might then at least rethink the relationships between those otherwise fragmentary and remote elements of experience, in terms of the theological categories of creation, revelation and redemption.

But such categories alone, while necessary, were not sufficient to provide the basis for a new thinking about God and the world and man as parts of the whole. Creation, revelation and redemption must be shown to be, not simply categories remote from experience, and so accessible only through abstract thought, but realities present to experience, and so expressible also through everyday speech. This condition was satisfied from a philosophical point of view, by identifying the possibility and necessity of creation,

revelation and redemption, with the possibility and necessity of speech itself. Thus, the possibility and necessity of creation were said to be identical with the possibility and necessity of speech about the past or narrative speech (as in the Biblical account of creation): the possibility and necessity of revelation were said to be identical with that of speech about the present or dialogue (as in the Song of Songs); and the possibility and necessity of redemption were said to be identical with that of speech about the future or exhortative speech (as in the Psalms of Praise).

The result of this radical identification of creation, revelation and redemption with speech about the past, present and future, respectively, is a new whole, i.e. a new perspective for thinking about all things. This new perspective distinguishes itself from the old, above all, by not requiring thinking of pre-philosophical experience as nothing; on the contrary, far from simply abstracting from pre-philosophical experience, the new thinking is required to expose itself to that experience -- which it understands in terms of events past, present and future. Accordingly, the new result likewise distinguishes itself from the old, since God and the world and man no longer appear as three fragmentary and remote elements of experience; on the contrary, having exposed itself radically to pre-philosophical experience, the new thinking is able to understand God and the world and man as elements underlying all experience, past, present and future -- thus

as elements of past creation, present revelation and future redemption. It follows that God and the world and man need no longer be thought as mere elements, but as parts of the new whole constituted by past creation, present revelation and future redemption. In other words, they form a whole which is temporal or quasi-temporal. God and the world and man are thus elements of a temporal or quasi-temporal process -- elements which become as parts of the whole.[143]

But if God and the world and man are to be known as parts of a whole which is in process, then this process is in turn not something apart from God and the world and man as such: it is identical with the becoming of God and man and the world. Conversely, the entry of God and the world and man into the process of creation, revelation and redemption is not simply something which God and the world and man may do or undergo: this entry in turn constitutes what they are. And yet, if God and the world and man are, only insofar as they enter into the process of creation, revelation and redemption, then must not each be equally in process, and so become indistinguishable both from one another and from all else? Or, despite each element's temporality or quasi-temporality, may each continue to be known as something distinct from all else?

Following the new thinking's self-exposure to religious belief, God may be said to be known most distinctly as Redeemer, since His redeeming also presupposes His creating and His

revealing. Precisely as a Redeemer Who is also Creator and Revealer, He enters into the process of creation, revelation and redemption most fully. Because He enters into that process at all, He must at once be understood, not just as Creator, Revealer and Redeemer simply, but -- like all other things in process -- as becoming created, becoming revealed and becoming redeemed. Yet because He enters into past creation, present revelation and future redemption most fully, He must in turn be distinguished from those things which are past or present or future simply and not all three at once. In contrast to such things as are merely temporal, God must then be said to be a-temporal or eternal. Similarly, the world and man may be said to distinguish themselves from the mere temporality of creation, revelation and redemption, only insofar as they too may be said to be a-temporal or eternal.[144]

However, man may so far be known, not as eternal, but only in terms of his experiences of revelation, i.e. as a beloved soul, and redemption, i.e. as one who loves his neighbor. Nor are these experiences alone sufficient to distinguish man from what is merely temporal, since the former is merely a momentary awareness of the presence of a lover, and the latter a momentary anticipation of a future blessedness. Man would become distinguished from what is merely momentary, and so temporal, only if, like God, he were to enter at once into the process of creation, as well as that of revelation and redemption. But such is possible for man only if he were to

experience creation together with revelation and redemption. In other words, he would become eternal, and so distinctively human, only be experiencing his being beloved of God, as well as his loving his neighbor, on the basis of his human creatureliness. Yet this possibility requires more than an analysis of creation, revelation and redemption as theological categories; it requires their realization in human life.[145]

Similarly, the world may so far be known, not as eternal, but only as the objects of creation, i.e. in the form of objects existing in nature, and of redemption, i.e. in the form of the growth of life or culture. Nor are these objects alone sufficient to distinguish the world from what is merely temporal in it, since nature has been said to exist only from moment to moment in dependence on Divine providence, while culture must likewise grow from moment to moment in dependence on human activity. The world would become distinguished from what is merely momentary or temporal in it, only if it were to enter into the process of revelation, as well as that of creation and redemption. But such is possible for the world only if it were to become an object of revelation, as well as of creation and redemption. In other words, the world would become eternal, and so distinctively worldly, only if its trusting dependence on Divine providence, as well as its anticipated self-exposure to human work, were a consequence of revelation. Yet this last possibility too requires more than an analysis of creation, revelation and redemption as

theological categories; its requires their realization in the history of the world.[146]

Thus the new thinking has so far shown the possibility and necessity of understanding God and the World and man in terms of creation, revelation and redemption. But it has not yet shown the reality of creation, revelation and redemption in human life and world history -- save as miracles by which religious belief, especially Jewish belief, has been said to stand or fall. The reality of creation, revelation and redemption, as a whole of which not only God but also the world snd man are distinct parts, would then seem to depend on their reality in religious belief itself, and especially in Jewish belief -- whose presence in human life and world history has so far merely been presupposed. The new thinking must therefore turn to discover creation, revelation and redemption as ingredients of human life and world history -- by turning above all to an understanding of Judaism.[147]

# PART III: PHILOSOPHY AND JUDAISM

# CHAPTER 11: THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION

## I

Rosenzweig's new thinking, to repeat, leads to an understanding of the whole in terms of creation, revelation and redemption. Yet creation, revelation and redemption become known as moments of time only, as conditions of the possibility of speech which refers to the past, present and future respectively. From a philosophical standpoint, such a whole must however be understood to remain distinct from its parts, God and the world and man; otherwise these parts in turn do not remain distinct even among themselves, but become merely passing moments within the whole. While from a theological standpoint, creation, revelation and redemption must also be understood to remain distinct from the religious beliefs through which they become known, Jewish belief included; otherwise creation, revelation and redemption become in the final analysis, not the realities underlying all beliefs, but themselves mere matters of belief.

A new concept is therefore required to distinguish creation, revelation and redemption from God and the world and man on the one hand, and from religious beliefs on the other. Such a concept, in order to have an ontological status within the whole, must become known in terms of creation, revelation and redemption. Nonetheless it must provide an

ontological ground for distinguishing between each of God and the world and man as well as between religious beliefs and the whole. This new concept is the concept of the religious situation.

II

The religious situation first comes to light in what may appear the most far-fetched claim of religious belief -- the claim that man can tempt God. This claim cannot obviously be understood in relation to God as Creator alone, for Whom men are said to be as worms or maggots (Job 25:6) and nations as drops in a bucket (Isaiah 40:15). Nor can it be understood in relation to God as Revealer alone, Who is not bound by human love but on the contrary only by His own love for man. It may however be understood in relation to God as Redeemer, Who is at once Creator and Revealer. For over against God as Redeemer the freedom not granted to man as a mere creature or as a mere beloved soul may yet appear in the form of the soul's freedom to act independently in the world, or at least to resolve so to act, i.e. the freedom of prayer. This freedom of prayer, in which man may act or resolve independently of God, and so even against God, would then constitute the religious situation.[1]

To this it may be objected that, precisely in prayer, Jew as well as Christian, attributes temptation, not to man, but to God Himself, by repeating the daily prayer, "...lead us not into temptation...". Thus prayer would not seem to

allow a genuine human freedom over against God. On the contrary, it would seem to involve a denial of God's very providence as Creator and love as Revealer, in favor of His freedom to do as He wishes with His creatures and His beloved -- even to tempt them. The reply to this objection can only be that, if temptation indeed originates in God, then while man thinks he is tempting, perhaps he himself is indeed being tempted by Another. Yet man's tempting God need not then presuppose that God tempts man purely capriciously. Perhaps such temptation does not contradict, but is the necessary presupposition of genuine human freedom.[2]

This interpretation would seem to be confirmed by consideration of an ancient Jewish legend about a river in a distant land which was so pious that it ceased to flow on the Sabbath. Were such a sign of God's power ever to become more than legendary, i.e. were such a sign to be realized here and now, no doubt it would increase the likelihood of Sabbath observance and other forms of piety among Jews. Yet if so, it seems equally likely that the most "pious" would then be, not the freest of men, but only the most fearful and most officious. For this reason, the absence of such signs may be interpreted as providing the opportunity for a human faith and trust in God which is not simply fearful and officious, but freely resolved. One may go further: in order to make possible such freedom in the highest degree, God may be said not only to hide His power from the eyes of men, but even

to deceive or mislead them about it. The religious man would then have to consider the possibility of God's tempting him in order to maintain his faith and trust in God despite all trials, i.e. in order to ignore the voice of Job's wife who urges him to "curse God and die" (Job 2:9).[3]

It follows that the religious situation or the situation of man's freedom before God may arise as a consequence of the following two possibilities. On the one hand, God's tempting man must be considered, not as an affront to, but for the sake of, human freedom. On the other hand, human freedom though perhaps limited elsewhere, must remain unlimited before God. (Thus an ancient Jewish sage once said that everything is in the hand of God except the fear of God.) Both these possibilities may come together in the situation of prayer. In prayer, man may fear for himself before God's temptation, yet at the same time know himself to have the power to tempt God.[4]

## III

But the religious situation in which man is said to have the power to tempt God, i.e. the situation of prayer, cannot be understood in terms of God and man alone. For man to have power over God directly would invite the consequence that man, by merely having the power to impose a human order in the world, could limit God's providence as Creator, or

alternatively by merely having the power to recognize his human belovedness or not, could limit God's love as Revealer. Man must then be said to have power over against God, not directly, but indirectly, i.e. insofar as God's providence as Creator and His love as Revealer meet in redemption. For in redemption God may be said to give power to His creation in order to grow in itself as life, and to free His beloved soul in order to perform an act of neighborly love.[5]

Still, man would not tempt God merely by the freedom of his act of love, since that very love has been said to be commanded by God. The possibility of Temptation arises only when man's free act of love is conjoined to an object in the world. It is this conjunction which may be said to be established by prayer. For an act of love alone is immediate and so blind, directed only by feeling towards the immediate neighbor. But prayer is far from blind. Prayer may be said to be essentially the request for enlightenment (cf. Psalm 13:4). Whereas love may then be compared to the groping hand, prayer must rather be compared to the opened eye, which sees beyond the neighbor to the whole world or which sees the neighbor in the light of the whole world. Prayer would then establish man's view of the world or bring about the human world-order.[6]

This human world-order must however be distinguished from the world simply, i.e. from the Divine world-order. Both orders are not simply one, since whereas God may be said to have created one world, He must also be said to have created

many men. To the one order of growing life in the world must then correspond many human standpoints from which that life is viewed. Nor are these standpoints even unified among themselves, since prayer in turn has been said to originate in the single God-beloved soul. And this singularity must remain, despite the possibility of the common prayer of redemption, as a condition of the further possibility of individual prayer for, e.g., forgiveness or food. In prayer, each single soul must then establish its own world-order.[7]

But this enlightenment of the single soul does not alone give rise to the possibility of man's tempting God either. Unlike love, enlightenment does not bring about a change in the world, but only in man. In order to bring about a change in the world, enlightenment would have to join itself to an act of love. In this case, the result would be no longer an act of love simply, nor enlightenment simply, but an enlightened or intended act of love, i.e. an act of purpose. An act of purpose, unlike an act of love, is not open and unpremeditated, but directed to a determinate visible or envisioned goal. By envisioning the goal, it may also envision its way to the goal and so take steps to reach the goal and avoid distractions and distortions <u>en route</u>. As an act of purpose, it would therefore cease when it reaches the goal. Its further destiny would then become inseparable from the consequences of the purpose, and the purer the act of purpose or the greater its dependence on enlightenment rather than love, the fewer its unintended consequences or the less

visible the act of love as distinct from the purely intended goal.[8]

It is clear from this that an act of purpose is more likely to be successful, the less it partakes of an act of love. As an act of love, it would -- to repeat -- remain blind, and so become aware of its object only insofar as that object were already immediately present to it as its neighbor. Even then, the act of love would not envision the best way to its neighbor. Thus the more an act of purpose consists of an act of love, the greater the likelihood that it may lose its way and never reach its object.[9]

One must therefore distinguish an act of purpose from an act of love. Whereas an act of purpose aims at becoming effectual or to have effects, an act of love cannot strictly aim and so cannot strictly have effects, but only side-effects. An act of purpose, not an act of love, shuns side-effects. The former may even take preventive measures to do so, since its object may otherwise be inseparably connected with other objects in the world. Not so, however, the latter. One may therefore suppose also that there are objects in the world which are not yet ready for the side-effects of love, which receive those side-effects yet resist them, and so fail to become appropriated by the soul. Perhaps these side-effects were also felt by the soul's immediate neighbor, whether that neighbor was correctly felt to be immediately present or not. For only on one condition could the soul's love fail to find its immediate

neighbor in the world, viz. if its love were not to remain blind and groping, but were to leap forward to the goal envisioned in a sudden enlightenment. The danger inherent in this, the soul's by-passing its neighbor in order to reach a distant goal, is that its love may then neither reach that goal (for love is blind), nor missing the goal return to its neighbor (for love being blind cannot envision its way back from that goal), but become lost in a void. This danger of becoming lost in a void must then be the danger inherent in prayer.[10]

One may therefore summarize the situation of prayer, in which it is possible for man to tempt God, as follows. On the one hand, prayer may enlighten the human eye, by directing it to the most distant goal which is yet common to all, viz. the goal of redmeption. On the other hand, that goal may be seen in prayer only through a foreground determined by a particular perspective, viz. the perspective of the single soul. Because prayer enlightens, it may enable love to direct itself to that distant object -- which would appear as near to the enlightened eye as is the neighbor to the feeling heart and groping hand. Yet because prayer is also qualified by a personal standpoint, love must then direct itself not simply towards the goal, but to the steps along the way to the goal. To these steps love may then hurry, feeling delay as its only danger. Love may then by-pass the immediately felt neighbor, which it now sees to be only the first step on the way. And

the side-effects of love would then befall, not the immediate neighbor, i.e. not the object which is in fact nearest the soul, but some next-nearest object.[11]

Thus prayer, when it enlightens the soul's way towards redemption, may intervene in the Divine world-order, by giving love to what is not yet ready for it. And thus it may make a man overlook his particular neighbor, to whom, once by-passed, mere love cannot find its way back. Thus too the prayer of the single person runs the risk, not of hastening, but actually of delaying the coming of the kingdom of redemption. And precisely in this delay, which may in turn come about by the fulfilment of the prayer for enlightenment, would consist of man's tempting God.[12]

The religious situation, in which this possibility of temptation arises, must therefore be, not a two-termed, but a three-termed situation. It must involve not only God and man but also the world. It need not however contradict the possibility of a Divine world-order. For it presupposes only that man has the power to love his next-nearest, as well as his nearest neighbor. It does not suppose that man can also appropriate that next-nearest object, as he can his nearest, and so redeem it from remaining a mere part of the world. Thus the prayer-enlightened man may anticipate or induce or solicit the kingdom of redemption. But he cannot force it, since the world must also continue to grow by itself. Man's attempt so to appropriate his next-nearest, as distinct from

his nearest neighbor in the world, thus makes itself known as the attempt to redeem the world before its time.[13]

IV

The religious situation or the situation of prayer is a situation in time. Yet it is not wholly in time, since it also includes God, Who is at once past Creator and present Revealer as well as future Redeemer, and therefore a-temporal or eternal. God's future cannot then strictly be distinguished from His past and present, or in Biblical language His "I am" remains indistinguishable from His "I shall be" (Exodus 3:14). God may then be spoken of as temporal, and so as anticipating a future redemption, not in Himself, but only in relation to the world and man.[14]

The world and man, however, live for the most part in the present, as distinct from the past and future. Precisely because they live in a present are they able to experience a distinct past at all, as the bearing of what is recollected on the present moment, and a distinct future, as the bearing of what is anticipated on the present moment. This experience of the future holds even where the future itself is not momentary, viz. the future <u>par excellence</u> of God's redemption which is experienced in prayer. This future too must then be measured, not in terms of standards beyond the world and man, i.e. in terms of God, but between the world and man, i.e. in terms of the relation between the world's self-exposure to man

in the form of the growth of natural and cultural life and man's self-exposure to the world in the form of love towards his neighbor. Thus the future kingdom of redemption may be said to be hastened or delayed only in terms of the relation between worldly growth and human love. Human love, enlightened by prayer, may either hurry forth to an anticipated goal in the future, thus by-passing its immediate neighbor and perhaps landing in a void. Or else worldly growth may open itself to wait an act of human love, which may however never come. Or, finally, human love may keep pace with worldly growth, and only in this last case may prayer which enlightens the future be said to be fulfilled, or occur in an acceptable time (cf. Psalm 69:4).[15]

Thus in the situation of prayer the right time is more important even than the right content. One may say that no prayer is improper on account of its content. Otherwise one is led to the conclusion that God may begrudge man his needs or supposed needs; but these may already have been granted even before prayer. Thus even the sinful prayer for the death of another has already been granted: the other, precisely as another, as an object of creation, must die or pass away, since death is the completion of merely created life. The sinfulness of the prayer for the death of another would then lie, not in its content, which is already fulfilled, but in man's acting as though it were not already fulfilled or as though creation had not already occurred. Thus its sinfulness would lie in

man's acting in an untimely way; for after creation, one does not ask for creation, but only gives thanks for it. By disregarding creation, the prayer for the death of another also disregards that the other is created "as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18), and so disregards the bridge which makes the other, not a mere other or a mere object of creation, but an object of redemption or a neighbor. The sinful prayer thus overlooks the proper time for soliciting what it must in the present, viz. the neighbor who is "as thyself".[16]

One may therefore summarize the bearing of time on the religious situation or the situation of prayer by distinguishing three kinds of prayer. First, the prayer of the sinner delays the coming of redemption by praying for what is already granted: it prays that the growth of life in the world may expose itself to his human hand, yet fails to act in love when that exposure occurs. Second, what may be called the prayer of the fanatic likewise delays the coming of redemption, though it tries to hasten it by directing love towards the distant goal which it anticipates: yet in so doing it bypasses its immediate neighbor, and its love falls into a void. Finally, the prayer of the believer alone hastens the coming of redemption, by anticipating the neighbor in prayer and by directing its love towards the neighbor in the present moment: in so anticipating the future and directing itself in the present, it alone occurs at the proper time.[17]

V

But the prayer of the believer, which occurs at the proper time, occurs in the religious situation, and hence not wholly in time or not only between the world and man, bur also before the eternal God. Otherwise the prayer of the believer would remain simply identical with the prayer of the unbeliever or of the humanist to his own destiny. The prayer of the unbeliever, such as that of Goethe, may also be timely: "Establish the daily work of my hands, great Fortuen, that I may complete it". Yet this prayer must be distinguished from that of the believer, such as that of "Moses the man of God"! "...Establish Thou...upon us the work of our hands; Yea, the work of our hands establish Thou it". (Psalm 90:17).[18]

For unlike the prayer of the unbeliever, the prayer of the believer must not only be timely, but ale relate what is timely to the Eternal. This the prayer of the unbeliever does not wish to do, as the prayer of the fanatic is unable to do. The prayer of the believer, however, aims at hastening a future redemption by making its goal, viz. the passing or disappearance of the world and man before the eternal Presence of God, into the one thing needful nere and now. The possibility of the prayer of the believer therefore stands or falls with the possibility of man's making such a Presence

enter into the here and now or of his bringing such an Eternity into the present moment of time.[19]

Yet is not such a moment, a moment which is a synthesis of time and eternity, a contradiction in terms? Or is there among moments one which is more than momentary, a moment which does not simply pass, but remains or -- at any rate -- recurs? Such a moment may be found in the hour. The hour -- or any period of time to which the concept of the "hour" may apply -- contains precisely such a synthesis of the passing and the permanent, of the new and the repeated. Each hour, like each passing moment, may be said to come anew. Yet unlike each passing moment, the hour may also be said to repeat itself, or to begin again, or in other words to remain constantly or timelessly present.[20]

The hour is moreover a human institution. It remains unknown on the basis of creation alone: the hour or day or week or month or year does not depend on the passing movements of the heavenly bodies alone, but rather on their perceptible repetition to men on earth. It therefore becomes intelligible only on the basis of redemption: the hour or day or week or month or year frees man from the merely passing moments of time, in enabling him to hold fast to them, by recollecting and anticipating them during his everyday life on earth. In the ever renewed repetition of those moments, as moments which are experienced not simply as present but also having occurred in the past and as about to occur in the future,

hence as more than timely but also timeless, man thus experiences eternity. The "hour" then makes possible man's experience of the Eternal. According to the Biblical account of the Flood, for example, the "hour", in the form of the unceasing repetition of the yearly seasons and daily hours which determine earthly labor and human life, is said to be guaranteed by God's first promise to the new generation of men as the most universal basis of His bond with humanity (Genesis 8:22).[21]

The "hour", as a more than merely temporal phenomenon, is best exemplified by the week. Like the other "hour", such as the day and the year, the week has some basis in creation: as the day and the year are based on the perceived changes of the sun, so the week is based on the perceived changes of the moon. Yet unlike the day and the year, there is no immediate basis in creation for the human and earthly changes which the week regulates: whereas the day regulates the human changes between waking and sleeping, and whereas the year regulates the earthly changes between seedtime and harvest (cf. Genesis 8:22), the week regulates the changes between workday and restday or between labor and contemplation. And these changes, though common to man and the earth, are so far from being based on creation, that the Bible compares them in turn to the work of creation itself (cf. Exodus 8:11). These changes are intelligible rather on the basis of redemption. The week binds man and the world together in the form of man's "culture" or cultivation of the earth. Yet it

also frees man from the world in order to bind both world and man to the Eternal, in the form of man's contemplation of the laws regulating his "culture" and the worldly and human changes it both presupposes and establishes. For example, it is no accident that the Biblical word for culture and cult, i.e. for service of the earth and service of God, is one and the same (Hebrew: 'avodah).[22]

The week, as the core of the cult, thus brings eternity into time. It therefore makes possible the prayer of the believer, as the prayer which occurs at the proper or acceptable time, in the form of the prayer of the believing community. Unlike the prayer of the unbeliever, the prayer of the believing community is not the prayer of the single person to his own destiny or in his own private time, but concerns the time of all. And therefore, unlike the prayer of the fanatic as well, the prayer of the believing community may bring about an enlightenment which comes not just to the individual but to all others, hence an enlightenment concerning a future goal which is no longer confined to the single standpoint or perspective, but concerns the end of all things or the end common to all.[23]

The religious situation in which the prayer of the believer occurs is thus best exemplified by the situation of the cultic prayer. For the cultic prayer does not abolish the situation in which the particular prayers of the single believer occurs. Rather it transfigures that situation, by subordinating those particular prayers to the prayer which

anticipates the common end of redemption. In enlightening the single believer concerning the end common to all, it however leaves the particular steps he must take on the way to that end shrouded in darkness. What is enlightened is then only the Object of anticipation par excellence: the eternal Presence of God. In cultic prayer, God may then reveal Himself as man's final Neighbor, Who is yet open here and now to human love.[24]

## VI

The religious situation thus discloses itself, above all, in the cultic prayer for redemption. The cultic prayer has so far been shown to have an ontological status within the whole, by being understandable in terms of creation, revelation and redemption. It remains to show that the situation in which the cultic prayer arises is itself not merely a matter of religious belief, but the situation underlying all religious belief: demonstration of this will however be limited to an account of Judaism. Following this, it remains to consider the final question, whether the religious situation also makes possible an understanding of God and the world and man as parts of the whole in terms of creation, revelation and redemption.

To that end a new organon is required. God and the world and man were first understood in terms of mathematics as

an organon; yet as a result of this organon, they were understood not as parts of the whole, but as fragmentary elements of experience. Creation, revelation and redemption were then understood in terms of grammar as an organon; yet as a result of this organon, the whole was understood to be quasi-temporal, and hence as temporary or as momentary as the spoken word. In order to understand God and the world and man as parts of a whole consisting of creation, revelation and redemption, the new organon must therefore overcome the mere fragmentariness of mathematics, and the mere momentariness of the spoken word. It must make possible an awareness of fragments of experience as parts of the whole, and of moments of time as anticipating the eternal. This new organon may be found in liturgy.

Liturgical patterns, like mathematical symbols, contain elements which may be isolated and correlated. Yet unlike mathematical symbols, liturgical patterns are accessible not only to reflective thought as remote abstractions, but also in everyday life as immediate realities. Like grammatical forms, then, liturgical patterns may also be intuited in common speech. Yet unlike grammatical forms, liturgical patterns disclose not merely relations among spoken words, but also the silence which no longer needs the spoken word, voz. the silence of understanding. Thus between men of common speech, not only the common word but often a certain glance may suffice to understanding. While between men of

different languages, not only stammers but more often gestures are the bridges to understanding. Similarly, the highest point of liturgy is not the common word, however understood, but the common gesture. Liturgy thus redeems gesture from the fetters of human speech, and so may be said to anticipate "that day" "when I will turn to the nations a purified lip, for all to call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one comment" (Zephaniah 3:9 and 11).[25]

# CHAPTER 12: JUDAISM

## I

An understanding of the religious situation, as the situation of cultic prayer, makes possible an understanding of Judaism. Judaism may accordingly be understood, not simply asa form of belief in past creation, present revelation and future redemption, but as a form of awareness, through these moments of time, of what is more than momentary or temporal, viz. eternity. In the situation of cultic prayer, the Jewish community recognizes not only an eternal Creator, Revealer and Redeemer, but also itself as partaking in that eternity. Thus, at the climax of the weekly Sabbath liturgy, viz. the reading of a portion of the Torah or Jewish law, the Jew prays: "Blessed art Thou...Who has planted eternal life in our midst." [26]

## II

This climax of the weekly Jewish liturgy, viz. the awareness of participation in "eternal life", may therefore be seen to be the core of the religious situation of the Jewish community or nation. The Jewish nation thus lives, not simply in time past, present and future, but in the constant recollection of the past and anticipation of the future during each present moment, hence in eternity. This eternity or this

constant recollection and anticipation of past and future in the present may be found at the most basic, as well as the highest levels of Jewish life. Thus even in the moment of bearing and propagation, by which the Jewish community is perpetuated its past and future are not distinct but inseparably connected: the new-born son is named after his oldest or most recently deceased forebear, a process which guarantees an unceasing link between the generations. At this level, the Jewish community or nation distinguishes itself from all other nations as an eternal blood-community -- a community whose continuance in past and future is based not on past and present will nor on present and future hope alone, but on the blood of generations past and future which flows through its veins in the present. As a blood-community, whose past and future does not depend on something alien to but within it, the Jewish nation thus distinguishes itself from other nations also in respect of its worldly dwelling or homeland, its human speech or language, and its divined customs or law.[27]

First, the Jewish nation distinguishes itself from all other nations in respect of its homeland. The national life of other nations requires that they root themselves on what is in itself not living but dead, on a piece of land. But their awareness of eternity, their recollection of the past and anticipation of the future, though superflicially more spiritual since independent of blood ties with the past and future, may also require for its preservation a defense of the land against conquering nations. In such cases, the nation

may reveal itself as dependent for its preservation more on its land than on its national life, and so may die by defending its land, while the land on which their life blood spills endures.[28]

The Jewish nation, in contrast, has endured precisely by abandoning its homeland. The father of the Jewish nation is not Adam, who is said to have sprung from the earth, but Abraham, who was commanded to leave the land of his birth, in favor of a land which God would show him. Moreover, not only in its earliest beginnings, but for the most part in its subsequent history, the Jewish nation has remained a nation in dispersion, having a homeland for which it can only yearn. And even when that land is settled, it is not then simply possessed by the Jews, but remains a holy land, a land in which the Jew is "a stranger and a sojourner" (Genesis 23:4), since, as God has told him, "the land is Mine" (Leviticus 25:23).[29]

Second, the Jewish nation distinguishes itself from all other nations in respect of its language. The everyday languages of other nations, unlike their homeland, are not an external or lifeless part of their life, but intimately bound up with their spiritual as well as their bodily life. Such languages are nonetheless transitory, since they too die with the passing away of the nation. A national language may then well be said to be the most vital possession of a nation, for which, like its homeland, a nation may well prepare to fight; yet what is fought for is not for that reason eternal, but

rather mortal and so temporal.[30]

The everyday language of the Jewish nation is however dependent not on itself alone, but on the language of the land in which it happens to settle. Thus even Yiddish, a language of Ashkenasic Jews, is for the most part a descendent of medieval High German (as is modern German), and Ladino, that of Sephardic Jews, is for the most part of Spanish derivation. And even where the Jew speaks the language of the land where he happened to be born, his tendency towards a special vocabulary or his preference for a part of its vocabulary reveals that the language as such which he speaks is not his own as a Jew. The Jewish nation's own language, while long removed from everyday life, is nonetheless never considered by Jews a dead, but rather a holy language -- a language of prayer. Because his language of prayer may differ from his everyday language or because the language in which he addresses God may differ from the language in which he addresses his fellow man, the Jew is never fully at home in the language of everyday, any more than in the land of exile. He may then take refuge in a region where his everyday speech cannot enter -- in the silent study of the written language which is found in his holy books.[31]

Finally, the Jewish nation also distinguishes itself from other nations in respect of its customs and law. For all other nations, customs may differ from law as what is handed down from the past differs from what is intended to provide for the future. Thus present changes of habit may remain alive as

tomorrow's customs, though they are not necessarily enforced as tomorrow's laws; while present provisions for the future may derive from yesterday's storehouse of memories, though they are not necessarily identical with yesterday's customs. It is this difference between past custom and future provision which makes possible for other nations the experience of a distinct past, present and future, yet which also prevents them from experiencing a present which is wholly identical with their past and future, i.e. a present which is eternal.[32]

Jewish custom and law, on the other hand, are never wholly distinct, since neither is allowed to be subject to change. What appear to be identical with customs, viz. the so-called ceremonial as distinct from the moral laws of Judaism, are not customs strictly speaking, since their number or obligation to be performed are said neither to increase nor decrease with the passing of time. And what appears to be identical with the constitutional or common law of other nations, nations which undergo foundings and revolutions, is not law as such, since Jewish law is said to be forsaken but never altered. Custom and law come together as one in the Jewish Torah -- literally: teaching -- a teaching which is independent both of the memory of the Jewish past and of the personalities of its subsequent interpreters. Because the Torah is independent of past memories, for example, the Jewish nation reckons time not from its founding as a people, but, having no such interest in its past, rather from the very creation of the world. And

because the Torah is independent of interpreting personalities, the Jewish nation defines its national purpose, not in terms of events past, present and futufe alone, but in terms of life which endures despite or apart from temporal changes -- a life in accord with a holy law.[33]

III

This distinction of the Jewish nation from all other nations, as a nation whose life is eternal rather than temporal, finds expression in the Jewish nation's understanding of itself as "the unique nation" (cf. II Samuel 7:23). As a merely unique nation, it might remain a nation among nations, a species sharing a common genus with other species, and hence a nation sharing a common identity with all other nations which is understandable in the terms of no one nation alone. Thus, for example, the Jewish nation's view of God and the world and man might be identical in certain respects with the views of gods and of the world and of man enjoyed by other nations, and this identity might well be understood from a point of view independent of those of all nations. But as the unique nation, the Jewish nation understands itself not simply as distinct from all other nations, but as the epitome of all nations, hence as superior to all other nations in the decisive respect or as containing within itself the best elements of all nations despite its also being a nation among nations. So too the Jewish nation understands its view

on

of God and the world and man as not only distinct from, but also inclusive or comprehensive of all other such views, i.e. as the comprehensive or total view of which all others are merely partial expressions. Yet the Jewish understanding of its one view as the view of all would seem to be paradoxical or self-contradictory -- a contradiction which also finds expression within each of the Jewish views of God and the world and man respectively, as a polarity or synthesis of opposite poles within each.[34]

Thus the Jewish God is at once a God of justice or retribution and a God of love or mercy. Both these views, love and justice, come together in Jewish prayers of blessing as "our Father" and "King of the universe", and in Jewish prayers for forgiveness as "our Father, our King". Yet these aspects remain distinct. Thus, for example, the psalmist admonishes kings and judges of the earth to "serve the Lord with fear...and trembling" (Psalm 2:11); while yet the prophet comforts Israel with God's mercy, that they "be not dismayed at the signs of heaven" as are the other nations (Jeremiah 10:2 with 9:23).[35]

Similarly, the Jewish man is at once a soul beloved of God and a lover of his neighbor. Thus, although God is said (in the blessing preceding the weekly Torah readings) to have chosen him from among all nations, he is nonetheless said to be not alone with God but set in the world among other nations who, like Egypt and Assyria, are also "My nation" (Isaiah 19:25). On the one hand, the Jewish man is thus the faithful

servant, eternally beloved of God. On the other hand, he is also the stranger in a strange land, who waits for the Messiah.[36]

Finally, the Jewish world is at once this-world, created by Divine providence, and the world-to-come, progressing toward Divine redemption. These poles come together in the Jew's blessings which accompany his everyday acts -- blessings which at once acknowledge everyday purposes, yet relate them to a Divine Creator and Redeemer. Yet these poles too remain distinct. Indeed, one blessing explicitly divides the world into the holy and the profane -- into Sabbath and workday, into the Jewish nation and the other nations, and by implication into study of Torah and earning of livelihood, etc.[37]

## IV

Yet the Jewish views of God and man and the world, by which the Jewish nation's understanding of itself as eternal receives expression, do not each remain simply polar or contradictory or twofold. Their twofoldness is also resolved or unified in Jewish awareness. However, their resolution does not occur simply through the Jew's abstract thinking or reflection on the "essence" underlying his views of God and man and the world, i.e. quasi-mathematically; nor does it occur simply through his constant interpretation and reinterpretation of the words which relate God and man and the world

for him in creation, revelation and redemption, i.e. exegetically or grammatically. The Jew's awareness of them is resolved liturgically: in the yearly cycle of Jewish ritual, the contradictory aspects and conflicting opinions arising from the Jewish views of God and man and the world are resolved in the shared silence of prayer.[38]

The basis of the Jewish liturgy is thus an establishing by speech of the conditions under which such shared silence is possible, or in other words the establishing of what is otherwise a mere crowd into a congregation. This establishing does not occur merely by dialogue: dialogue invites reply, and hence not shared silence but noisy controversy. It occurs rather by a sermon, which differs from dialogue or the speech of controversy by being based on a text which is non-controversial, and hence appears in the form of exegesis which professes to add nothing to the text but what is already implied in it. The sermon, unlike, say, the political speech, evokes no reply, but the unanimity of silent listening.[39]

This basis is found above all in the weekly Jewish Sabbath, in which the liturgical focus is the reading of the Torah. Since each Sabbath is like every other Sabbath, save for the portion of the Torah read, which differs according to an annual cycle, the Sabbath reveals itself as part of a larger whole, viz. of the year. The Sabbath however remains the basis of the Jewish year, since it progresses unchanging through the year, despite the changing seasonal and personal celebrations. The Sabbath is, as it were the creation of

the Jewish year in which Jewish life is situated, and so is celebrated as a "memorial of the work of creation".[40]

The Sabbath thus reflects at once an awareness of the sameness of events past, present and future in the year, and of the creation of the world; it thus reflects an awareness of events past, present and future from the point of view of the creation of the world, or in other words an awareness of past creation, present revelation and future redemption in relation to the world as created. The awareness of the world in relation to its past creation occurs above all in the Sabbath eve home liturgy, where the words concluding the Biblical account of creation ("...and the heaven and the earth were completed...") accompany the blessing over wine, and the thought of God's providing the basic necessity for human life accompanies the blessing over bread. The awareness of the world in relation to revelation occurs in the Sabbath morning liturgy, as the reader chosen from the congregation to read from the Torah or book of revelation concludes with the blessing which acknowledges God's choosing the Jewish nation from all the nations of the world in giving it the Torah, and so planting within its midst eternal life. And the awareness of the world in relation to future redemption occurs in the Sabbath afternoon liturgy, above all in the insertion of the hymn to God's unity, which echoes the proclamation of faith by which the Jewish nation is required to "hear" that God is One and to take upon itself

"the yoke of the kingdom of heaven".[41]

Yet the Sabbath, which reflects the world's creation, revelation and redemption, reflects them only and does not realize them to the full extent as do the other festivals. It remains a festival of reflection or rest, which for the most part merely mirrors passively the activity of the other days surrounding it. Thus its liturgy may be determined by the liturgy of the yearly festivals with which it may coincide. And thus it is distinguished from other days of the week only as rest from activity or as the holy from the profane or as a restful completion of past work from an active beginning of new work. However, as a day of rest or reflection, it also provides the basis for the Jewish experience of revelation, as creation of the world itself was said to provide the basis for revelation to man. On the Sabbath, the Jew ceases from workday talk, including even the workday talk of the household, in favor of a silence or listening before God. And the Sabbath also provides the basis for the Jewish experience of redemption, as the creation of the world itself was said to provide the basis for redemption. The Sabbath liturgy, for example, omits the weekday requests for creaturely necessities and revealed forgiveness, and retains only the prayers for peace and redemption, as well as praises and thanks.[42]

But if the basis of Jewish liturgy is silent listening, as found in the Sabbath, that basis is not the whole of Jewish liturgy. For Jewish life does not remain, once created, merely repetitive and reflective, but also renews or recreates

itself. This renewal occurs, not in listening alone, which may make possible the life of the spirit, but in eating, which is also necessary for the life of the body. And whereas common listening may establish the basis of the community, the life of the community becomes further revealed not simply in common obedience to what is heard, but in the individual freedom which is possible on that basis -- the freedom which may be found at a common meal.[43]

The common meal, though present in the Sabbath, occurs above all in Judaism during the three harvest or pilgrim festivals, viz. the festival of Passover or the deliverance from Egypt, the festival of Weeks or the revelation of the Ten Commandments, and the festival of Booths or thanksgiving in the wilderness. These three festivals, like the Sabbath, also celebrate creation, revelation and redemption. Thus the deliverance from slavery creates the Jewish nation into a nation, the revelation on Sinai is the Jewish nation's revelation <u>par excellence</u>, and the wandering in the wilderness is at once a wandering through the world with the Torah. Yet unlike the Sabbath, the focus of these festivals is not the world as created in the past, but man as a bearer of revelation in the present. For these festivalsdo not simply recall past events in the world, but experience those events as present to man today: the Passover Haggaddah, for example, instructs each participant to celebrate the festival as though he personally had been delivered from Egypt. These festivals, as festivalsof revelation, are thus themselves revelations

to the Jewish man.[44]

Passover, like the Sabbath, celebrates creation, though whereas the Sabbath commemorates the creation of the world, Passover celebrates the creation of the Jewih nation as a nation chosen to receive a revelation of the Divine law. Like the Sabbath, Passover is a reminder of freedom from servitude, though whereas the Sabbath reminds of man's freedom from service to the earth, Passover reminds of man's freedom from servitude to his fellow man. Unlike the Sabbath, the Passover ritual meal therefore expresses this freedom not simply in the silence of listening, e.g. to the Passover story, a silence which would remain autocratic subjecting all at the table to the dictation of the father who is reader of the story, but in the fact that the meal must both begin and end with a question and contribution from the youngest member of the family, and culminate in common song. The Passover synagogue liturgy ale culminates with a distant revelation of redemption, as prophesied in the very creation of the Jewish people -- a prophecy of the messiah who is to arise from the stock of Jesse, and of the messianic age (Isaiah 11: 1-10).[45]

The festival of Weeks, like Passover, concerns the Jewish nation as a nation chosen to receive a revelation of the Divine law. Yet whereas Passover concerns the nation's creation for that purpose, Weeks concerns the revelation simply. Thus, though the festival is anticipated by the counting of days for seven weeks between Passover and Weeks,

the festival itself concentrates solely on the miraculous events of Sinai, viz. God's descent to His nation, and the proclaiming of the Ten Commandments, which are the core of Jewish law. The liturgical readings from the Prophets too speak of nothing more than Divine revelation, in the form of Ezekiel's vision of the chariot (Ezekiel 1) and Habakkuk's song of God's stormy entry into the world (Habakkuk 3).[46]

Finally, the festival of Booths, like the festival of Passover and Weeks, concerns the Jewish nation's being chosen to receive a revelation of the Divine law. Yet unlike those festivals, the festival of Booths is celebrated not by recalling the creation of the Jewish nation in its exodus from Egypt, not by reenacting the revelation of its law on Sinai, but by anticipating its future redemption despite its present wanderings. Thus the festival of Booths is at once a festival of wandering and rest, and is celebrated by reenacting a temporary pause in the Jewish nation's wandering through the wilderness: meals and other home life are then conducted not in the home itself, but under a temporary and makeshift roof. The awareness of present wandering and future rest come together in the awareness of hope: the first day of the festival includes a reading of that portion of the book of Zechariah which prophesies hopefully, "And the Lord shall be King over all the earth; in that day shall the Lord be One and His name one" (Zechariah 14:9). Yet as a festival of revelation, the festival of Booths remains a festival of revelation of hope only, and not of realization of that hope: it also in-

cludes a reading of that most skeptical of Biblical books, the books of Ecclesiastes. And the festival ends with the Rejoicing in the Law, a day which concludes the annual cycle of reading of the Torah, the book of revelation, and immediately begins that cycle again.[47]

Nonetheless these festivals or common meals, though based on a common listening, do not yet constitute the whole of the common silence of Jewish liturgy. The common meal unites only at hours of celebration, and unites only those who are actually invited to it. And though the invitation may remain open for all who might have heard it, those who did hear it did so each singly, for each then becomes a member of the community only during the meal itself, as he becomes acquainted with all others present. Moreover, although those who partake together become no longer strangers but may even come to express their mutual acquaintance at future gatherings in the silent gesture of greeting or in some wordless salutation, still this silence may also be disturbed, even as at the meal table, by the voices of those who did not hear the common invitation or who do not partake in the common meal. This silence would then be truly complete or truly common to all only if past listening and present partaking too were somehow to become common to all, and so make possible a common salutation of all to all. But such would be possible on the basis neither of past listening or obedience, nor of present eating or partaking alone. In an army, for example, past obedience may result in common discipline, as expressed in

the stiff salute of private to officer, and present partaking may result in common comradeship, as expressed in the easy greeting among privates; yet both, while necessary to the morale of the army, do not suffice for an awareness of its common goals -- an awareness whose expression is possible only in the common parade or review, in saluting a flag before the commander-in-chief. This common salute like the stiff salute of subordinate to superior expresses common discipline, yet unlike the stiff salute it also expresses common morale, since though required of all it need not or cannot be returned by anyone (the commander-in-chief) or anything (the flag); and like the easy greeting it expresses common comradeship too, but unlike the easy greeting its expression remains independent of past and present experiences which may prepare or forestall the realization of that comradeship, since neither the flag nor the commander-in-chief passes with the passing of individual soldiers in the parade, but remains common to all. Similarly, the common salutation of all to all takes place in Jewish liturgy, not by a common obedience and partaking alone, but by a common kneeling or prostration before God.[48]

This common kneeling or prostration occurs in Jewish liturgy only on the Days of Awe -- the Jewish New Year and Day of Atonement. The central prayer of these days is an enlargement of the prayer which concludes each weekday, festival and Sabbath service, for a future redemption "when every knee shall bow before God, when the idols will be utterly

cut off, when the world will be perfected under the kingdom of the Almighty, and all the children of flesh will call upon His name, when He will turn unto Himself all the wicked of the earth, and all will accept the yoke of His kingdom". Yet this prayer is enlarged not only in speech but also in deed, for it is here and here alone that the Jew actually prostrates himself before God. And as this silent prostration before God is the focus of the liturgy of the Days of Awe, there is a corresponding diminution in the significance of the worldly and the merely human.[49]

Worldly events and circumstances no longer appear of decisive importance on the Days of Awe, since the Jew's freely prostrating himself is something no worldly power could compel him to do (as, for example, the king of Persia once tried to do) and no worldly desire would provoke him to do. For he does not kneel to confess or even to pray for forgiveness, but only to acknowledge the immediate nearness of God on those Days. He kneels then at the prospect of Divine judgment, not as a member of a nation, but as a single person. For though he craves forgiveness as "We", the sins for which he prays are not those which are merely transgressions of Jewish law, but sins common to men as men.[50]

But man too diminishes in importance on these Days, as symbolized by the Jew's clothing himself in his funeral shroud. For on the holiest of these Days, man prays for forgiveness not of sins against his fellow man: for these he is to have sought human forgiveness from his fellow man during the pre-

ceding interval between the New Year and the Day of Atonement. On the Day of Atonement, he prays only for forgiveness of his sins as a single soul before God, Who is "merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, Who keeps His mercy unto the thousandth generation, Who forgives uniquity and transgression and sin, and has mercy on him who returns" (cf. Exodus 34:6-7). And he concludes the liturgy of that Day with the sound of the ram's horn, having no more need to express his relation to God in merely worldly and human analogies: "The Lord, He is God".[51]

This disappearing or passing of the worldly and the human before the immediate Presence of God, as acknowledged in the Jew's silent kneeling during the Days of Awe, constitutes the Jew's experience of redemption par excellence. And the experience is more than momentary, but marks the passing of the old year and the coming of the new, hence a togetherness of past and future in the present, i.e. a present which is eternal. Yet this experience of eternity or this hour in which the Jew experiences redemption also gives way once more to what is not yet redeemed. In the same month as the Days of Awe, occurs the festival of Booths, which reinstates the liturgical cycle of the year by recommencing the weekly Sabbath readings of the Torah.[52]

## V

So much for an account of Judaism in terms of the

religious situation or the situation of cultic prayer. Such an account suffices, at any rate, to distinguish the Jewish experience of creation, revelation and redemption, as well as its awareness of God and the world and man. The question however remains whether God and the World and man can also be understood philosophically in terms of creation, revelation and redemption, apart from Judaism. The answer to this question thus requires turning away from Judaism to an understanding of God and the world and man as parts of the whole, or in other words to a theory of philosophical truth.

# CHAPTER 13: THE WHOLE

## I

The religious situation or the situation of prayer is constituted by man's experience in the world before God. Can man then, given that situation, also aspire to a philosophical truth concerning himself and the world and God, i.e. an experience of God and the World and man as being each distinct from all else or a knowledge of each as parts of the whole? Such a knowledge would appear inescapably confined to man's religious situation, and hence far from comprehending the whole truth underlying that situation, would remain the merely partial and fragmentary experience of the man in that situation. However, there is at least one element of the religious situation which man may experience as more than a mere part or fragment of that situation, viz. the God Who enters into the religious situation as past Creator, present Revealer and future Redeemer, yet also remains distinct from that situation as past, present and future simply, i.e. as timeless or eternal. Man's search for the truth concerning God and the world and man which does not simply depend on his religious situation, but underlies it, would then seem best to begin with a consideration of God. This beginning would also seem confirmed by Jewish experience, according to which truth itself is an attribute of God, viz. the "seal by which He is known" (Babylonian Talmud: Sabbath 55a).[53]

II

But man, including the Jewish man, experiences God directly only by revelation, hence only in Divine love. Nor does he then experience that God is a lover, since his experience of Divine love remains too momentary or immediate for man to experience what God is. In the moment of Divine love, he may experience only that Such revelation points to past creation as its basis (cf. Song of Songs 8:6) and to future redemption as its completion (cf. ibid. 8:1). He may then experience only that all his experience is determined by a revelation which is at once a revelation of past creation and future redemption.[54]

God's essence thus remains hidden to man even in His revelation to man. Man then envisions God as past Creator of human life and death in the world, and as its future Redeemer from the world, only insofar as he first becomes enlightened by a revelation of Divine love in the here and now. But on the one hand, what preceded that revelation in the past remains too remote for him to behold directly the hand of God as Creator. While on the other hand, what will follow that revelation in the future remains too remote for him to behold directly the face of God as Redeemer.[55]

On the one hand, in revelation man envisions God's past directly only as beginning in creation. Thus the First word of the Bible, the book of revelation, is simply "In the beginning" (Hebrew: b'reshit) and its second word "created"

(Hebrew: barah). Beyond that beginning, God may be envisioned only indirectly or comparatively speaking, i.e. in an indirect or comparative way, viz. as superior to creation or as Lord of creation. What God is apart from creation however remains inaccessible to direct experience, or would become accessible only by way of comparison with what preceded creation, viz. nothing. Thus, from the standpoint of creation, it is possible to envision what God is or what the gods are apart from creation, i.e. as the Lord or lords of nothing. But such a God or such gods, i.e. the God or gods of paganism, may themselves become experienced as "nothings" (Psalm 96:5), though perhaps as living "nothings", in comparison to "the Lord Who made heaven and earth" (Psalm 115:15).[56]

On the other hand, too, in revelation man envisions God's future directly only as ending in redemption. Thus revelation promises only that man's eye may come to gaze upon Him Whom he loves (cf. Micah 4:11). It does not specify further what precisely will be gazed upon. Nonetheless, man may experience God as Redeemer not only directly, through revelation, but also indirectly, by his appropriating those objects in the world which are his neighbor, and so unifying himself and the world before God. In this work of unification, man anticipates God's future by making himself and the world, hitherto like God only by comparison as Lord to creature, more and more like God simply, viz. One. The future of God is thus knowable indirectly, by anticipation, as the disappearance of all distinctions between man and objects in the world, and so

between the earthly and the Divine, or in other words as the disappearance of all objective distinctions or names simply, in favor of the One Name Which may be opposed by no other or in favor of the silent Unity of God.[57]

This silent existence of the Highest, a Being opposed to nothing but ruling one and all, is thus the final or highest or limiting truth which is knowable in the religious situation. It is a philosophical truth, since although it is not a truth knowable simply by philosophical analysis of other truths or half truths or error, it may yet testify to itself by being one with all reality and in no way distinguished from it. Nonetheless it also remains a religious truth, a truth which is experienced merely by anticipation of man in the religious situation. In Jewish liturgy, this truth is anticipated by the Jew's keeping silent God's true name, as symbolized by the tetragrammaton (YHWH), but calling Him only Creator or Revealer, viz. as "Lord" (Hebrew: Adonai).[58]

Nonetheless this Jewish silence remains a profound silence -- a silence which believes itself to anticipate the final silence by which God redeems Himself and the world and man from all words. Such a silence thus makes possible too an awareness of God's essence, not indeed directly, but indirectly, by reflection on the anticipated possibility of a final silence of God. God's essence would then have to be expressed in a word which no longer requires other words or distinctions for its meaning, but which would connote the last word simply, including in its meaning the meanings of all other

words, viz. not "nothing" (which refers only to what precedes creation), not "something" (which refers to what precedes redemption), but "everything" or "all things" or "the whole". The whole, as the truth underlying man's religious situation, may thus make itself known not only to religious immediacy, but also by philosophical reflection, as "the seal by which /God/ becomes known".[59]

III

This knowledge of God's essence by reflection, as the whole or the truth about the whole or the truth simply, is not without consequences for a knowledge of the world. For if God is the truth, and if God is also Lord of the world or of all objects in the world or of all reality, then must not the truth like God be elevated above all reality, and so perhaps be inaccessible through merely human efforts in the world? Conversely, if truth is accessible to man in the world, then must it not be, in addition to the essence of God, also an object in the world? But in the latter case it would follow that God, as the truth, would be not only the whole or absolute Reality of the world-to-come, but meanwhile a mere partial or finite reality in the world today![60]

This dilemma would be resolved only if God were not simply identical with His essence, viz. truth, but if truth remained the mere "seal" or sign of His Lordship over the world, while at the same time God remained somehow more than the truth or

more than His essence. Thus even if truth were the final and only attribute of God, still God must remain more than simply truth. This solution becomes intelligible grammatically, at any rate, if the sentence, "God is truth", is distinguished from all sentences whose predicate is a universal concept subordinating or including the subject, so that the subject, "God", would signify more than the predicate, "truth", i.e. so that the thing referred to as "God" would not be sufficiently described by its concept, "truth". But if truth is not identical with God, then what is it?[61]

According to one view, the truth may be said to be nothing more than that which is undeniable or indubitable in itself, and this self-undeniability or self-indubitability would be the sole and whole guaranty of or warrant for truth. Thus the sentence "There is truth", or "Truth exists", would be the only undeniable or indubitable sentence. It would follow that the sentence, "God is truth", is not only doubtful, but even impermissible, since this sentence makes truth dependent on something else which is the subject of the sentence, whereas truth as wholly and solely warranted by its indubitability must remain always an autonomous subject and never a predicate dependent on another subject. Thus too the question, "What is truth?" would appear a major philosophical error.[62]

Now one may grant with this view the existence or validity or matter-of-factness of truth. For it is impossible to say "There is no truth", since this sentence too must then be true. But the question remains what else is granted along with this

matter of fact of truth, or what is the basis for regarding this matter of fact. For example, must not the matter of fact then be as worthy of regard or as important as the truth itself, in which case the conclusion follows that truth is not simply autonomous or guaranteed by itself, but also requires belief in a matter of fact as its basis?[63]

This last conclusion would seem confirmed in that in everyday life any fact, including the fact of truth, requires some basis for its being believed in. And yet truth is not simply believed in as a fact, otherwise its importance as truth would give way to its mere importance as a matter of belief. But in this last case, truth would be indistinguishable from error, since error too is believed in as a fact. Can one then safely grant both the fact of truth, as distinguished from error, and the basis of that fact in belief? In order to do so, one would have to say that the undeniability of truth is believed in as a true fact, while the undeniability of error is believed in only as an untrue fact. In other words, thesource of such belief must be, not merely its matter-of-factness, but its believability or trustworthiness, its "truth" as a matter of fact. The source of belief in the matter-of-factness of truth must then be the further belief that matters of fact are capable of supporting the truth believed in, or that truth itself has some basis not only in reflective thought but also in the world of everyday life. Thus, for example, identification of truth in everyday life as God's

"seal", need not be denied simply by a reflective thought without further basis in everyday life.[64]

Truth must then be identified, not as a universal concept which may cast light on God's essence for philosophical reflection alone, but on the contrary as something which demands belief or trust in itself as a matter of fact in the world. For this reason, truth, though predicable of God, must remain distinct from Him. Far from being the basis for knowledge of God by man in the world, it may rather appeal for its believability or trustworthiness to God Himself as its origin beyond the world. Thus truth may be confirmed by an enlightenment of man in the world which is possible, not only in the abstract reflections of philosophy, but in the religious immediacy of prayer. And God's essence would then appear, not aswholly explained by that enlightenment, but rather as the mysterious Source of all such enlightenment. The sentence, "God is truth", would then signify not simply the furthest limit of knowledge possible in the religious situation by means of philosophical reflection, but also a return to the immediate experience of that situation, viz. the momentary experience of God's love.[65]

This twofold understanding of truth, viz. as the truth of religious immediacy as well as of philosophical reflection, entails that truth may be experienced most clearly at the point of convergence between everyday life as attested to by religious immediacy and speculative thought as found in philosophical reflection. On the one hand, sheer speculation,

which presupposes nothing, must lead not to God's essence as a part of the whole, but only to "nothing" simply -- as shown in Part 1. On the other hand, in religious immediacy God's essence likewise remains hidden behind His creation, and the whole knowable only by a momentary anticipation of His future redemption -- as shown in Part II. The fragmentariness of both attempts to discover the truth about the whole becomes intelligible when both are set in the religious situation -- as developed earlier in Part III.[66]

For if the attempt to discover the truth about the whole is in the last analysis dependent on the religious situation, then, on the one hand, the "nothing" which is the result of a purely speculative attempt may be seen, not simply as an autonomous whole which comes to be thought, but as a contingent fact of life, i.e. the lack or expectation of something which is not yet experienced, viz. revelation. And on the other hand, the whole which is anticipated by religious immediacy may be seen, not simply as a momentary vision, but as a confirmation or explication of a revelation already experienced. The former as well as the latter search for truth then leads, not away from, but into the midst of everyday life. Conversely, everyday life is then situated between both expectation and fulfilment, or in theological terms between creation and redemption. But if so, then the religious situation in turn discloses itself as the situation <u>par excellence</u>, i.e. as the actual situation of man in the world. And that situation becomes the situation, not only of man's search for truth,

but also of man's living with truth, viz. the truths of everyday life as they present themselves above all to the man enlightened by prayer.[67]

IV

The foregoing implies that, whereas the final or whole truth may remain hidden to man in the religious situation or man in the situation of prayer, yet it may also appear in a fragmentary form to the man who becomes enlightened concerning himself and the world and God in prayer. This last possibility would receive expression by the word which acknowledges whatever light prayer may cast upon man's situation, viz. the particle "truly" (Hebrew: amen). Yet this human acknowledgement of truth in life occurs from the standpoint of his personal experience of past fulfilment and future expectation or of past creation and future redemption in his presently revealed here and now. It implies that whatever awareness man has of the whole truth requires an awareness of what is true of or for him personally here and now.[68]

It implies that man may appropriate or recognize the whole truth or the truth of God only by first appropriating or recognizing the immediate truth or the truth presently revealed in the religious or human situation. So far as that truth is revealed, it must then be appropriated not just as a discovery, but as a gift which points to a Giver. While so far as it occurs in that situation, it reveals itself as, not

indeed the whole truth, but nonetheless a part of the whole. And it may also be recognized by each man as his own "part" or "portion" of the whole (cf. Psalm 16:5).

Such a portion is moreover not simply fragmentary, since man may also recognize its fragmentariness as a fragment of the whole or as a portion granted by the Eternal. And this whole or this Eternal may then be reflected upon insofar as it becomes part of human life by revelation. Thus, for example, man may reflect on God so far as the word of revelation, the Bible, becomes a part of his life. Yet as man experiences through the word of any other only what the other himself speaks, and not what the other himself experiences, so too with the Other par excellence. This Other or God may thus disclose Himself to human reflection as the Source of man's human situation here and now, yet beyond that as remaining a Mystery of mysteries. And the particular standpoint by which man recognizes that Mystery would become the highest expression of his situation as man.[70]

One is therefore led to a final distinction, between the whole truth or the truth about the whole and the human truth or the truth of man's religious situation. The former must remain a mystery to man, knowable only as God's truth, which He bears in Himself as His "part" or "seal". The latter is however man's acknowledgement of that truth, as expressed in his human "truly" or "amen". As truth simply may be said to be the seal of or the truth sealed by God, so man's "truly" or "amen" may be said to be the seal of, or the truth sealed by, man.[71]

V

This final distinction between the whole truth and the human truth implies that the search for knowledge of God and the world and man as parts of the whole must give way to an awareness of ignorance concerning God and the world and man, though of an ignorance which is aware of the grounds of its ignorance in terms of the religious or human situation. This means that philosophy can no longer aspire to a truth which wholly transcends the situation of the individual man who philosophizes. On the contrary, it must concern itself precisely with the truth already present in that situation. For the Jew, for example, the philosophical search for knowledge of God and man and the world must concern itself with the truth present in what has already been called the Jewish God, the Jewish man and the Jewish world.[72]

The Jewish God, for example, has already been said to be at once a God of justice or retribution and a God of love or mercy, or in other words a God of both creative power and revealed love. These poles may come together in Jewish awareness as "our God and God of our fathers". In this expression God is indistinguishably Creator and Revealer: as Creator He is not called by His revealed name but only as "God" (Hebrew: Elohim) generally, yet His having revealed Himself to the Jewish nation is acknowledged by the inseparable adjective "our" (Hebrew: Elohenu). However, this unification of God as Creator and Revealer in Jewish everyday awareness may appear

on reflection to be a rather narrow or simply parochial view of God. It may appear to overlook that God is also said by Jews to be "King of the universe" -- a universe not simply confined to the creation of and revelation to the Jewish nation. Philosophical reflection may therefore wish to conclude that the Jewish awareness of God restricts creation to the world of Jewish experience and revelation to the Jewish soul.[73]

Similarly, the Jewish man has already been said to be at once a soul beloved of God and a lover of his neighbor. These poles too come together in the Jewish concept of the "remnant" of Israel (cf. Isaiah 11:11). According to this concept, a Jewish remnant "shall remain" (ibid.) throughout world history, though not necessarily by expanding itself throughout the world, but rather by constant subtraction of its numbers and its non-Jewish responsibilities. Yet this bringing together of the Jewish man's experiences of revelation and redemption may also seem somewhat narrow or parochial. Thus men are said to be judged in the final Judgment by Jewish standards, e.g. by such questions as, on the one hand, "Have you deduced one thing from another (in study)?" i.e. did you reckon all things in terms of the revelation given to the Jewish nation, and on the other hand, "Have you hoped for salvation (viz. the coming of the Messiah)?" i.e. did you acknowledge the Jewish nation's being directed towards a final redemption. The conclusion may seem inescapable that

revelation is here confined to the Jewish soul and redemption to the Jewish nation.[74]

Finally, the Jewish world has already been said to be at once this-world created by Divine Providence and the world-to-come requiring future redemption. These poles come together also in the Jewish notion of its Torah as the Law par excellence. Thus the Torah is said to order all this-worldly life, while at the same time the Torah will not change in the world-to-come, so that God Himself according to an ancient legend "studies" the Torah daily. But this view of the world, like the Jewish views of God and man, may also appear simply narrow or parochial. That God may have more to do with a world which is not yet ready for redemption, than to study Jewish law, would seem so far forgotten, that the Jew himself is advised to study the Torah carefully, on the ground that "all is in it". Upon reflection, it may therefore appear here too that the creation of the world and its redemption are confined only to the world as experienced by the Jewish nation.[75]

Philosophical reflection is therefore required to face the possibility of three dangers inherent in Jewish experience, consequent upon the Jewish nation's distinguishing itself from all other nations in the world. First, the danger of a Jewish renunciation of the world may arise when the Jew, anticipating himself alongside a Redeemer Who is "our God and God of our fathers", overlooks that God is also Creator of the whole world and Revealer to man simply. Second, the danger of a Jewish despising of the world may occur when the Jew,

feeling himself a "remnant" and so alone primordially created in God's image, withdraws from his fellow man for whom revelation and redemption may also be intended. And finally, the dnager of a Jewish mortification of the world may take place when the Jew, possessing a revealed Law by which he lives, dares to subordinate all creation and judge all redemption according to its terms.[76]

Yet these dangers would be -- and are -- dissipated, insofar as the Jew's apparent retreat into narrow or parochial or inward awareness may also be an ascent to the highest possible awareness. Thus they may make possible the awareness of his religious or human situation as a Jew. The Jew, though born a Jew with "eternal life" in his veins, may come to know that the meaning of his Jewishness requires his turning inward towards himself, in order to experience his situation. One need only recall the prototype of a Jew as an old man, rich with inward reflection.[77]

Thus philosophical reflection must also acknowledge that the Jew may become inward "for the sake of heaven". If so, perhaps the severity of his apparent renouncing the world, the haughtiness of his apparent despising the world and the inflexibility of his apparent mortifying the world may remain dangers for individual Jews. But, not so for Judaism as such. For the Jewish experience of God as "our God...",of man as the "remnant" of Israel, and of the world as subordinate to his Law, are not final experiences for the Jew, but may also lead to his experience of creation, revelation and redemption simply.[78]

Thus, for example, Jewish mysticism casts a bridge between "our God and God of our fathers" and the Law, by interpreting universal creation in a mysterious way, with allusions to Ezekiel's account of the chariot (Ezekiel 1). According to this doctrine, the world as created is full of mysterious connections to the Law, so that the Law is not alien to the world but rather the key to all its riddles. The plain meaning of the words of the Law is said to conceal a hidden meaning, which leads to an understanding of all events in the world. Accordingly, the Jewish book of Law becomes as it were a book of nature, or at any rate a book concerning the heavenly things by which the earthly things are understood. In this way, the apparently narrow meaning of the words may be said to be broadened into a universal meaning, and conversely the world becomes prefigured in the Law. Thus the sense of the resulting interpretation of the Law is that between the Jewish God and the Jewish Law all of creation is inserted, and that both God and His Law thereby show themselves as all-inclusive as creation.[79]

Similarly, Jewish mysticism also casts a bridge between "our God..." and the "remnant" of Israel, by means of the doctrine of the Shechinah or Divine Presence. According to this doctrine, revelation or the descent of God to man is represented in terms of a preceding distinction within God Himself. God is said to distinguish Himself from Himself, in order to give part of Himself away to His nation, to suffer with them their sufferings and endure with them their exile and wander with them in their wanderings. Thus, just as the

Jewish thought that the Torah was created before the world and the world for the sake of the Torah gains a more than parochial meaning through the account of the chariot, so too the "remnant" of Israel gains a universal meaning as the representative of the Shechinah. For here the suffering of the remnant is interpreted as a suffering for the sake of God, and conversely the remnant is seen as a bearer of God's sufferings. Between the Jewish God and the Jewish remnant, all of revelation is thus inserted and found wanting, and so points to the need for a redemption not just of Israel, but of the whole world.[80]

Finally, the relation of the Jewish "remnant" to the Jewish Law is bridged by the doctrine of the purpose of the myriad customs and prescriptions required of the Jewish man, as a unifying of God with His Shechinah in the world. According to this doctrine, the purpose of these customs and prescriptions is neither present satisfaction nor future reward, but for man to gather in the world the scattered sparks of the Godhead, Who is represented as a great Light. Thus, for example, the prescription for the daily confession of God's unity is itself represented as an act of unifying God -- an act which is still in progress, and so requires the human soul and hand in the world. The apparently narrow relation between the Jew and the Law is thus expanded in Jewish awareness to an act of redemption of God Himself, and so to a man-and world-redeeming truth.[81]

# FOOTNOTES

## NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung ("The Star of Redemption") (3 vols.; 2nd ed.; Frankfurt am Main: J. Kauffmann Verlag, 1930); hereafter this book will be referred to as Stern.

2. "Das neue Denken", ("The New Thinking"), in Kleinere Schriften ("Shorter Writings"). (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1937), pp.373-98; hereafter this collection of essays will be referred to as K.S.

3. K.S., p.374, with p.391.

4. K.S., pp.376-78.

5. K.S., p.380: "We know in the most precise way, we know with the intuitive knowledge of experience, what God taken by Himself, what man taken by himself, what the world taken by itself 'is'; if we did not know that, you could we talk about them and above all how could we 'reduce' any two to the other or dispute the possibility of reducing those two!" Cf. Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p.9.

6. K.S., p.378-87.

7. K.S., p.388-98.

8. Cf., e.g., the "Preface" to Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, as translated in Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p.390. Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a20 et seq.

9. Else Freund, Die Existenzphilosophie Franz Rosenzweigs: Ein Beitrag zur Analyse seines Werks "Der Stern der Erlösung". ("The Existence-philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig: A Contribution to the Analysis of his Work 'The Star of Redemption'.") (2nd rev. ed.; Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1959), p.11; Karl Löwith, "M.Heidegger and Franz Rosenzweig: A Postscript to Being and Time," Nature, History and Existentialism: and Other Essays in the Philosophy of History, ed. with a critical intro. by Arnold Levison (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), esp. p.52; Julius Guttman, Philosophies of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig, intro. by R.J.Zwi Werblowski, trans. by David W. Silverman, Anchor Books (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966), pp.416 et seq.

10. Emil L. Fackenheim, "Schelling's Conception of Positive Philosophy", The Review of Metaphysics, VII (1954), p.567, n.9.

11. Hegel's "Preface" to The Phenomenology of the Spirit, as translated by Kaufmann, op. cit., p.408; bracketed additions mine.

12. Aristotle, Physics 192b8 et seq., with Metaphysics 981a13 et seq. Rosenzweig, K.S., pp.527-28. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ("Critique of Pure Reason"), e.g., B147, B161, B173, B175, A176 or B218, A567-68 or B595-96, A764-65 or B792-93.

## NOTES TO PART I

1. Compare Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies. (Glencoe, III: The Free Press, 1959), pp.40, 44, 53-54, 172.

2. Franz Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.7-32 passim; K.S., p.359 et seq.

3. Consider Plato, Phaedo 61c-67b (especially 646-c), 97b et seq., 99d et seq.; with Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp.122-23.

4. Compare Aristotle's definition of the "whole" in Physics 207a9-15.

5. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.7-9. -- This conclusion is not wholly inescapable if one considers Professor Strauss' remark on the Platonic dialogue: "Each dialogue, we venture to say, abstracts from something that is most important to the subject matter of the dialogue. If this is so, the subject matter as presented in the dialogue is strictly speaking impossible. But the impossible is in the highest sense ridiculous or, as we are in the habit of saying, comical." See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1964), p.62. But see also infra, note 10.

6. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.9-11.

7. Compare, e.g., Emil L. Fackenheim, "Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy", in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. by Vergilius Ferm (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), pp.174, 179 et seq.

8. Compare, e.g., Judah Halevi, The Kuzari (Kitab al Khazari): An Argument for the Faith of Israel, intro. by Henry Slonimsky, trans. by Hartwig Hirschfeld (New York: Schocken Books, 1964) V, 1, p.248.

9. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.11-12. -- Rosenzweig refers here to Hegel, and especially to Hegel's philosophy of religion; for a brief analysis of Hegel's philosophy of religion which owes much to Rosenzweig's analysis, see Emil L. Fackenheim, "Samuel Hirsch and Hegel: A Study of Hirsch's Religionsphilosophie der Juden (1842)", in Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual History, ed. by Alexander Altmann, Philip W. Lown Institute of Advanced Judaic Studies, Brandeis University, Studies and Texts: Volume II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), especially pp.71-75.

10. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.12-13; K.S., pp.357 et seq. -- Rosenzweig refers to Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel; consider especially Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp.16 et seq.: "...the systematic philosopher...says with speculative emphasis: 'Not until we reach the end of our exposition will everything become clear'...However,...it is ridiculous to treat everything as if the system were complete, and then to say at the end that the conclusion is lacking. If the conclusion is lacking at the end, it is also lacking in the beginning, and this should therefore have been said in the beginning."

11. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.15-17. Compare the account of Aristotle's doctrine of the relationship between ethics and the political community and the whole in Harry V. Jaffa, "Aristotle", in History of Political Philosophy, ed. by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1965), especially pp.68-72 and 127-28.

12. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.17-22. -- Compare Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis ("Logic of Pure Cognition"), (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1902), p.79 et seq.

13. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.22-28. -- For Thales see Aristotle, On the Soul 411a7 et seq.

14. For these last four paragraphs, compare Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.28-32; and K.S., pp.359 et seq. -- For Aristotle, see Nichomachean Ethics 109rb12 et seq. Rosenzweig mentions that he modifies the concept of the differential found in the writings of his teacher, Hermann Cohen; see, e.g., Cohen, op. cit., pp.69 et seq.; compare Julius Guttmann, op.cit., p.424. For Hegel's discussion of the differential, see Hegel's Science of Logic, trans by W. H. Johnston and J. G. Struthers, The Muirhead Library of Philosophy (2 vols.: London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1929; New York: The MacMillan Company, 1929), I, pp.272 et seq.

15. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.33-36.

16. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.37-39. -- Rosenzweig indicates that he derives the symbols A, B, A=A, etc., from Fichte; K.S., p.360.

17. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.39-42.

18. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.42-46.

19. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.46-48.

20. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.51-52. -- See infra, note 29.

21. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.52-54.

22. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.55-57.

23. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.57-59

24. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.60-61.

25. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.62-68. -- For a similar analysis and discussion of the relation between life and thinking awareness, based however on a distinction between the animate and the inanimate which we cannot reproduce here, see Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), passim.

26. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.69-72. -- For a profound modern philosophical confrontation with Aristotle, which centers on this point, see G.R.G.Mure, Aristotle, A Galaxy Book (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), especially p.14 et seq. passim; see also Jacob Klein, "Aristotle, An Introduction", in Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, ed. by Joseph Cropsey, New York and London: Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1964), especially pp.64-66.

27. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.72-75. -- For a recognition of the need for modern thought to confront Aristotle on these points, see Emil L. Fackenheim, review of The Politics of Aristotle, trans. with intro. and notes by Ernest Barker, The Review of Metaphysics, I (1947), especially p.97, n.8. For a brief account of Aristotle's doctrine of the relation between man and citizen, see especially Harry V. Jaffa, op.cit., pp.98-100. See also Mure, op.cit., pp.136 and 157-62.

28. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.75-76.

29. Rosenzweig, Stern, I. p.80. -- Rosenzweig often prefers the word "plastic", which however has other connotations in contemporary English idiom, to the word "figured" or "figurative". Concerning this and other concepts which we have called aesthetic, one may note the following remark by Mure, op.cit., p.136, n.1: "Aristotle...does not,on the whole, think of both sense-perception and imagination as arising out of mere presentation..., and of imagination as therefore capable of an aesthetic development not in immediate connexion with sense-perception". One may contrast the view of Hegel as stated by Edgar Wind, Art and Anarchy (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), p.12 et seq.

30. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.80-81.

31. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.82-83.

32. Rosenzweig, Stern, I. pp.83-86.

33. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.86-88.

34. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.88-97.

35. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.100-105. -- For an awareness of the relationship between what is said and what is left unsaid by the hero in one Greek tragedy, compare Seth Bernadete, "Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus", in Ancients and Moderns, especially pp.5 et seq. For an analysis of a profound modern confrontation with Greek drama similar to Rosenzweig's see Emil L. Fackenheim, "Schelling's Philosophy of the Literary Arts", The Philosophical Quarterly, IV (1954), pp.310-326, especially pp.320 et seq.

36. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.105-107.

37. Rosenzweig, Stern, I, p.108.

38. For this whole section, compare Rosenzweig, Stern, I, pp.109-118, and K.S. pp.359 et seq., with Emil L. Fackenheim, "Schelling's Conception of Positive Philosophy", The Review of Metaphysics, VII (1954), pp.563-582.

## NOTES TO PART II

1. Rosenzweig, Stern, II, pp.7-8.
2. Ibid., pp.8-13.
3. Ibid., pp.13-15.
4. Ibid., pp.15-20
5. Ibid., pp.20-21.
6. Ibid., pp.21-24.
7. Ibid., pp.24-27.
8. Ibid., pp.27-30.
9. Ibid., pp.31-32.
10. Ibid., pp.32-33.
11. Ibid., p.33.
12. Ibid., pp.33-34
13. Ibid., pp.34-35.
14. Ibid., pp.35-36.
15. Ibid., pp.39-40.
16. Ibid., pp.40-41.
17. Ibid., pp.41-42.
18. Ibid., pp.42-43.
19. Ibid., p.43.
20. Ibid., pp.43-44.
21. Ibid., pp.49-50.
22. Ibid., p.50.
23. Ibid., pp.50-51.
24. Ibid., pp.51-53.

25. Ibid., p.54.
26. Ibid., pp.54-56.
27. Ibid., pp.56-57.
28. Ibid., p.57.
29. Ibid., pp.57-59.
30. Ibid., p.59.
31. Ibid., p.60.
32. Ibid., pp.77-78.
33. Ibid., pp.78-79.
34. Ibid., pp.79-80.
35. Ibid., pp.80-81.
36. Ibid., p.82.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., pp.82-83.
39. Ibid., pp.83-84.
40. Ibid., pp.84-85.
41. Ibid., p.85.
42. Ibid., pp.85-86.
43. Ibid., p.86.
44. Ibid., pp.86-87.
45. Ibid., p.87. -- Cf. A Rabbinic Anthology, selected and arranged with commentaries and introductions by C[laude] G. Montefiore and H[erbert] Loewe, Meridian Books (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1963; Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1963), pp.305 and 542; hereafter this anthology will be referred to as R.A.
46. Ibid., pp.88-89.
47. Ibid., pp.89-90.
48. Ibid., pp.90-92.

49. Ibid., pp.92-96.
50. Ibid., pp.96-97.
51. Ibid., pp.97-99.
52. Ibid., p.102.
53. Ibid.,
54. Ibid., pp.102-03.
55. Ibid., pp.103-04.
56. Ibid., pp.104-05.
57. Ibid., pp.105-08.
58. Ibid., pp. 110-11.
59. Ibid., pp.111-12.
60. Ibid., p.112.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p.113.
63. Ibid., pp.113-14.
64. Ibid., pp.114-15.
65. Ibid., p.115.
66. Ibid., p.116.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., pp.117-18.
69. Ibid., pp.118-20.
70. Ibid., pp.120-21.
71. Ibid., pp.121-22.
72. Ibid., pp. 122-24.
73. Ibid., p.124.
74. Ibid., p.125.

75. Ibid., pp.126-27.
76. Ibid., p.127.
77. Ibid., pp.127-29.
78, Ibid., pp.133-36.
79. Ibid., pp.136-39.
80. Ibid., pp.139-40.
81. Ibid., pp.141-42.
82. Ibid., p.143.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., pp.146-48.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., pp.147-48.
87. Ibid., pp.149-50.
88. Ibid., p.150.
89. Ibid., pp.150-51. --Cf. R.A., p.279.
90. Ibid., p.152. -- Cf. R.A., p.172.
91. Ibid., pp.152-53.
92. Ibid., pp.154-60.
93. Ibid., pp.160-63.
94. Ibid., p.163.
95. Ibid., pp.163-64.
96. Ibid., pp.164-65.
97. Ibid., p.168.
98. Ibid., pp.168-69.
99. Ibid., pp.169-71.
100. Ibid., p.171.

101. Ibid., pp.172-73.
102. Ibid., p.173.
103. Ibid., pp.174-76.
104. Ibid., pp.176-77.
105. Ibid., p.177.
106. Ibid., pp.181-82.
107. Ibid., pp.182-85.
108. Ibid., p.185.
109. Ibid., pp.185-86.
110. Ibid., pp.186-87.
111. Ibid., pp.187-88.
112. Ibid., pp.188-89.
113. Ibid., pp.189-90.
114. Ibid., p.190.
115. Ibid., pp.190-91.
116. Ibid., pp.191-92.
117. Ibid., pp.192-93.
118. Ibid., p.193.
119. Ibid., pp.193-94.
120. Ibid., p.194.
121. Ibid., pp.194-95.
122. Ibid., p.195.
123. Ibid., p.196.
124. Ibid., pp.196-97.
125. Ibid., pp.197-99.
126. Ibid., p.199.
127. Ibid.

128. Ibid., pp.199-200.

129. Ibid., pp.200-02.

130. Ibid., pp.202-04.

131. Ibid., p.204.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., p.205

134. Ibid., pp.205-06.

135. Ibid., pp.206-07.

136. Ibid., pp.207-08.

137. Ibid., pp.208-10.

138. Ibid., pp.210-11.

139. Ibid., pp.210-12.

140. Ibid., p.212.

141. Ibid., pp.212-13.

142. Ibid., p.213 -- Cf. R.A., p.607.

143. Ibid., pp.214-18.

144. Ibid., pp.218-20.

145. Ibid., pp.220-21.

146. Ibid., p.221.

147. Ibid., pp.222-23.

## NOTES TO PART III

1. Rosenzweig, Stern, III, pp.7-8. A translation of Stern, III, pp.7-16 by Steven S. Schwarzschild may be found entitled "On Temptation", Judaism: A Quarterly Journal, XVI (1967), pp.90-96.

2. Ibid. Cf. R.A., p.359 along with The Authorized Daily Prayer Book, Hebrew Text, English translation with commentary and notes by Joseph H. Hertz (rev. ed.; New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1948) pp.24-25. Hereafter this edition of the Jewish prayer book will be referred to as P.B.

3. Stern, III, pp.8-9.

4. Ibid., pp.9

5. Ibid., pp.9-10.

6. Ibid., p.10

7. Ibid., p.11.

8. Ibid., pp.11-12.

9. Ibid., p.12.

10. Ibid., p.13.

11. Ibid., p.14.

12. Ibid., pp.14-15.

13. Ibid., pp.15-16.

14. Ibid., p.16.

15. Ibid., pp.16-17.

16. Ibid., pp.17-19.

17. Ibid., pp.19-20.

18. Ibid., pp.20 et seq. and 37-38.

19. Ibid., p.38.

20. Ibid., pp.38-39.

21. Ibid., pp.39-40.

22. Ibid., pp.40-41.

23. Ibid., pp.41-42.

24. Ibid., pp.42-43.

25. Ibid., pp.40-46

26. Ibid., p.48. Cf. P.R. pp.486-87. A translation of most of Stern, III, pp.48-96, may be found in Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought, presented by Nahum N. Glatzer (2nd rev. ed.; New York: Schocken Books, 1961) pp.292-341 passim; Henceforth this translation will be referred to alongside references to Stern as F.R.

27. Stern, III, pp.48-49; F.R., pp.293-94.

28. Stern, III, pp.49-50; F.R., pp.294-95.

29. Stern, III, pp.50-51; F.R., pp.295-96.

30. Stern, III, pp.51-52; F.R., pp.296-97.

31. Stern, III, pp.52-53; F.R., pp.297-99.

32. Stern, III, pp.54-55; F.R., pp.299-300.

33. Stern, III, pp.55-56; F.R., pp.300-301.

34. Stern, III, pp.57-59; F.R., pp.302-04.

35. Stern, III, p.59; F.R., pp.304-05. Cf. P.B., e.g., pp.162-67 and 984 et seq.

36. Stern, III, pp.59-60; F.R., pp.305-06.

37. Stern, III, pp.60-61; F.R., pp.306-07. Cf. P.B., pp.748-49.

38. Stern, III, p.61; F.R., p.307.

39. Stern, III, pp.61-62; F.R., pp.308-09.

40. Stern, III, pp.63-64; F.R., pp.309-10. Cf. P.B., pp.408-09.

41. Stern, III, pp.64-67; F.R., pp.310-13. Cf. P.B., 408-09, 486-87, 558-63 with 438-39 and R.A., p.3.

42. Stern, III, pp.67-69; F.R., pp.314-16.

43. Stern, III, pp.69-71; F.R. pp.316-18.

44. Stern, III, pp.71-72; F.R., pp.318-19. Cf. Israel Passover Haggadah, arr. and ed. by Menachem M. Kasher (New York: Shengold Publishers, Inc , 1964), pp.152 et seq.

45. Stern, III, pp.72-74; F.R., pp.319-21.

46. Stern, III, pp.74-75; F.R., ;.32.

47. Stern, III, pp.75-78; F.R., pp.323-25.

48. Stern, III, pp.78-80; F.R., pp.326-28.

49. Stern, III, pp.80-81; F.R., pp.328-29. Cf. P.B., pp.870-71 with, e.g., 210-11.

50. Stern, III, pp.81-83; F.R., pp.329-31. Cf. P.B., pp.906-21.

51. Stern, III, pp.84-85; F.R., pp.333-34. Cf. P.B., pp.936-37.

52. Stern, III, p.86; F.R. p.334.

53. Stern, III, pp.155-56.

54. Ibid., p.156. Cf. supra, pp.106-10.

55. Stern, III, pp.156-57.

56. Ibid., pp.157-58.

57. Ibid., pp 158-59.

58. Ibid., pp.159-60.

59. Ibid., pp.160-61.

60. Ibid., pp.161-62.

61. Ibid., p.162.

62. Ibid., pp.162-63.

63. Ibid., p.163.

64. Ibid., pp.163-65.

65. Ibid., pp.165-66.

66. Ibid., pp.166-67.

67. Ibid., pp.167-70.

68. Ibid., pp.170-71.

69. Ibid., pp.171-72.

70. Ibid., pp.172-74.

71. Ibid., p.174.

72. Cf. ibid., pp.200 ad fin.

73. Ibid., pp.184-85. Cf. R.A., pp.362 et seq.

74. Stern, III, pp.185-87; F.R., pp.360-62. Cf. R.A., p.379.

75. Stern, III, pp.187-89; Cf. R.A. pp.41 and 142.

76. Stern, III, pp.189-90.

77. Ibid., pp.190-91.

78, Ibid., p.191. Cf. R.A., p.127.

79. Stern, III, pp.191-92.

80. Ibid., pp.192-93.

81. Ibid., pp.193-94. Cf. R.A., pp.105 and 127. Vide supra, note 41.

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